

RĀNĪRĪ AND THE WUJŪDIYYAH OF 17th CENTURY

ACHEH

A critical study of Nūru'l-Dīn al-Rānīrī's refutation of Ḥamzah Fansūrī's mystical philosophy, based on Rānīrī's Hujjatu'l-Siddiq li daf'i'l-Zindiq and Tibyan fi Ma'rifati'l-Adyan and other Malay sources.

by

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# PREFACE

The subject of this thesis is a critical study of Nūru'l-Dīn al-Rānīrī's refutation of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī's mystical philosophy, based on two of Rānīrī's works: the Ḥujjatu'l-Siddīq li daf'ī'l-Zindīq (Maxwell Text no. 93, Royal Asiatic Society, London), and the Tibyān fī Ma'rifati'l-Adyān (Leiden Text cod. or. 3291), both of which have been reproduced in facsimile in Voorhoeve's Twee Maleise Geschriften van Nūruddīn ar-Rānīrī (1955); and on the works of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī containing various collections of mystical poems and two prose works: the Asrāru'l-'Ārifīn and the Sharābu'l-'Āshiqīn or Zīnātu'l-Muwahhīdīn, all of which have been edited and transliterated into the Roman script and bound in a single volume by Doorenbos in De Geschriften van Hamzah Pansoeri (1933). None of Rānīrī's two works mentioned above - or his other extant works for that matter - have been edited and transliterated in Romanized form, nor have they - including the works of Ḥamzah referred to - been translated into English or any other language. In this study I have made a Romanized Malay edition of the text of the Ḥujjatu'l-Siddīq li daf'ī'l-Zindīq including an English translation of it.

As far as I am aware, this is the first thesis on the subject dealing with a detailed study of the mystical controversy between Rānīrī and Ḥamzah, and it is the second thesis on studies in Malay mysticism written for an English-speaking university.<sup>1</sup> Otherwise

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1 The first being the doctoral dissertation of A.H. Johns (published in the Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 30, pt. 2, August 1957).

work in this field has been the preserve of Dutch scholars. To the best of my knowledge there has yet been no work done on Rānīrī insofar as his refutation of Ḥamzah's mystical philosophy is concerned, nor work on Ḥamzah's teachings with a view to bringing together for close comparison the ideas of these two men who have played so significant a role in the life of the people of their time, as is here attempted.

Scholars in Indonesian and Malay studies seem to have taken for granted as true Rānīrī's representation of Ḥamzah's beliefs and teachings. They believe in Rānīrī's claim to being an exponent of "orthodox mysticism," and in Rānīrī's denunciation of Ḥamzah as a "heretical pantheist" and of his teachings as "heresies." Thus, for example, we find a great scholar in Malay studies such as Winstedt succumbing to Rānīrī's persuasive influence in interpreting Ḥamzah's mystical philosophy as mere materialistic pantheism:

For Ḥamzah God includes heat and cold, good and evil, the Ka'bah and idolatrous temples. All lies potential in the Divine Being like the seed in the tree. If heat and cold, good and evil, were not always immanent in God, then He could not be called perfect.<sup>2</sup>

Even in the most recent observation in connection with Ḥamzah's mystical philosophy we find it said that:

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2 Winstedt, R.O., A History of Classical Malay literature, Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 31, pt.3, June 1958, p. 118.

There is not sufficient primary material available to be absolutely certain of the standpoint of the various authors concerned, even in regard to the works of Hamzah and Shamsu'l-Dīn, although it seems safe to say they were Pantheists of an extreme kind.<sup>3</sup>

It is the veracity of what has been reported as Ḥamzah's beliefs and teachings as conveyed to us by Rānīrī and all those who agree with him that I now challenge, for from what I understand of Ḥamzah's mystical philosophy, I contend that for the most part - and a damaging one at that - the reports and presentations are distortions and caricatures of what Ḥamzah actually says and means. It is therefore with reason that I now suggest we no longer continue to consign him to the company of that uncultured and antinomian brand of pedestrian 'Ṣūfīs' whom Rānīrī calls the Heretical or Deviating Wujūdiyyah, for as Sa'dī would say, if dust were blown to the heavens it would still be dust; and if gold were cast into the dung-heap, gold it still would be!

I have selected Rānīrī's Hujjatu'l-Ṣiddīq li daf'i'l-Zindīq for translation as I think this work reveals the nature of Rānīrī's concepts of Being, Existence, Essence. These are key concepts in his polemics against the heretical Wujūdiyyah mystics and against Ḥamzah. The Romanized Malay edition and English translation appears respectively in chapters six and seven of this study. The edition and translation have been briefly annotated to throw some light on

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3     Johns, op. cit., p. 30.

the meaning of the text and to convey critical comments on the text. The system of transliteration of Arabic characters that I adopt throughout this study is as follows:-

(a) Consonants:

ا = a	ع = ʿ	ب = b	ت = t	ث = th
ج = j	ح = ḥ	خ = kh	د = d	ذ = dh
ر = r	ز = z	س = s	ش = sh	ص = ṣ
ض = ḍ	ط = ṭ	ظ = ṣ	ع = ʿ	غ = gh
ف = f	ق = q	ك = k	ل = l	م = m
ن = n	و = w	ه = h	ي = y	

(b) Long vowels: ا or آ = ā; و = ū; ي = ī

(c) Short vowels: َ = a; ُ = u; ِ = i

(d) Diphthongs: اَو = aw; اَي = ay; اِيَّ (final form ī) = iyy (final form ī)  
 اُوَّ = uww (final form ū)

(e) Others: ة = ah (as in ma'rifah) and at (as in ma'rifatu);  
 ال (article) = al or 'l

Throughout this study and in chapter six in particular, the system of Romanized Malay spelling is not the same as that still officially used in Malay schools and textbooks in the Malay Peninsula. I am following closely the system adopted by the Kongres Bahasa dan Persuratan Melayu III. In this system, the pepet sign (◌ْ) and hyphens (except in cases of repetition of words usually denoting plurals and emphases) are dropped out, and the spelling is more phonetic. Thus, for example, sa-suatu is spelled

sesuatu; di-perolěh-nya is spelled diperolehnya - and so on. In chapters six and seven, numerals in brackets ( (1) ) indicate Rānīrī's notes to the written text on the margin of the manuscript; numerals without brackets are my notes continued in the usual order from the preceding chapters; numerals in square brackets ([1]) indicate paging of the manuscript; a word or words in square brackets ([one]) denotes conjecture; a letter or letters in square brackets ([o]) indicates missing letters in either the correct spelling, or the modern form of spelling, such as, for an example of the latter, terbunyi (archaic) and ter[sem]bunyi (modern form); memantah (archaic) and men[b]antah (modern form). Arabic words occurring in the Malay text, and words of Arabic origin which have become common Malay usage are spelled according to the Arabic form following the system of transliteration into Arabic characters here adopted. Thus words now regarded as part of common Malay usage such as maksud, kaum, alam, dunia, are Romanized with the addition of diacritical marks to indicate their original Arabic derivation as maqṣūd, qawm, ‘ālam, and dunyā.

## CHAPTER I

Introduction: The historical background

Trade has been going on in the Indonesian Archipelago since ancient times, linking it with the various parts of Asia and with the Middle East and the lands of the North. In Roman times, the Alexandrian geographer Ptolemy, who flourished in the year 160 of the Christian era, mentioned for the first time an area in the Archipelago, referring to it as the 'Golden Chersonese.' This prosperous land seems now to have been identified with the Malay Peninsula.<sup>1</sup> Along with trade came changing religions and various cultural elements imparting upon the people their distinctive impressions. Islām too had come via the trade route. Yet it seems strange that, when considering the fact that Arab and Muslim settlements had established themselves in Sumatra as early as 674,<sup>2</sup>

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1 The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque, Second Viceroy of India. With notes and introduction by Walter de Gray Birch. The Hakluyt Society, LII, LV, LXII, LXIX, London, 4 volumes, 1875-1884. Volume III, p. 71. Malacca and the Malay Peninsula is referred to as the Golden Chersonese. Camillio Portio in his Oration to Pope Leo X in 1515 on the capture of Malacca, extolls Malacca as the Golden Chersonese (ibid., pp. 169-187). Hereafter cited as Commentaries. See also Vlekke, B.H.M., Nusantara, a history of Indonesia, The Hague, 1959, p. 18. Hereafter cited as Vlekke.

2 See Arnold, T.W., The preaching of Islam, London, 1913, p. 364. Hereafter cited as Arnold.

and again in 878,<sup>3</sup> and in Java in 1082, in Champa in 1039,<sup>4</sup> in

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3 See Huzayyin, S.A., Arabia and the Far East, their commercial and cultural relations in Graeco-Roman and Irano-Arabian times, Cairo, 1942, pp. 274, 164. See also note 1 on p. 164. Hereafter cited as Huzayyin. In 878, following a troublesome rebellion which broke out in South China among the troops of the T'ang Emperor Hi-tsung (874-889), Mas'ūdī reported that about one hundred and twenty thousand, or two hundred thousand traders from the West comprising Muslims (the majority), Jews, Christians, and Parsees who had settled in what was known to the Arabs as Khanfu (Canton), were massacred (see Chau Ju-Kua: his works on the Chinese and Arab trade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, entitled Chu-fan-chi, translated and annotated by F. Hirth and W.W. Rockhill, St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 18. Hereafter cited as Chau Ju-Kua). Consequently the Muslim traders, who were mainly Arabs and Persians, left Canton and sought refuge in Kalah (Kedah) on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. This considerable emigration of the Muslim traders to the Malay Peninsula effected a transference of the entrepot for trade with the Chinese Empire from Canton to Kedah. We can reasonably assume that since the Muslims had quite a considerable settlement in Canton, enjoying a high degree of civil and religious autonomy (see reference to Chu Yu's work written between 1111 and 1117 in Chau Ju-Kua, pp. 16 and 17; notes 1 and 2 on p. 16, and notes 1 and 2 on p. 17), they must have perpetuated their mode of settlement and social organization in Kedah and San-fo-tsi (Palembang) in east Sumatra, whither they had similarly migrated. This event seems to have marked the beginning of the coming of Islām in these areas. We may imagine - if we accept our assumption that the Muslims established settlements similar to those in Canton and elsewhere in South China - that the Muslims coupled trading with missionary activities; especially in the coastal areas which were their ports of call and trading centres.

4 Krom, N.J., Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis, The Hague, second edition, 1931, p. 452 and notes 5 and 6. Cited in van Leur, J.C., Indonesian trade and society, The Hague, 1955, p. 168.

the Malay Peninsula in 878<sup>5</sup> and in 1302,<sup>6</sup> we discern little missionary activity when compared with the spread of missionary activity among the Muslims at the end of the thirteenth century; and that this activity, which in the fourteenth century increased in momentum, dominated the entire Archipelago in the fifteenth century. The reason is that, so Schrieke believes,<sup>7</sup> a race with Christianity was going on; and the coming of the Portuguese, who took upon themselves with extreme zeal the "privilege allowed them through the extraordinary blessing of God"<sup>8</sup> to exterminate the Muslims, accelerated the process. Had death not overtaken him, Albuquerque planned to seek the land of the legendary Prester John, which he presumably thought lay in Africa near the Nile. Having crossed the small range of hills from the Red Sea to the Nile, Albuquerque planned to divert the waters of the Nile and ruin Egypt. Then he dreamed of fitting out an expedition of four hundred horsemen galloping from the eastern shores of the Red Sea

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5 See above note 3.

6 See Paterson, H.S., An early inscription from Trengganu, Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (JMBRAS), 1924, vol. 2, pt. 3, pp. 252-258. See also Blagden, C.O., A note on the Trengganu inscription, JMBRAS, 1924, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 258-264.

7 Schrieke, B., Indonesian sociological studies, The Hague, 1955-1957, parts I and II. Cited hereafter as Schrieke I and Schrieke II respectively. Schrieke II, p. 232.

8 Schrieke quoting Barros, Schrieke I, p. 39.

to Makkah to sack and make a stable of the Ka'bah, then to raze it to the ground. From there the horsemen would rush upon Madīnah, exhume the Prophet's bones to trade them for Jerusalem.<sup>9</sup> The Portuguese adventure in world politics succeeded to a certain extent in crippling the economy of some Muslim countries - particularly Egypt. There was no need for Albuquerque to divert the waters of the Nile to ruin Egypt, for in 1511 when he captured Malacca, trade from the Archipelago was diverted round the Cape of Good Hope to European ports. This was one of the main causes for the downfall of the Mamlūks (another one being the discovery of America which also diverted world trade). From the point of view of trade, the Golden Age for Egypt seems to be not during the time of the Fāṭimīs, but during the period of the Mamlūks (1250-1517) when the transit trade from the Spice Islands and the Archipelago was thriving briskly. To indicate the grave economic loss suffered by the Mamlūks by virtue of Portuguese interference in their transit trade, it would be worthwhile to point out that according to Becker, gold to the value of about 420,000 pounds passed through Egypt at that time each year.<sup>10</sup>

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9 Commentaries IV, pp. 36-37.

10 Cited in Schrieke I, p. 10, from Becker's work on the economic history of Muslim Egypt to be found in his Islamstudien, pp. 214, 186.

The spices involved in the trade were so much in demand in Europe, where they were used not only in kitchens but in apothecaries as well. But ironically enough, just as the destruction of Baghdād and of the Khilāfat by Hūlāgū and his Mongols in 1258 diverted world trade from 'Irāq to Egypt,<sup>11</sup> and contributed to promoting the rise of Muslim trade in the East, so did the attack on Muslim trade in the East contribute in influencing the rise of Islām there. The spread of Islām would appear to have begun at the same time as that of the Portuguese. The Portuguese's role was that of an extension of the Crusades between Islām and Christianity, and trade competition between Muslims and Christians.

However, one point of Schrieke's thesis is unacceptable to me as I think the arguments marshalled in support of it are inadequate. This is his magnification of the role of Christianity and the Portuguese in bringing about the rise of Islām in the Archipelago. As a result of this the importance of Malacca's role as the centre whence Islamic propaganda and missionary

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11 Since the rise of the Fātimīs, trade was diverted from 'Irāq to Egypt; and even more so after the destruction of Baghdād. During the period of the 'Abbāsīs, the trade route used to be from the Persian Gulf via Baghdād to the Mediterranean ports. Furthermore, it should be noted that the conquest of southern Palestine by the Franks in the twelfth century had resulted in diverting the spice trade route in Egypt itself. Ras 'Ilba on the Red Sea across from Jiddah became the port of the Indian transit trade. From there it followed through the desert to Qush in Upper Egypt and via the Nile to Fustāṭ and thence to Alexandria, whence it reached the European ports. See Huzayyin, map no. 9, facing p. 168.

activity radiated to the extremities of the Archipelago is relegated to the background. Schrieke himself knows that before the sixteenth century Islām had already spread to many parts of the Archipelago. In the earlier centuries Pasai had supplied the missionaries, but when Malacca became the centre of Muslim trade and learning in the fifteenth century, Islām spread more rapidly. It was the prosperity and brilliance of Malacca that made it the headquarters for the Muslim missionary invasion of Java. Hence the saying: 'Java was converted in Malacca.' All this happened long before the Portuguese appeared on the scene. Yet to Schrieke "so little progress was made by Islām before the sixteenth century"! I do not see how it is "impossible to understand the spread of Islām in the Archipelago unless one takes into account the antagonism between the Muslim traders and the Portuguese" when that spread of Islām had begun before the Portuguese even came. It seems to me quite possible indeed to understand the spread of Islām in the Archipelago as a process that had already begun (though naturally slowly at first) in the early fourteenth century and increased its momentum in the fifteenth century, dominating the sixteenth century not so much because of a "race with Christianity" but because - and I do not want to imply that I am necessarily a disciple of Plekhanov - the momentum of the historical process must inevitably be increased as it progresses. Whether or not the Portuguese appeared then on the scene would not

have made that much difference as Schrieke maintains, for Islām by then would still have spread rapidly due to its own increasing progression. Viewed in this way it is easy to see how the Portuguese factor can be easily magnified at the expense of other more important ones. I do not doubt that the appearance of the Portuguese and Christianity must have some effect on the historical process of the spread of Islām in the Archipelago, but I certainly doubt that their role was as big as Schrieke makes it out to be. The Muslims, then, had a good start of more than a century in spreading Islām in the Archipelago, and there was really no "race" with the Portuguese; they had established centres in Pasai in north Sumatra and in Malacca long before the Portuguese appeared on the scene. When Malacca was captured by the Portuguese, the Muslims moved their centres to Aceh in north Sumatra and Banten in west Java, and to Ternate in the Moluccas. Thus Pasai, Malacca, and Aceh in turn became centres of international trade. This period of economic power and prosperity of the Muslim port towns corresponded - as has always been the case in these areas - with intellectual and religious achievements which radiated from there to all the other parts of the Archipelago. The Sultāns' courts were thronged with, in most cases, foreign scholars and mystics. In the Archipelago, Islām had come, contrary to what seemed to be the case in other lands, through the channel of trade and

missionary zeal. Sufism had eased the way for it, and the Tarīqahs carried the propaganda skilfully. The Walīs conveyed the spiritual message effectively and Makkah wielded the mystic influence. Apart from the scholars and mystics, there flourished also the administrators - the Shāhbandars who not only represented a link between Islām and the royal courts, but between the courts and the outside world as well.<sup>12</sup>

According to the Malay chronicles, Islām first spread in the area now called Aceh through the missionary zeal of an Arab (who must have come via India) called 'Abdu'l-Lāh 'Ārif who came there in the beginning of the twelfth century.<sup>13</sup> It is related that the Sharīf of Makkah sent one Shaykh Ismā'īl and a small group of missionaries to Samudra to spread Islām there in the middle of the thirteenth century.<sup>14</sup> He succeeded in Perlak and from there moved on to Samudra where he converted the ruling king,

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12 For information about the various roles of the Shāhbandar, see Moreland, W.H., Shahbandar of the Eastern Seas, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS), 1920, pt. 4, pp. 517-535. See also Blagden, C.O., Shahbandar and Bendahara, JRAS, 1921, pt. 1, pp. 246-250.

13 See Arnold, p. 366.

14 Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai; a revised romanized version of Raffles MS 67, with an English translation, an introduction and notes by A.H. Hill, JMBRAS, vol. 33, pt. 2, 1960, p. 56. Hereafter cited as Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai.

Merah Silu, to Islām. The realms of Perlak and Samudra were then united under this king's rule and called Pasai. The king, whose Muslim title was al-Maliku'l-Ṣāliḥ, died in 1297. Marco Polo, visiting this part of Sumatra in 1292, witnessed the fact that the inhabitants were Muslims. During the reign of al-Maliku'l-Ẓāhir (who may have been the eldest son of al-Maliku'l-Ṣāliḥ) in the first half of the fourteenth century, Islamic learning was already flourishing in Pasai. It was the earliest centre of Islamic learning in the Archipelago. According to Ibn Baṭṭūṭah,<sup>15</sup> the Sulṭān was a lover of religious debates and discourses, and had himself surrounded by 'Ulamā' and Fuqahā'. He makes mention of several Fuqahā' from Persia who acted in the capacity of religious advisors to the Sulṭān and his sons. These may have been the ones he met when he stopped there in 1345-1346.<sup>16</sup> Ibn Baṭṭūṭah also mentioned that the Sulṭān was zealous in propagating the faith in the surrounding country by means of wars and raiding expeditions.<sup>17</sup> From the same source, we know too that the Sulṭān's court maintained close relations with the Indian courts

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<sup>15</sup> Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354; translated and selected by H.A.R. Gibb, London, 1953, p. 274. Hereafter cited as Ibn Baṭṭūṭah.

<sup>16</sup> Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, p. 273.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 274.

and was markedly Indian in character, with a court official who bore the Arab-Persian-Indian title of amīr.<sup>18</sup> During the period of religious transition in Java, Javanese scholars gathered in the court of Pasai, which had contributed towards the conversion of west Java by sending there Sunan Gunung Jati, one of the most illustrious missionaries in Java who became the founder of Banten and who converted Sundanese Java to Islām.<sup>19</sup> It was at the court of Pasai that in 1407 al-Muntaṣir, the great-great grandson of the last 'Abbāsī Khalīfah, died.<sup>20</sup> Sumatra in 1365 still owed nominal allegiance to Hayam Wuruk, the king of Majapahit, and Aceh in 1412 was still ruled by a Maharaja, but by 1416 Chinese sources reported that Aceh was already Muslim,<sup>21</sup> vigourously expanding her power by pushing further south.

In 1401, Parameswara, a Shailendra prince of the once great Shrivijaya (Palembang) who had married a Javanese princess of Majapahit, was fleeing Java because of political disturbances in east Java. He took refuge in Tumasik (Singapore) and, after slaying his host, took possession of the island. In 1402, the

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18 Ibid., p. 273. Ibn Baṭṭūṭah had been acquainted with the amīr when the latter had come as an envoy to the Sulṭān of Delhi (p. 274).

19 See Schrieke II, p. 238, 261.

20 See Winstedt, R.O., Early Muhammadan missionaries, Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (JSBRAS), 1920, no. 81, p. 5.

21 See Winstedt, R.O. and Wilkinson, R.J., History of Perak, JMBRAS, 1934, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 18. Hereafter cited as History of Perak.

murdered man's brother, who came from Pahang or Patani, drove Parameswara out of Tumasik. Fleeing up the Muar River, he finally settled in a fishing village and founded his kingdom of Malacca there.<sup>22</sup> By 1414, through marriage with a daughter of the Sultān of Pasai, Parameswara became a Muslim, styling himself Sultān Iskandar Shāh.<sup>23</sup> Malacca, due to its favourable position which eclipsed even old Shrivijaya and Malayu in the Sumatran mainland, expanded rapidly in the sphere of trade. It developed into an emporium, a rendezvous for traders and trading vessels that plied between ports of east Java and India carrying their precious spices from the Moluccas. Not only was Malacca an emporium where international trade was carried out at a brisk rate, it developed also into another centre of Islamic studies in the whole of the Archipelago. The development of Malacca into a great commercial centre and the propagation of Islām in that part of the world went hand in hand; and it would appear that in the latter case, Sufism had played a significant role in the process of islamization. In less than a century after Parames-

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22 Cf. Commentaries III, pp. 71-84.

23 That Parameswara, or Permaisura, was identical with Iskandar Shāh was shown by Winstedt in several places. Kern was earlier in holding this view. It was Tome Pires, a Portuguese accountant who wrote his Suma Oriental in Malacca and India between 1512 and 1515, who pointed out this fact. See Winstedt, R.O., The Malays, a cultural history, London, 1953, p. 34. See also his Malay chronicles from Sumatra and Malaya in Historians of South East Asia, edited by D.G.E. Hall, London, 1961, vol. II, p. 25.

wara became a Muslim, the theologians of the kingdom were already formulating religious questions and taking an active part in polemics in metaphysical matters, vying with those of Pasai.<sup>24</sup> In 'Abdu'l-Lāh ibn 'Abdu'l Qādir Munshī's edition of the Sejarah Melayu,<sup>25</sup> chapter twenty<sup>26</sup> relates that a certain Ṣūfī Shaykh at Makkah - Abū Ishāq by name - had written a book entitled Durru'l-Manzūm. This book, dealing with mysticism, was at first apparently written in two parts: the first part a discourse on the nature of the dhāt (essence), and the second on the nature of the ṣifāt (attributes) of God. Having completed this work, the Shaykh Abū Ishāq then instructed his disciple Abū Bakr to spread the knowledge in Malacca. Before taking leave of his Shaykh, however, Abū Bakr was said to have suggested to him to include in the book a discourse on the af'āl (works) of God, so

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24 See the article on the Pasai questions, JSBRAS, 1922, no. 86, pp. 264-265.

25 Edited by Situmorang, T.D. and Teeuw, A., Djakarta, 1958. Hereafter cited as Sejarah Melayu.

26 Pp. 168-173. See also Winstedt, R.O., The Malay annals, JMBRAS, 1938, vol. 16, pt. 3, p. 8; and A history of Malay literature, JMBRAS, 1940, vol. 17, pt. 3, p. 92.

that should he be asked questions pertaining to the af'āl of God, he would be well prepared. The Shaykh Abū Ishāq agreed to his disciple's suggestion and included the discourse required in his book. The completed book of three parts dealing with the essence, attributes, and works of God was taken to Malacca where both, the book and Mawlānā Abū Bakr, were received with great pomp and ceremony; drummed all the way to the Malaccan court. The Sultān of Malacca at the time, Manṣūr Shāh, himself took a keen interest in the study of the book and had it sent to Pasai to the Makhdūm Patakan, who was instructed to interpret its inner meanings. Sultān Manṣūr Shāh also sent Tun Bija Wangsa to Pasai, offering presents of gold, slave girls, and cockatoos for the solution of the problem as to whether those in heaven and hell enjoy or suffer eternally. At first Tun Bija Wangsa was told that they will dwell in heaven or in hell enjoying and suffering eternally, but since this was not the answer expected, he was privately given an esoteric answer: that the sufferings of the damned would be turned to pleasure. This answer reflects a teaching of 'Abdu'l-Karīm al-Jīlī, who was born in 1365-6 and probably died some time between 1406 and 1417.<sup>27</sup> Johns noted that Manṣūr Shāh ascended the throne in 1459 and that it is fair to assume that the contents of the Insānu'l-Kāmil and its author

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<sup>27</sup> See Nicholson, R.A., Studies in Islamic mysticism, Cambridge, 1921, pp. 136-137 and note 5. Hereafter cited as Nicholson. Cf. also Johns, A.H., Malay Sufism, as illustrated in an anonymous collection of seventeenth-century tracts, JMBRAS, 1957, vol. 30, pt. 2, p. 9. Hereafter cited as Johns.

were well known (at least in Pasai) well before it is referred to in the Sejarah Melayu, so that the possibility of the work being known in Indonesia within fifty years of its author's death is not unreasonable.<sup>28</sup> The foundations of Sufism had already been well laid in Malacca in 1488, and it is not a surprise for us to learn that the Sultān who reigned at that time was himself an enthusiast in Sufism. The Ṣūfī orders must have already been well established in the Archipelago - particularly in Pasai - between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for we could find men whose comprehension of the doctrines of the Ṣūfīs and of Muslim theology and metaphysics revealed a maturity found only within a society in which Sufism flourishes.

When in 1511 the Portuguese captured Malacca, Aceh rose rapidly as the most important Muslim commercial centre in the Archipelago, for the Muslim merchants and traders from Malacca had moved over and selected Aceh as their base in their trade with the Archipelago. Aceh became an important transit point for Muslim trade between Muslim lands in the North-West, India, and the Far East. In the early sixteenth century, under the first maker of Greater Aceh, Sultān 'Alī Mughāyat Shāh (d. 1530), Aceh had conquered several territories in the regions of southern Sumatra and in the eastern coastal regions; repulsed the Portuguese fleet under Ruy de Brito (1521); and expelled the Portuguese from their

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<sup>28</sup> Muslim mystics and historical writing, in Historians of South East Asia, edited by D. G. E. Hall, London, 1961, vol. II, p. 41.

fort at Acheh (1524) which they had occupied since 1521.<sup>29</sup> His successor, 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh al-Qahhār (d. 1568) raised the military prestige of Acheh still higher when in 1537 he made an incursion into the interior of central Sumatra - the Batak country - and conquered the territory. His mercenaries were said to have been hired from Turkey, Abyssinia, Gujerat, and Malabar. The tenth Sulṭān from 'Alī Mughāyat Shāh was also named 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh. He reigned from 1589-1604. The opulence of his court is illustrated by the descriptions of those who came there. Queen Elizabeth greeted him as "our loving brother" in her letter which Sir James Lancaster conveyed to his court where diplomats as well as mystics were welcome. The Englishmen came to anchor in the Road of Acheh on the 5th of June, 1602 about five miles off the city. They found about eighteen other ships of different nations - from Gujerat, Malabar, Bengal, Calicut, Pegu, Patani, and even the Red Sea.<sup>30</sup> On the 8th of June, the Sulṭān sent to fetch Lancaster:

... sixe great elephants, with many trumpets, drums and streamers, with much people to accompany the generall to the court, so that the presse was exceeding great. The biggest of these elephants was about thirteene or fourteene foote high, which had a small castle, like a coach upon his back, couered with crimson veluet. In

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29 History of Perak, p. 18.

30 The voyages of Sir James Lancaster, Kt., to the East Indies, edited by C.R. Markham, The Hakluyt Society, LVI, London, 1877, p. 74. Hereafter cited as Voyages.

the middle thereof was a great bason of gold, and a peece of silke exceeding richly wrought to couer it, vnder which her Majesties letter was put. The generall was mounted vpon another of the elephants; some of his attendants rode, others went a foote. But when he came to the court gate, there a nobleman stayed the generall, till he had gone in to know the kings further pleasure. But presently the said nobleman returned, and willed the generall to enter in. And when the generall came to the kings presence, he made his obeysance after the manner of the country, declaring that hee was sent from the most mightie Queene of England to congratulate with his hignesse and treat with concerning a peace and amitie with his Maiestie, if it pleased him to entertaine the same.<sup>31</sup>

Lancaster presented the Sultān a silver basin with a fountain in the midst of it, a great silver cup, a rich looking glass, a plumed head-piece, a case of daggers, a richly wrought and embroidered sword-belt and a feather fan. In the banquet that followed all the dishes in which the meat was served were of pure gold and some of gold alloy. After the banquet, the Sultān caused his dancing girls to perform, richly attired and adorned with bracelets and jewels. Lancaster was presented with a fine white robe of calico richly wrought with gold, a girdle of Turkish work, and two keris. When Lancaster presented himself at court again to negotiate a treaty of peace and friendship between England and Acheh, the Sultān sent two noblemen on his behalf to discuss the matter with Lancaster.

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31 Voyages, p. 76.

The one of these noblemen was the chiefe bishope of the realme, a man of great estimation with the king and all the people; and so he well deserued, for he was a man very wise and temperate. The other one was one of the most ancient nobilitie, a man of very good grauitie but not so fit to enter into those conferences as the bishop was.<sup>32</sup>

It has been suggested that the "chiefe bishope of the realme" may have been Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī the mystic,<sup>33</sup> or it may have been Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī.<sup>34</sup> It seems to me that the other man mentioned may have been Ḥamzah, who was actually in Aceh at this time, for in one of his poems (undated) he indicates that it was composed during the "season of white men"<sup>35</sup> referring no doubt either to the Dutch or to the English who appeared on the scene at this time.

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32 Ibid., p. 81.

33 See Van Nieuwenhuijze, C.A.O., Samsu'l-Dīn van Pasai, Leiden, 1945, p. 18. Hereafter cited as Van Nieuwenhuijze. Pertinent references to Shaykh Shamsu'l-Dīn in the Hikayat Aceh seem to confirm the view that Shamsu'l-Dīn was in fact the 'chiefe bishope of the realme.' See Teuku Iskandar, De Hikajat Atjeh, 's-Gravenhage, N.V. De Nederlandsche Boek -en Steendrukkerij v.h. H.L. Smits, 1959, pp. 137, 153, 168. Hereafter cited as Hikayat Aceh. Shamsu'l-Dīn bore the Ottoman title of Shayku'l-Islām. The Dong Dawis mentioned on p. 136 was none other than John Davis, the great Arctic navigator who had visited the Achehnese court in his voyage to the East Indies in a Dutch ship in 1593.

34 See Schrieke II, p. 393, note 149.

35 De Geschriften van Hamzah Pansoeri, by J. Doorenbos, Leiden, 1933, p. 118. Hereafter cited as Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī.

The term 'orang putih' could not have referred to the Portuguese who would have been called Pertugali or Peringgi (from Ar. faranjī); rather even to this day it refers to Englishmen.

Acheh had grown so great and famous on account of her prosperity that Francois Pyrard, describing conditions in 1602, writes that:

All people in the Indies or on the other side of the Cape of Good Hope, when they go to Sumatra, merely say that they are going to Achen: for this city and port has acquired the name and reputation of the island.<sup>36</sup>

In Sulṭān Iskandar Muda, who reigned from 1607 to 1636, Acheh reached its zenith in military as well as commercial power. Iskandar Muda conquered Perak and sacked Johore, and with the exception of Java and the eastern parts of the Archipelago, held sway over the rest. When Captain Best visited Acheh in 1612, he saw Iskandar Muda "a gallant man of warre, of thirty two yeares, of middle size, full of spirit"; fond of smoking the huqqah and watching cock fights and fights between elephants, rams, and tigers. His splendid court was fashioned after that of the Mogul court.<sup>37</sup> When the Sulṭān went to the Friday prayers, it is said that:

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<sup>36</sup> The voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil; translated by Albert Gray, assisted by H.C.P. Bell, from the French, Hakluyt Society, LXXVI, LXXVII, London, 1887-1890, 2 vols. in 3 parts, part 1, pp. 159-160.

<sup>37</sup> See Schrieke II, pp. 251-252.

... He had for his guard, (who) went before him, 200 great ollephantes, 2000 small shot, 2000 pikes, 200 launces, 100 bowmen, 20 naked swordes of pure gould carried before him; 20 fencers went before him, plaininge with swordes and targettes; a horse leed before him, covered with beaten gould, the bridle set with stones; at his sadle-crutch a shafte of arrowes, the quiver of beaten gould set with pretious stones. Before him went his tow sons, of 8 or 9 years ould, arrayed with jewelles and rich stones. His Majestie rode upon an ollephant, his saddle of pure gould, his slave behind him in rich arraye, with his betel boxe, and a fan of pure gould in his hand to keepe the flies from the Kinge. The Kinge's robes were so rich that I cannot well describe them; he had a turband upon his head set with jewelles and pretious stones invalluable; creast and sword of pure gold, the skaberd set with stones. Before him went an ollephant, with a chaire of state couered all with beaten silver, that, if yt should chaunce to rayne, he might change ollephantes ...<sup>38</sup>

Not only was Iskandar Muda reputed to be a conqueror, but he was also credited with having brought a reform in Acheh which, in accordance with what was believed to be Islamic, he created into a theocratic state. As part of his reform programme, he is said to have created the office of qādī as an official of the court.<sup>39</sup> I must, however, point out that the title Qādī Malikul-'Adil,

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38 See Voyages, p. 256.

39 See Van Langen, K.F.H., De Inrichting van het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder het Soeltanaat, BKI, Leiden, 1888, p. 420. Hereafter cited as Van Langen. Hurgronje, C.S. (in The Achehnese, translated by A.W.S. O'Sullivan, London, 1906, 2 vols, vol. 1, p. 97), also mentions this, but he leaves it an open possibility that another earlier sovereign might have instituted the qādī's title. I believe, however, that it is certain that the institution of the qādī had existed at a much earlier date. See below note 40.

by which the court qāḍī was known, was in use long before Iskandar Muda's time.<sup>40</sup> In Aceh before Iskandar Muda's time, the qāḍī was not the sole judge in legal matters pertaining to him, as was the case in other Muslim countries.<sup>41</sup> In conformity with the system of administration prevailing in Aceh at the time, it would be more precise to regard the qāḍī as the President of the Sulṭān's judicial college, which consisted of the various Territorial Chiefs, Dignitaries, and Fuqahā' of the realm. The reason underlying the qāḍī's appointment to the presidency of the judicial college was the Sulṭān's desire - undoubtedly influenced by the 'Ulamā' and mystics around him - to check the power of 'ādat law and to reconcile it with the sharī'ah as it was then conceived. Under 'ādat law, all decisions of the judicial college were unanimous decisions of the members which consisted of the Territorial Chiefs and other Dignitaries of the realm. With the Qāḍī Maliku'l-'Adil as its head, such decisions could therefore be swayed (by the 'Ulamā' represented by the Qāḍī) in favour of those aligned to the

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<sup>40</sup> See Hikayat Aceh, p. 150. In paragraph 196, the chronicler mentions Sulṭān 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat-Shāh (al-Qahhār r. 1540-1567) conferring the title Qāḍī Maliku'l-'Adil to a Faqīh. The Sulṭān alone exercised the prerogative of appointing one to the Qāḍīship (see p. 149, para. 194).

<sup>41</sup> Regarding the jurisdiction of the qāḍī in other Muslim countries, see Tyan, E., "Judicial organization" in Law in the Middle East, edited by M. Khadduri and H.J. Liebesny, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 245.

requirements of the sharī'ah. In this way too a compromise was reached between the exponents of 'ādat on the one hand and those of the sharī'ah on the other. Iskandar Muda promulgated statutes outlining rules and regulations to be put into effect in Aceh.<sup>42</sup> He also appointed a state Qāḍī from among the 'Ulamā' of the realm whose duty it was to ensure that laws regarding matters within the purview of religion were duly administered. This Qāḍī's jurisdiction would seem to prevail only within the domain of private law.<sup>43</sup>

His reforms and stern rule, however, did not seem to effect the spiritual climate of Aceh which, since the time Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī flourished, had betrayed 'heterodox' tendencies. In this period flourished Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī, a mystic from Pasai who may have been influenced by the teachings of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī.<sup>44</sup> It is possible moreover that these two famous figures in the domain of Malay mysticism may not have taught 'heterodox' doctrines, but that those who claimed to be their disciples have distorted what they teach. When Sulṭān Iskandar Thānī, Iskandar Muda's

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<sup>42</sup> For the contents of the daftar of rules and regulations, see Van Langen, pp. 436-447.

<sup>43</sup> See Van Langen, p. 422. Indeed in those times certain parts of private law were still in the grip of 'ādat law. See the description of the customs at Aceh in Voyages, pp. 259-260. The Sulṭān seems to follow the Ottoman Law of Fratricide with regard to succession.

<sup>44</sup> Van Nieuwenhuijze, pp. 234-235.

successor, ascended the throne in 1636, there were marked changes. He was a 'sober' man and encouraged 'orthodox' 'Ulamā' at his court. By this time, the greatness of Aceh, both as a commercial and religious centre, had begun to decline. The Dutch capture of Malacca from the Portuguese in 1641 made Malacca once again the most important commercial centre in the Archipelago soon to eclipse even Aceh. The level of scholarly activity in the courts had sunk to a low degree. Pseudo-mystics and charlatans had taken hold of the minds of the people. But their activities were put to an abrupt end when Nūru'l-Dīn al-Rānīrī arrived in Aceh in 1637 and found favour at court. He soon inaugurated, after engaging himself in polemics and debates with the deviating Wujūdiyyah mystics in the presence of the Sulṭān, a widespread zindīq hunt.

## CHAPTER II

Nūru'l-Dīn al-Rānīrī

The latest account about the author of the Hujjatu'l-Siddiq li daf'i'l-Zindiq, and probably the most concisely informative so far, is that given by Voorhoeve;<sup>45</sup> according to whom, on the authority of Drewes which commands respect, Nūru'l-Dīn ibn 'Alī ibn Ḥasanjī ibn Muḥammad Ḥamīd al-Rānīrī came from Rānīr (Rander) in Bikanir, Rajputana, Gujerat. The eminent Indonesian scholar Raden Hoesein Djajadiningrat had conclusively pointed out the error of van der Tuuk who asserted that Rānīrī wrote his Bustānu'l-Salāṭīn in Aceh in the year 1630-1631.<sup>46</sup> Djajadiningrat showed that Rānīrī - as far as we can glean from historical sources at our disposal - arrived in Aceh in 1637,<sup>47</sup> and there is so far no evidence as yet to show that he was in Aceh at some earlier date. The same Indonesian scholar also corrected the error that another book written by Rānīrī, the Sirātu'l-Mustaqīm, was written in 1634. It is now known that he wrote this work in 1644.<sup>48</sup> Voorhoeve is of

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<sup>45</sup> Voorhoeve, P., Twee Maleise Geschriften van Nūruddīn ar-Rānīrī, Leiden, 1955, pp. 5-7. This contains facsimiles of the Tibyan fī Ma'rifati'l-Adyān (128p., Leiden text, Cod. Or. 3291), and the Hujjatu'l-Siddiq li daf'i'l-Zindiq (27p., Maxwell text no. 93, Royal Asiatic Society, London). References to Voorhoeve's introduction will hereafter be cited as Voorhoeve. The Tibyan fī Ma'rifati'l-Adyān will hereafter be cited as Tibyan; the Hujjatu'l-Siddiq li daf'i'l-Zindiq will hereafter be cited as Hujjah.

<sup>46</sup> V. der Tuuk, H.N., Short account of the Malay MSS belonging to the R.A.S. in miscellaneous papers relating to Indo-China and the Ind. Arch., 2nd series, vol. II, p. 15.

<sup>47</sup> Djajadiningrat, R.H., Critisch overzicht van de in Maleische werken vervatte gegevens over de geschiedenis van het Soeltanaat van Atjeh, BKI, 65, Leiden, 1911, pp. 136-137. See also note 4. Hereafter cited as Djajadiningrat.

<sup>48</sup> Voorhoeve, p. 6, note 4.

the opinion that it was not necessary for Rānīrī to acquire such knowledge of Malay literature as is apparent in that work before his arrival in Aceh in 1637.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, he went on to say that Rānīrī did not have to go to Aceh to learn the Malay language, as in Gujerat there was a considerable Malay population from which he could obtain the knowledge required. The coastal towns of Gujerat were then having an international population. Trading ships plied regularly between these towns and the Straits of Malacca. The Malays and Javanese in these coastal areas even served among the mercenary troops. The Malay language in these harbour towns was then well known. Rānīrī's family had also kept contact with Aceh - his mother being a Malay. But the question as to how and where Rānīrī learned the Malay language to be able ultimately to vanquish the indigenous 'heterodox' mystics who were surely masters of their own language seems to me to be still problematic. Assuming that he was in Gujerat learning Malay from the Malays there, it would still be hard to accept that his knowledge of the language learned in that manner from traders, sailors and mercenary troops would suffice to equip him to challenge the Malay mystics who spoke court language and who, in the case of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī, was also an accomplished poet. Although Voorhoeve mentioned that most of the sources Rānīrī was acquainted with were all famous books by Indian authors and not one of those of his older

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<sup>49</sup> Loc. cit.

contemporaries at Makkah,<sup>50</sup> it would still seem to me strange that Rānīrī did not appear in his works to betray any knowledge of the thought and works of Aḥmad Sirhindī who died in 1625. One would have thought that Rānīrī would be well acquainted with Sirhindī's well-known criticism directed against Ibnu'l-'Arabī and his doctrine of wahdatu'l-wujūd,<sup>51</sup> for this is an important matter connected so closely with his own attack on the Wujūdiyyah mystics. Perhaps it would not be too improbable to conjecture that Rānīrī might well have been in Aceh before the year 1637, or more likely in Pahang which was then under Achenese domination, or even in Malacca, and had acquired a good grounding of the Malay language in either of these places to prepare him for the task to come.

Rānīrī's family had always maintained close contact with Aceh. In 1580 and 1583 his uncle had come to Aceh to teach logic, rhetoric, ethics and fiqh, but found to his dismay that he could not generate interest in these subjects, the reason being that mysticism prevailed then. Only after he had journeyed to Makkah to study and master Sufism did he, on returning to Aceh, achieve some measure of success at court. Rānīrī must have

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50 Ibid., p. 7.

51 Short of a comprehensive account of Sirhindī's conception of tawḥīd and his criticism of Ibnu'l-'Arabī's wahdatu'l-wujūd, see Burhan Aḥmad Fārūqī's brief work, The Mujaddīd's conception of tawḥīd, Lahore, 1943.

learned a great deal about the spiritual climate of Aceh from his uncle, for when he arrived in Aceh fifty years later, as a teacher of Sufism he was well prepared. We know for certain that he returned to Rānīr in 1644 and died there in 1666.

Rānīrī was a member of the Rifā'iyyah Order and the shaykh who initiated him, Sayyid Abū Ḥafs 'Umar ibn 'Abdu'l-Lāh Bā Shaybān, of South Arabian origin (Ḥaḍramawt), was born in India. This man had studied in Arabia, but later settled in India where he was initiated into the Rifā'iyyah Order by Sayyid Muḥammad al-'Aydārūs at Sūrāt. Bā Shaybān lived mainly in Bījāpūr where he enjoyed the patronage and protection of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shāh. He died in Bilgrām in 1656. The famous Shaykh Yūsuf of Macassar, who departed from Celebes on a trip to Makkah in 1644 was also a murīd of Bā Shaybān. Rānīrī too is mentioned as one of Shaykh Yūsuf's teachers. Sayyid Muḥammad al-'Aydārūs, Bā Shaybān's teacher, was born in Tarīm in the Ḥaḍramawt in 1561. At the age of nineteen he left his native land for Gujerat and became a theologian there. Thence he went to Sūrāt where he died in 1620. Al-'Aydārūs' uncle, 'Abdu'l-Qādir who died at Aḥmadābād in 1628, was more well known as author of several books and treatises. His father came from South Arabia to settle in Sūrāt in 1551. There he married an Indian woman. Such, in short, was the environmental setting where Rānīrī found himself; nurtured by that spiritual atmosphere which was to prepare him for the court of Aceh. The people who had made up the milieu whence Rānīrī sprang were of mixed Arab-Indian blood,

who through regular correspondence and frequent study trips, maintained an unbroken chain of contact with the motherland, while, at the same time, keeping in touch with Aceh.

It was then the general rule that those who devoted themselves to teaching and religious work accomplished them by virtue of the Sultān's patronage and protection. The spiritual climate in Aceh during the reign of Sultān Iskandar Muda (Mahkota 'Ālam) was rather unhealthy for an exponent of 'orthodoxy' such as Rānīrī; for the Sultān, who reigned from 1607 to 1636, was prone to give a willing ear to the enlightened subtleties of the mystical teachings spread abroad by Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī, and to the teachings of Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī who was then flourishing and holding sway at court. Shamsu'l-Dīn might have been, according to Nieuwenhuijze,<sup>52</sup> one of the most famous scholars who graced the court, whose mystic doctrines attracted numerous disciples including the Sultān himself. When he died in 1630,<sup>53</sup> his disciples remained in the Sultān's favour and continued to control the spiritual life in Aceh. But in 1636, on the Sultān's death, the spiritual state of affairs changed. His successor, Sultān Iskandar Thānī (1637-1641), compared to his predecessor was of a different temperament, for no sooner was he installed than Rānīrī decided it

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52 Van Nieuwenhuijze, p. 234.

53 Ibid., p. 15.

timely to appear at court, arriving in Aceh on a Sunday, May 31, 1637. He gained favour at once and in 1638 received the order from the Sultān to write the Bustānu'l-Salātīn.<sup>54</sup> In 1641 during the ceremony of the Erection of the Tombstone<sup>55</sup> by the new Sultān,

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54 Djajadiningrat, p. 136.

55 Chau Ju-Kua in 1225 noted that:  
There is (in San fo-tsi) a (kind of) Buddha (i.e. image) called 'Hill of Gold and Silver,' and it is cast in gold. Each succeeding king before ascending the throne has cast a golden image to represent his person, and they are most particular to make offerings of golden vessels to these images, and the golden images and golden vessels all bear inscriptions to caution future generations not to melt them down. (Chau Ju-Kua, p. 61)

John Davis, who was in Aceh in 1599, gives this account:

As touching their Burials, every Generation or Kinred have their particular place to burie their dead; which is in the Fields. They lay the Corps with the head towards Mecha, having a free Stone at the head, and another at the feete curiously wrought, thereby signifying the worthinesse of the person. But in the place of the Kings Burials every grave hath a piece of Gold at the head, and another at the foot, weighing at the least five hundred pound weight, cunningly embossed and wrought. This King ['Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh Sayyid al-Mukammal] hath two such Peeces in making and almost finished, which wee saw, that are a thousand pound weight a piece, and shall bee richly set with stones.

(Purchas, S., Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others, Hakluyt Society, Extra series, XIV-XXXIII, 20v., 1905-07, vol. II, pp. 321-322)

Schrieke points out that from what John Davis said it is clear that the Sultān of Aceh had his tombstones made during his lifetime. Iskandar Muda too made his tombstones during his lifetime and even chose his own posthumous title. The ceremony which Rānīrī attended may well have been one in which Iskandar Thānī

Rānīrī was present with the courtiers. At the time of this ceremony the Sultān had already assumed his posthumous title Marḥūm Dāru'l-Salām by which Rānīrī addressed him in his treatise entitled Tibyān fī Ma'rīfatī'l-Adyān.<sup>56</sup> This work must have therefore been written by him between 1641 and 1644 - the year of his return to Rānīr. In his very words Rānīrī relates how, in a polemic against the exponents of the 'heretical' Wujūdiyyah in the presence of the new Sultān, he banished them forever:

... Maka tatakala zāhirlah qaum Wujūdiyyah yang zindīq mulḥid lagi sesat daripada murid Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī yang lisut ... maka berbahathlah mereka itu dengan kami beberapa hari dihadapan ḥadrat Sultān yang terlebih ṣāliḥ pada masanya (didiamkan Allāh Ta'ālā kiranya akan dia pada sama tengah shurga!); iaitu Mawlānā al-Sultān Iskandar Thānī 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Mughāyat Shāh, yang bergelar Marḥūm Dāru'l-salām. Ialah yang mendirikan agama Allāh dengan keteguhan yang amat 'ajab ... Serta kata mereka itu: "Bahwa sanya Allāh Ta'ālā diri kami dan wujud kami, dan kami diriNya dan wujudNya" ... Maka [telah] kukarang pada membatalkan kata mereka itu yang salah dan i'tiqād mereka itu yang sia-sia itu suatu risālah pada menyatakan da'wā bayang-bayang dengan empunya bayang-bayang ... Dan kukatakan [pada] mereka itu: "Bahwa sanya kamu menda'wā diri kamu ketuhanan seperti da'wā Fir'awn, katanya: "Akaulah Tuhan kamu yang Maha-tinggi"; tetapi bahwasanya adalah kamu qawm

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placed the tombstones for his dead father the ruler of Pahang. This ceremony is called the menanam batu ceremony, and is ... in origin a megalithic usage in accordance with which memorial stones are elected for dead chieftains. On Java the megalithic usage was Hinduized, so that there deceased rulers were entombed in deification images of Buddha images with the facial characteristics of the deified ruler. Here we encounter the Malay form of the same usage. (Schrieke in Schrieke II, p. 260)

56 Tibyān, p. 4.

yang kāfir ...". Maka masamalah muka mereka itu, serta ditundukkan mereka itulah kepalanya, dan adalah mereka itu mushrik. Maka mem[b]eri fatwālah segala Islām atas kufr mereka itu dan akan mem[b]unuh dia ... Dan setengah daripada mereka itu mem[b]eri fatwā akan kufr dirinya, maka setengahnya tawbat dan setengahnya tiada mahu tawbat. Dan setengahnya daripada mereka itu yang tawbat itu murtad pula ia; kembali ia kepada i'tiqādnya yang dahulu itu jua ... Maka terbunuhlah segala tentera qaum yang kāfir. Dan segala puji-pujian bagi Allāh Tuhan serwa 'ālam.<sup>57</sup>

... When there arose that group of the deviating and strayed Wujūdiyyah from amongst the disciples of the misguided Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī ... they engaged us in a polemic for several days before the presence of the Sultān, who is the most pious in his time (may Allāh include him among the dwellers in Paradise!), Mawlānā al-Sultān Iskandar Thānī 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Mughāyat Shāh, who is called Marhūm Dāru'l-Salām. He it is who set up firmly the Religion of Allāh with a firmness that evokes wonder ... They [the deviating Wujūdiyyah] asserted: "God is our selves and our beings, and we are His Self and His Being ...". In refuting them in their erroneous and vain belief I [have] compose[d] a treatise expounding the meaning of the analogical expression regarding the image and the possessor of the image<sup>58</sup> ... I said to them: "You have claimed for yourselves divinity in the same manner as did Pharaoh who said: "I am your Lord Most Exalted;"<sup>59</sup> but indeed you are of the unbelieving group." [When they heard this] their faces betrayed a sour expression and they bowed their heads, for surely they are polytheists. The entire 'Ulamā' of Islām

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57 Tibyān, pp. 3-6.

58 Cf. Van Ronkel, Ph.S., Catalogus der Maleische Handschriften, Batavia, 1909, p. 433. Hereafter cited as Van Ronkel.

59 Qur'ān 79:24.

pronounced against them the fatwā of unbelief and condemned them to death ... Some of them acknowledged the charge of unbelief levelled against them, and some recanted whilst others refused to recant. Yet some of those who have recanted committed apostasy - they fell back upon their former belief ... Thus were executed the host of unbelievers. Every praise be to Allāh, Lord of the Worlds.

In order to refute the Wujūdiyyah in their erroneous interpretation of the formula lā ilāha illa'l-Lāh, Rānīrī had written a short treatise entitled Shifā'u'l-Qulūb.<sup>60</sup> But all his works on the subject are mainly devoted to refuting Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī and Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī whose disciples he found holding sway at court and village alike. Rānīrī's aim was to cleanse the minds of the people of the Malay world from the corrupting effects of their teachings which have spread rapidly abroad and grown famous. However, in this study we shall concern ourselves mainly with Rānīrī's attack on Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī's teachings, comparing his criticism with what Ḥamzah actually taught in order to see whether or not Rānīrī represented them truly and justly.

From what I have understood of the mystical philosophy and teachings of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī gleaned from his works that have escaped the flames and come down to us,<sup>61</sup> it appears to me that all of Rānīrī's criticisms of him and the alleged beliefs he

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60 Van Ronkel, p. 434.

61 See above note 35, and preface on p. ii.

attributed to him were not to the point and falsely presented. In Ḥamzah's time, Rānīrī's uncle had taught in Aceh and nowhere was Ḥamzah publicly refuted by him. Rānīrī himself did not publicly refute Shamsu'l-Dīn when the latter was alive. Why had Rānīrī to delay his refutation so that there was no possibility for retaliation on the part of the one (or ones) refuted? It seems clear to me that when Rānīrī began his polemics against the Wujūdiyyah his opponents were all of them inferior with respect to knowledge and character to either Ḥamzah or Shamsu'l-Dīn, and that Rānīrī was therefore guilty of taking advantage of this in order to obtain a high position at court. In fact Rānīrī, after his success against the Wujūdiyyah, probably did obtain a high position at court, for "the moorish bishop [*i.e.* Qādī] Sich Noordijn" mentioned in the Dag Register of 1641-1642 may well have been him.<sup>62</sup>

It must be pointed out that the success of Rānīrī's destructive attack against Ḥamzah seems, to my mind, to have been due not to learned and scholarly critical analyses of his teachings as one would expect, but rather to distortions of what Ḥamzah actually taught; distortions which he had cunningly branded as 'heretical' and had easily torn to pieces. It seems to have been a case of attacking the caricature, not the true picture, as will become apparent in this study. It fails to convince me to say that

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62 Cf. Schrieke II, p. 394.

the motivation underlying Rānīrī's attack was one of sincere attempt at intellectual and religious reform, untainted by bias and personal interest. Indeed, the contrary seems to have been the case. It cannot be said of Rānīrī that he had obtained a distorted picture of Ḥamzah's teachings from the latter's disciples who may have distorted them through lack of proper understanding, for he had access to Ḥamzah's writings. I cannot say that I am impressed by Rānīrī's apparatus criticus. He betrays in his writings not only a lack of comprehension of the Ṣūfī doctrines, as contrasted with the more thorough and deep understanding which reveals itself in Ḥamzah's writings, but also a lack of understanding of the Qur'ān and Quranic interpretation! Furthermore, it is also possible that Rānīrī's understanding of the teachings of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī was impaired - apart from bias and personal interest - by a lack of mastery of the Malay language; that is, a mastery sufficient to enable him to plumb the depths of Malay linguistic consciousness in order to understand the conceptual structures of the symbols employed so that the thoughts that underly them may become clear to him.

### CHAPTER III

Rānīrī's refutation of Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī

Rānīrī's refutation of Ḥamzah's teachings which he considers 'heretical' and which he uses as evidence for branding Ḥamzah with infidelity is based upon several points. These points he has selected in a manner calculated to expose and condemn the 'heresies' which to him are scattered in Ḥamzah's writings disguised, so to speak, in the garb of true Sufism. In these points of Rānīrī's criticism, we will be able to obtain an idea as to the manner in which he represents Ḥamzah's ideas and the manner in which - to achieve maximum credence from his audience - he couches his attacks. The points may be summarized thus:

(a) That Ḥamzah's ideas regarding God, the world, Man and the relationship between them, in short, Reality, are identical - to mention some - with those of the Philosophers, the Zoroastrians, the Metempsychosists, the Incarnationists, the Brahmins.

(b) That Ḥamzah's belief is pantheistic in the sense that God's essence is completely immanent in the World; that God permeates everything that is seen.

(c) That, like the Philosophers, Ḥamzah believes that God is Simple Being.

(d) That Ḥamzah, like the Qadariyyah and the Mu'tazilah, believes the Qur'ān to be created.

(e) That, like the Philosophers, Ḥamzah believes in the eternity of the World.

Speaking of a sect of the Zoroastrians, he says:

Ketiga tā'ifah daripada Majūsī itu bernama Sumaniyyah. Adalah mereka itu menyembah tiap-tiap cahaya daripada mata hari dan bulan dan bintang dan api dan barang sebagainya. Seperti katanya adalah sekalian cahaya itu daripada suatu cahaya jua dahulu daripada dijadikan Allāh segala makhluk (iaitu 'arsh, dan lawh, dan tujuh petala langit). Maka tatakala dijadikan Allāh Ta'ālā segala perkara itu, jadi bercherailah segala cahaya itu; iaitu pada penglihat mata jua, tetapi pada haqiqatnya sekalian cahaya itu suatu jua: iaitulah Nūr Allāh. Demikianlah i'tiqād Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī. Katanya dalam kitab Asrāru'l-'Arifīn bahwa cahaya yang pertama-tama cheral daripada Dhāt Allāh itu Nūr Muḥammad. Maka daripada perkataan ini chendereng kepada madhhab Tanāsukiyyah, dan serupa dengan kata Falāsifah bahwa adalah Ḥaqq Ta'ālā itu suatu jawhar yang basīt. Dan demikian lagi i'tiqād Wathaniyyah yang daripada kaum Barāhimah dan Samiyyah yang mengediami negeri Tubbat. Dan seperti i'tiqād kaum Hulūliyyah yang mengediami negeri Halwāniyyah dan benua Hindustān. Demikianlah i'tiqād mereka itu.<sup>63</sup>

The third sect of the Zoroastrians<sup>64</sup> is called the Sumaniyyah.<sup>65</sup> They worship all kinds of light; the sun, the moon, the stars, fire, and the like. They say that all light originated from one light [i.e. source] even before God created Creation (i.e. the Throne, the Tablet, and the Seven Layers of Heaven). When God Most Exalted created these things, all light became separated from their source; that is, it is so only to outward perception, for in reality all light is one - that is the Light of God. Such is the belief of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī. He said in the book Asrāru'l-'Arifīn that the first light to separate from the Essence of God is the Light of Muḥammad.<sup>66</sup> From this saying [it is

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63 Tibyān, pp. 17-18.

64 For the Majūsī, see the Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI); edited by M. Th. Houtsma, T.W. Arnold, R. Basset and R. Hartmann, Leiden, Brill, 1913-38. 4v. and supplement, article Madjūs.

65 Cf. Watt, W.M., Free will and predestination in early Islam, London, 1948, p. 103. Hereafter cited as Watt.

66 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 141.

clear that] he tends towards the Tanāsukhiyyah school.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore it amounts to the same thing as what the Falāsifah said; that the Truth Most Exalted is Simple Monad [or Simple Atom, or Simple Being]. And this is also the belief of the Wathaniyyah from among the Barāhimah, and the Samiyyah who inhabit the land of Tibet. The same is true also of the Ḥulūliyyah who dwell in the land of Halwāniyyah and the continent of India. Such is their belief.

Notice how in the passage quoted, Rānīrī connects Ḥamzah with the various groups mentioned. In fact these expertly woven connections are all of them questionable - even false - except perhaps in the case of the connection with the Philosophers. But even in this latter case, we should not be led to believe in the kind of connection Rānīrī creates for us. What Ḥamzah actually says on the point in dispute is:

Antara 'ālim dan ma'lūm itulah asal chahaya Muḥammad pertama bercherai daripada Dhāt Allāh. Adapun pada suatu 'ibārat, itulah bernama rūḥ idāfī (ya'nī, nyawa berchampur); dan pada suatu 'ibārat 'aql al-kull namanya (ya'nī, perhimpunan segala budi); dan pada suatu 'ibārat nūr namanya (ya'nī, chahaya); pada suatu 'ibārat qalam al-a'alā namanya (ya'nī, qalam yang mahatinggi); dan pada suatu 'ibārat lawḥ namanya (ya'nī, papan tempat menyurat) ...

Kerana 'ilmu hidup dinamanya rūḥ; kerana 'ilmu ma'lūmāt kelihatan dinamanya nūr; kerana 'ilmu mencharakan segala ma'lūmāt dinamanya 'aql; kerana 'ilmu tersurat rupa ma'lūmāt dinamanya lawḥ; kerana 'ilmu menjadi hurūf sekalian ma'lūmāt dinamanya qalam ...<sup>68</sup>

Between Knower and Known, that is when the Light of Muḥammad first separates from the Essence

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67 For this school, See EI, article Tanāsukh.

68 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 141-142.

of God. One expression is that it is called the Relational Spirit; another is the Universal Intellect; another is Light; another is the Most Exalted Pen; and another is the Tablet ...

Because knowledge is living, it is called Spirit; because by knowledge the things known are manifest it is called Light; because knowledge patterns the forms of the things known it is called Intellect; because in knowledge is inscribed the forms of the things known it is called Tablet; because knowledge becomes letters of the things known it is called Pen ...

Now what Ḥamzah is saying here is a well-known Ṣūfī doctrine which Ibnu'l-ʿArabī and Jīlī and other famous Ṣūfīs also hold. It is strange that Rānīrī should single out Ḥamzah and accuse him of 'heresy' for holding a doctrine which he learnt, most of all, from Ibnu'l-ʿArabī and Jīlī whose names Rānīrī mentions reverently. Ḥamzah does not distort the teachings of his masters, so that Rānīrī cannot accuse him of this in order that he may interpret the teachings of these Ṣūfī masters according to his own 'orthodox' brand. Rather it would seem that it is Rānīrī who distorts the teachings of the Ṣūfī masters to suit his own ideas. What Rānīrī wants to convey in the passage quoted is not that part of the point which deals with this particular aspect of the Ṣūfī doctrine, but that he wants to focus the attention of his readers on the point that Ḥamzah, like the Zoroastrians, worships light. Rānīrī wishes to convey to his readers the notion that the word 'light' used by Ḥamzah is meant not in the metaphorical, but in the real sense. In fact Rānīrī even resorts to using the word 'fire' so as to make his intention clear. This word he

uses again in another passage where he elucidates the salient features of the doctrines of the Tanāsukhiyyah school to which Hamzah has already been assigned. Note in this passage that the meaning of the word 'fire' is taken in the real sense:

Katanya bahwa segala arwāh dan segala sesuatu itu daripada suku-suku Allāh dari kerana Ia berbuat dan menjadikan segala suatu. Maka perbuatanNya dan yang demikiannya itu jadi daripada api, dan kembali pula kepadanya jua. Maka segala makhlukāt itu suku-suku daripada Allāh. Inilah madhhab Hamzah Fanṣūrī dan Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī yang dalālat keduanya. Dan lagi kata setengah daripada qawm Tanāsukhiyyah bahwa takwīn dan mukawwan,<sup>69</sup> dan taf'īl dan maf'ūl suatu jua. Dan demikianlah madhhab Hamzah Fanṣūrī dan Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī [itu] kata ma'nawīyyah daripada qawm Tanāsukhiyyah jua: bahwa Allāh Ta'ālā ḥulūl dengan DhātNya pada segala suatu yang kelihatan.<sup>70</sup>

They [i.e. the Tanāsukhiyyah school] say that all spirits and every single thing are parts of God by virtue of His doing and creating them all. His doings and the like come from [i.e. have their origin in] fire and return to it. This is the strayed opinion of both Hamzah Fanṣūrī and Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī. Some of the Tanāsukhiyyah say that the Producer and the Production, the Doer and the Thing Done, are identical. Likewise is the opinion of Hamzah Fanṣūrī and Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī; they really adhere to the true meaning of what the Tanāsukhiyyah believe: that God in His Essence is incarnate in every thing that is seen.

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69 The text reads mukawwin. Al-Ash'arī too seems to have identified the two. See McCarthy, R.J., The theology of al-Ash'arī, Beyrouth, 1953, p. 168. This work contains al-Ash'arī's Kitāb al-Luma' and Risālat Istihsān al-Khawḍ fī 'Ilm al-Kalām (Arabic texts and annotated translations), and relevant Appendices. Hereafter cited as al-Ash'arī.

70 Tibyān, pp. 26-27.

In this passage, apart from the point mentioned, Ḥamzah is accused of adhering to the real meaning of what the Tanāsukhiyyah believe, that is the diffusion and distribution of the divine spirit among the beings of the World. Rānīrī here accuses Ḥamzah of pantheism. But what kind of pantheism? "There is a form of pantheism which, starting from the assumption that God is an absolute, infinite and eternal being, who is the source and ultimate ground of all that is, was, and will be, gradually assumes a form of acosmism according to which the Phenomenal World is but a passing shadow of the Reality which lies behind it."<sup>71</sup> Then there is another form of pantheism which asserts that the Essence of God or the Absolute is completely immanent in the World; God, so to speak, exhausts Himself in the World, so that transcendence is denied Him. It is to this somewhat crude type of pantheism that Rānīrī refers in his accusation of Ḥamzah's conception of the relationship between God and the World. But this accusation is false. Had Rānīrī read Ḥamzah carefully and understood what he read, then he would know that it is absurd to label Ḥamzah's system as pantheistic in the sense he means. It has been said that in any pantheistic doctrine either God is bound to suffer in the sense that He is a fabrication of the human mind - that only the Phenomenal World is real, or that the Universe suffers

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<sup>71</sup> 'Affīfī, A.E., The mystical philosophy of Muhyid Dīn-Ibnul 'Arabī, Cambridge, 1939, p. 54. Hereafter cited as 'Affīfī.

in the sense that it is mere illusion - that God alone is the Real Being. Ḥamzah certainly holds the latter view although Rānīrī would have us believe that he holds the former. Like Ibnu'l-'Arabī,<sup>72</sup> Ḥamzah conceives Reality as having both aspects of transcendence (tanzīh) and immanence (tashbīh),<sup>73</sup> and takes care to assert repeatedly that God is not everything and all things in the sense of being an aggregation of existents. Almost all of Rānīrī's attacks on Ḥamzah's 'pantheism' seem to prove to be nothing beyond his own fallacy of jumping to conclusions in identifying what Ḥamzah means metaphorically with what Ḥamzah considers to be real. In this way it is the metaphors that are attacked and the picture of the real caricatured. Rānīrī makes mention of Ḥamzah's book entitled Muntahī<sup>74</sup> from which he deduces evidence to denounce the author as belonging to the false brand of the Wujūdiyyah.<sup>75</sup> In one of the passages, speaking on behalf of Ḥamzah, he says:

... Tamthīl seperti biji dan pohon; pohonnya dalam biji itu lengkap [ber] serta dalam biji itu.

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72 See 'Affīfī, pp. 18-24.

73 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 70-74.

74 This book was apparently consigned to the flames. Fortunately, however, in those works of Ḥamzah that have come down to us, it is possible to reproduce all his ideas and even analogies which he had written in the Muntahī (the correct form should be Muntahā). Ḥamzah himself apparently refers to this work in one of his poems (Ibid., p. 62).

75 Tibyān, p. 97-101.

Maka nyatalah daripada perkataan Wujūdiyyah itu bahwa serwa semesta 'ālam sekalian ada lengkap berwujud dalam Haqq Ta'āla. Maka keluarlah 'ālam daripadanya seperti pohon kayu keluar daripada biji.<sup>76</sup>

... The analogy is like the seed and the plant; the plant resides in its completeness within the seed. Hence it is clear from this saying of the [false] Wujūdiyyah that the Universe together with all its parts exists in its completeness in the Truth Most Exalted. The World proceeds from Him as the plant from the seed.

The impression that Rānirī conveys here is that the World proceeds from God out of its own necessity without any act of willing on God's part. But what Ḥamzah says is precisely the opposite, for here he is actually revealing what he understands by God's creative will (irādah), which according to him is:

... Berkehendak kepada isti'dād yang dalam 'ilmunya kepada 'ālam ini. Seperti kata ḥadīth qudsī: "Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aḥbabtu an 'urafa" - ya'nī: "Aku perbendaharaan yang ter[sem]bunyi, maka kukasih bahwa aku dikenal." Ya'nī: 'ālam dengan isti'dādnya sekalian yang didalam 'ilmunya itulah maka dinisbatkan dalamnya kepada perbendaharaan yang ter[sem]bunyi hendak mengeluarkan ma'lūmāt dari dalam 'ilmunya. Maka bersabda "Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aḥbabtu an 'urafa."

Adapun mathal perbendaharaan itu seperti pohon kayu sepuhun dalam bijinya. Biji itu perbendaharaan, pohon kayu yang dalamnya itu isi perbendaharaan, ter[sem]bunyi dengan lengkapnya; akarnya, dengan batangnya, dengan chabangnya, dengan dahannya, dengan rantingnya, dengan daunnya, dengan bunganya, dengan buahnya - sekalian lengkap didalam biji sebiji itu. Maka biji itu hendak keluar tumbuh pohon kayu itu daripada dirinya di tengah padang yang mahaluas.

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76 Ibid., p. 97.

Maka biji itu berkata: "Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aḥbābtu an 'urafa" - ya'ni sekalian kata ini isyarat kepada berkehendak jua.

Dan lagi firmān Allāh Ta'ālā: 'Innamā amruhu idhā arāda shay'an an yaqūla lahu kun fa yakunu'<sup>77</sup> - ya'ni: 'Bahwa sanya barang titahNya tatakala berkehendak kepada sesuatu, bahwa berkata baginya "jadi lu!" - menjadi.' Ini pun ishārat kepada berkehendak jua.<sup>78</sup>

... Willing the potentialities in His knowledge to become the World. As the ḥadīth qudsī says: "I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known" - that is: the World together with all its potentialities in His knowledge is likened to the hidden treasure about to bring forth the things known in His knowledge. Thus it says: "I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known."

The treasure is likened to a plant in its seed. The seed is the treasure, the plant within it is the content of the treasure; hidden in its completeness: its roots, trunk, branches, small branches, twigs, leaves, flowers, fruits - all complete within the seed. The seed wants to bring forth the growth of plant within itself on a field of vast expanse. The seed says: "I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known." All this is an allusion to [God's act of] willing.

And further God the Most Exalted says: 'Verily His command is, when He is in the state of willing a thing, to say to it "Be thou!" - and it becomes.' This too is an allusion to [God's act of] willing.

Then Rānirī goes on to say:

Dan lagi pula katanya: "Tamthīl seperti air hujan didalam sebuah tanaman. Airnya itu jua lengkap pada sekalian tanaman itu. Bagimu rasanya pada limau masam, pada tebu manis, pada mumba pahit; masing-masing membawa rasanya.

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77 Qur'ān 36:82.

78 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 131-132.

Tetapi haqīqatnya air itu jua pada sekalian itu." Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr kerana dii'tiqādkannya makhluk dengan Haqq Ta'ālā mesra seperti mesra air dengan bumi (Mahasuchi [Allāh] Ta'ālā daripada kata kāfir itu!).<sup>79</sup>

And he says further: "The analogy is like rain water in a plant. The water permeates the entire plant. To you the taste is, for lemon, sour, for sugar-cane, sweet, for the mumba plant<sup>80</sup> bitter; each conveying its own taste. But their essence [or reality] is water." Such a belief is infidelity for it is believed that the Truth Most Exalted permeates the created beings just as water permeates the earth (Pure is the Most Exalted God from the saying of that infidel!).

On this point Ḥamzah actually says:

Fa'lam menjadikan makhluk siang dan malam: ya'nī āthārNya itu yang dinamai wujud, kerana [itulah yang] menjadikan. Wujud makhlukāt seperti bumi; jika tiada hujan, dimanakan tumbuh kayu-kayuan? Adapun bumi ditamthilkan 'ilmu Allāh, hujan seperti wujud, kayu-kayuan seperti makhluk. Adapun bumi tanah sendirinya, hujan pun air jua sendirinya. Setelah berchampur maka ada kayu-kayuan tumbuh. Adapun kayu-kayuan yang tumbuh daripada bumi dan air, dengan hukum isti'dād jua: setengah tumbuh menjadi pahit; setengah tumbuh menjadi manis; setengah tumbuh menjadi kelat; setengah tumbuh menjadi hijau; setengah tumbuh menjadi merah; setengah tumbuh menjadi putih; setengah tumbuh menjadi hitam. Warna, dengan sekalian rasa, dengan isti'dād aṣlī jua. Adapun air serupa semata; tanah pun serupa semata. Kayu-kayuan itu tumbuh daripada air dan tanah jua, tetapi rupanya dan warnanya menurut isti'dād jua ...

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79 Tibyān, pp. 98-99.

80 See Wilkinson, R.J., A Malay-English dictionary, Singapore, 1903, p. 655. Hereafter cited as Wilkinson.

Tamthīl ini ditamthīlkan kepada 'ālam: aṣalnya daripada wujūd, maka menjadi siang dan malam; langit dan bumi; 'arsh dan kursī; shurga dan neraka; kāfir dan islām; baik dan jahat - dengan hukum isti'dād dirinya jua. Adapun Dhāt Allāh amat suchi. Farq makhlukāt berbagai-bagai kerana sifātNya banyak, af'ālNya banyak, āthārNya banyak, kerana isti'dād sekalian makhlukāt didalam sifātNya jua. Perbuatan yang baik daripada sifāt Jamāl; perbuatan yang jahat daripada sifāt Jalāl. Adapun aṣal Jalāl dan Jamāl daripada wujūd, aṣal wujūd daripada Dhāt. Pada haqīqat, sekalian keranaNya jua; lain daripadaNya tiada lulus 'ālam ini, kerana Ia wahdahu lā sharīka lahu.<sup>81</sup>

Know that [by God] creating [His] creatures day and night is meant His effects that are called existence for they give existence to the creatures. The existence of the creatures is like earth; without rain how can plants grow? The earth is likened to God's knowledge, rain is existence, the plants are the creatures. The earth is, in itself, earth, and rain is, in itself, water. When [they] mix, the plants begin to grow. The plants that grow out of earth and water are determined by the law of potentiality: some grow becoming bitter; some sweet; some tart; some grow becoming green; some red; some white; some black. Colour and all taste become according to their original potentiality. The water is water, the earth is earth, and the plants grow out of water and earth, but their forms and colours are determined by their potentialities ...

This analogy is applied to the World: originating from existence there comes forth day and night, the heavens and the earth, the Throne and the Kursī<sup>82</sup> Heaven and Hell, the believer and the unbeliever, the good and the evil - [all] by virtue of their respective potentialities. The Essence of God is Most Pure. The creatures are many and have contraries, because His attributes are many, His acts are many, His effects are many for the potentialities of the creatures are in His attributes. Works that are good come from His

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81 Hamzah Fansūrī, pp. 151-152.

82 See EI article Kursī.

attribute of Beauty, works that are evil come from His attribute of Majesty. The origin of Beauty and Majesty is from Being, and Being is from Essence. In reality all [come to be] because of Him; but from Him this world has no existence, for there is none like unto Him.

Again, quoting another passage from Ḥamzah, Rānirī accuses him of identifying the creator with the Creatures thus:

Dan lagi pula katanya pada mere[n]chanakan firmān Allāh Ta'ālā: 'Kulla yawmin huwa fī sha'nin'<sup>83</sup> - ya'nī, pada ẓāhirNya jua berbagai dan berubah-ubah kerana Ia huwa'l-awwalu wa'l-ākhiru wa'l-ẓāhiru wa'l-bāṭinu - ya'nī: awwal[Nya] tiada ketahuan, akhirNya tiada berkesudahan, ẓāhirNya amat nyata, bāṭinNya tiada kedapatan. Memandang diriNya dengan diriNya, melihat diriNya dengan dhātNya, dengan ṣifātNya, dengan af'ālNya, dengan āthārNya; sungguh pun namanya empat haqīqatNya esa jua. Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr kerana dijadikannya Khāliq dengan Makhlūq bersuatu.<sup>84</sup>

And he further says in interpreting the words of God the Most Exalted: 'Every moment He is in a state of glory' - that it means that He in His manifestation is many and is subject to change, for He is the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden. By this it means that His Firstness is unknown, His Lastness is endless, His Manifestation is so clearly evident [to perception] and His Hiddenness is unknowable. He looks upon Himself through Himself, and sees Himself with His essence, His attributes, His acts and His effects; although [these are] four in name, but in reality [they are] one. Such belief is infidelity for the Creator and the Creatures are identified as being one.

This point is explained by Ḥamzah in at least two places. In one he says that everywhere in the World His effects are manifest.

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83 Qur'ān 55:29.

84 Tibyān, pp. 99-100.

It is these effects that "give existence" to the World.<sup>85</sup>

Everything in the World is a mode of His Being. By a mode Ḥamzah means a state (kelakuan), so that the passage 'Every moment He is in a state of glory' is interpreted by him to mean that:

... Segala rupa, rupaNya; segala warna, warnaNya; segala bunyi, bunyiNya; kerana Ia wahdahu lā sharika lahu.<sup>86</sup>

... All forms are His form, all colours are His colours, all sounds are His sounds, for there is none like unto Him.

Here Ḥamzah is expressing the idea that God, although immanent in everything, is nevertheless transcendent because He is above limitation and individualization. This is of course Ibnu'l-'Arabī's concept of transcendence,<sup>87</sup> which according to 'Affīfī's analysis which I quote below is fundamentally of two different kinds:

- (1) That which belongs to the divine Essence per se and a se - the absolute simplicity and unity of the One - the state of the Aḥadiyyah.
- (2) Transcendence asserted by the intellect, which must be always coupled with immanence and which may assume the following forms:
  - (a) God may be called transcendent in the sense of being absolute; or,
  - (b) He may be called transcendent in the sense of being a necessary being, self-begotten, self-caused, etc., in contradistinction to the contingent, created or caused beings of the Phenomenal World; or,

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85 Ḥamzah Fansūrī, p. 151.

86 Ibid., p. 157.

87 See 'Affīfī, p. 19.

- (c) He may be called transcendent in the sense that He is unknowable and incommunicable and beyond all proof.<sup>88</sup>

In another place Ḥamzah speaks of the same idea thus:

... Pada Ahlu'l-Sulūk Allāh Ta'ālā qadīm dan 'ālim. Apabila Ia 'ālim, ma'lūm dalam 'ilmuNya, hendaknya: barang yang dijadikanNya dahulu atau kemudian, kita lihat, sekaliannya daripada ma'lūm itu jua. Jikalau demikian hukumnya, daripada ada jua diadakanNya, bukan daripada tiada diadakanNya kerana yang namanya "ada" itu wujud shu'ūnNya. Seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā; 'Kulla yawmin huwa fī sha'nin' - ya'nī: 'Kepada segala hari Ia itu dalam kelakuanNya jua,' hai Ṭālib, kerana keadaan Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā seperti laut yang tiada berhingga dan tiada berkesudahan. Semesta sekalian 'ālam ini dalam laut itu seperti buih kecil sebijir jua; manusia seorang didalam buih itu berapa bahagiannya? Ya'nī tiada lagi melainkan seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā: 'Kullu man 'alayhā fānin wa yabqā wajhu rabbika dhu'l-jalāli wa'l-ikrām'<sup>89</sup> - ya'nī: 'Barang segala yang diatas 'ālam ini lenyap; bermula: yang kekal Dhāt Tuhanmu jua, Yang Empunya kebesaran dan kemuliaan.' Hai Ṭālib!, 'ālam ini seperti ombak, keadaan Allāh seperti laut; sungguh pun ombak lain daripada laut, kepada haqīqatnya tiada lain daripada laut ...<sup>90</sup>

... According to the Itinerants, God is eternal and knower. Since He is knower, the known is in His knowledge, that is to say: we see that the things He creates, 'before' or 'after,' are all of them from the known. If such is the case, it is from being that He creates them, not from nothingness, for what is called "existence" is the being of His modes. As God says: 'Every day He is in a state of glory,' O Seeker, because God's condition is like a limitless ocean. The World in its entirety is like

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88 Ibid., p. 24.

89 Qur'ān 55:26-27.

90 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 195.

a tiny speck of foam within it, and what avails one man to be in this tiny speck of foam? That is, it is none but as God says: 'Every one<sup>91</sup> in it must pass away. And there will endure forever the person<sup>92</sup> of your Lord, the Lord of Glory and Honour.' O Seeker! this World is but a wave, God's condition is the sea; though wave is not the same as sea, in reality it is not distinct from the sea.

Rānīrī's allegation that Ḥamzah adheres to the thesis of the Philosophers that God is Simple Being<sup>93</sup> may be a reference to Ḥamzah's idea of God as the attributeless Absolute Being which he calls the Dhāt or Huwa.<sup>94</sup> However, this idea is, for that matter, also that of Ibnu'l-'Arabī, Jīlī, and other Ṣūfīs. If it is true that Rānīrī's allegation refers to this idea (which is most likely the case although he does not mention it), then it is false, for the thesis of the Ṣūfīs on this point<sup>95</sup> - Ḥamzah included - is that God in His essence is unknowable and independent of all assertions. The Essence is only known to the divine Essence. It is in the sense that the Essence, in its bare abstraction, is beyond all knowledge and relations that He is attributeless,<sup>96</sup>

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91 For 'every one' (kullu man) Ḥamzah has 'every thing'.

92 Wajh is interpreted by Ḥamzah as Dhāt. Cf. Ibnu'l-'Arabī in 'Affīfī', pp. 24, note 1; 55, note 4.

93 Tibyān, p. 18. For the thesis of the Philosophers that God is Simple Being, see Ghazzālī's Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, translated by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Lahore, 1958, pp.235-341. Hereafter cited as Tahāfut.

94 Ḥamzah Fansūrī, pp. 125.

95 See Arberry, A.J., The doctrines of the Ṣūfīs, Cambridge, 1935, pp. 14-18.

96 Ḥamzah Fansūrī, p. 126.

and not that it is impossible for Him to possess attributes since they would be an augmentation of His Essence. The argument of the Philosophers that God is Simple Being has its basis in their arguments against the attributes and the division into genus and specific difference.<sup>97</sup> The thesis of the Ṣūfīs on this point, which is also that of Ḥamzah, is not the same as that of the Philosophers, for the Ṣūfīs do not uphold the denial of attributes. For Ḥamzah, as for other Ṣūfīs, the attributes of God are eternal and never separate from His Essence - not because God needs them or does things with them, but because they mean the denial of their opposites and the assertion that they exist in themselves and subsist through Him. To some the attributes are neither God nor other than God. To Ḥamzah the attributes are God - or the Essence (Dhāt) is the attributes (ṣifāt).<sup>98</sup>

In the following passage Rānirī accuses Ḥamzah of adhering to Qadarī views. What is interesting to note in this passage, as indeed in some others, is the manner in which he parades the 'heresies' of the Qadarīs before coming to the point: namely their belief that the Qur'ān is created, in which he also condemns Ḥamzah. In this way it would seem to me that he purposely paints the picture of the Qadarīs as black as possible as a prelude to

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97 Tahāfut, pp. 109-131.

98 Cf. Jīlī in Nicholson, pp. 90, 95 note 1. Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 127, 196-7. Cf. also al-Ash'arī, pp. 16-17 note 16, and p. 19.

associating Ḥamzah with this picture - a method which in modern times we know so well as the 'smear campaign':

Shahdān. Lagi pula i'tiqād qawm Qadariyyah. Dan katanya bahwa adalah Hagg Ta'ālā menyuruhkan dan memilikkan [or memikulkan?]<sup>99</sup> segala pekerjaan hamba itu kepada hamba jua. Maka hambalah menjadikan segala perbuatan, tetapi dinyatakan Allāh akan segala hambaNya amr dan nahī. Maka tiada harus akan Allāh menjadikan segala perbuatan hambaNya dengan irādatNya, dan mashiyyatNya, dan qadā'Nya, dan qadarNya. Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr kerana mereka itu menyabitkan ada yang menjadikan [sesuatu] lain daripada Allāh. Dan setengah daripada mereka itu i'tiqādnya [me] mungkirkan<sup>100</sup> sifat Allāh. Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr. Dan setengah daripada mereka itu i'tiqādnya bahwa Qur'an itu makhlūq. Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr; seperti sabda Nabī s.a.w.: "Man qāla 'l-qur'ānu makhlūqun fahuwa kāfirun"<sup>101</sup> - ya'ni "Barangsiapa mengatakan Qur'an itu makhlūq, maka ia itu kāfir." Demikian lagi i'tiqād Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī dalam kitāb yang bernama Asrāru'l-'Arifīn: katanya Qur'an yang dibawa Jibrā'il itu dapat dikata makhlūq.<sup>102</sup>

Shahdān. Now the beliefs of the Qadariyyah.<sup>103</sup> They say that God wills and makes as their own [or

99 The text looks ambiguous: Memilikkan preferred.

100 The text is corrupt. It reads: منكران

101 Cf. Sa'du'l-Dīn al-Taftāzānī on the creed of Najmu'l-Dīn al-Nasafī, translated with introduction by Elder, E.E., A commentary on the creed of Islam, New York, 1950, p. 62. Hereafter cited as Taftazani.

102 Tibyān, pp. 70-71.

103 Cf. Watt, pp. 32-57, 93-129, and see EI article Qadariya; al-Ash'ari, pp. 39, 74-75.

places the burden of] the actions of His creatures. Hence the creatures are the doers of all [their] actions, although God makes manifest to them the 'do's' and 'don't's'. God in reality then does not, by virtue of His will, and His desire, and His decision, and His power, create the actions of His creatures. Such belief is infidelity, for they affirm that there is an 'other' apart from God who creates acts. Some of them refused to believe that God has attributes.<sup>104</sup> Some of them believe that the Qur'ān is created.<sup>105</sup> Such beliefs are a rejection of the truth, for as the Prophet says: "Whosoever believes that the Qur'ān is created, then he is an unbeliever." Such indeed is the belief of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī in the book entitled Asrāru'l-ʿArifīn: he says that the Qur'ān which is conveyed by Gabriel may be regarded as created.<sup>106</sup>

In the same vein he associates Ḥamzah with a sect of the Jahmiyyah:<sup>107</sup>

Kesepuluh qawm Jahmiyyah [itu] Lafẓiyyah namanya. Adalah i'tiqād mereka itu dan katanya yang melafazkan dan yang dilafazkan itu sama keduanya; ya'nī Qur'ān itu kalām Allāh, yang melafazkan - ertinya kalām yang dibaca itu - bukan kalām Allāh. Inilah i'tiqād Wujūdiyyah Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī. Katanya dalam kitāb Asrāru'l-ʿArifīn bahwa kalām Allāh yang dibawa Jibra'il itu

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104 Cf. Watt, p. 102.

105 Loc. cit.

106 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 133.

107 For the Jahmiyyah cf. Watt, pp. 99-104, and see EI article Djahm and Djahmiya.

dapat dikata akan dia makhlūq. Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr, kerana firmān Allāh Ta'ālā: (Innā anzalnāhu) Qur'ānan 'Arabiyyan [ghaira] dhi 'iwajin<sup>108</sup> - ya'ni: 'Bahwa sanya Kami turunkan Qur'an dibawa Jibrā'il dengan bahawa 'Arab bukannya ia makhlūq.<sup>109</sup>

The tenth sect of the Jahmiyyah is called the Lafziyyah. They believe and say that the one who pronounces and the thing pronounced are one and the same. [By this they mean that] the Qur'an is God's speech, but the one who pronounces - meaning the speech that is read - is not God's speech. This is the belief of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī's [brand of] Wujūdiyyah. He says in the book Asrāru'l-ʿArifīn that the speech of God conveyed by Gabriel may be regarded as a thing created. Such a belief is infidelity, for God says: 'We have sent down an Arabic Qur'an conveyed by Gabriel [and] it is not created.'<sup>110</sup>

But what Ḥamzah actually says on this subject is not really similar to what Rānīrī reports.

Adapun madhhab Mu'tazilah dan Rāfiḍī dan zindīq, kalām Allāh makhlūq. Pada hukum sharī'atnya, barang siapa mengatakan kalām Allāh makhlūq, kāfir - na'ūdhu bi'l-Lāhi minhu! Kalām Allāh peri Dhāt; qadīm sama-sama dengan sekalian yang sedia ketujuh itu. Adapun kalām Allāh yang dibawa Jibrā'il kepada Nabī Muhammad Rasūlu'l-Lāh yang tersurat pada maṣḥaf dapat dikatakan makhlūq, kerana hukumnya sudah bercherai dengan Dhāt pada 'ibārat. Adapun kepada haqīqīnya, wa'l-Lāhu a'lam bi'l-ṣawāb.<sup>111</sup>

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108 Qur'ān 39:28. The words I have put in brackets actually do not appear in the Quranic text. The word in square brackets has been omitted in Rānīrī's text.

109 Tibyān, pp. 77.

110 This is Rānīrī's translation and interpretation of the sūra quoted.

111 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 133-134.

According to the Mu'tazilah and the Rāfiḍī and the Zindīq, the speech of God is created. According to the shari'ah, whosoever says that the speech of God is created is an unbeliever - may God preserve us from such! God's speech is as His Essence; eternal, together with the accompanying seven [attributes]. As for the speech of God conveyed by Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad the Messenger of God, which is written in pages, it may be said to be created for the judgment concerning it is that it is already separate - from the point of view of expression - from the Essence. However in reality only God knows.

This passage cannot be regarded as an assertion that the Qur'ān in meaning and conceptual content is created.<sup>112</sup> In two places he says that the Qur'ān as such is not created.<sup>113</sup> Furthermore Rānirī's authority for denouncing Ḥamzah as an infidel which he bases on the Quranic passages is false, for his translation of the text is not correct and his interpretation of it very much stretched to suit his purpose. What the text of the verse reads is actually:

Qur'ānan 'arabiyyan ghayra dhī 'iwajin la'allahum yattaqūna.

An Arabic Qur'ān without any crookedness that they may guard (against evil).

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112 What Ḥamzah is saying is in fact what the later Ash'arīs, in particular al-Māturīdī and his school, also maintain. Cf. Taftāzānī, pp. 61-66.

113 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 112, 146.

The whole context of the verses in this section of sūra thirty-nine denotes that the Qur'ān is the guiding light, the perfect Book.<sup>114</sup> Rānirī goes on further to say in his accusation that Ḥamzah adheres to the teachings of certain sects of the Jahmiyyah, that:

Kesem[b]ilan qawm Jahmiyyah [itu] Zanādiqiyah namanya. Adalah i'tiqād mereka itu dan katanya bahwa 'ālam itu qadīm dan ma'dūm itu suatu jua; dan Allāh Ta'ālā tiada ma'dūm. Maka inilah i'tiqād Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī dan Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī dan segala yang mengikut keduanya. Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr kerana firmān Allāh Ta'ālā: 'Wa'l-Lāhu khāliq kullī shay'in' - ya'nī: 'Allāh jua yang menjadikan segala sesuatu.' Shahdān. Adalah segala Ahlu'l-Sunnah wa'l-Jamā'ah ittifaq mengatakan barangsiapa meng-i'tiqādkan bahwa ma'dūm itu suatu shay' maka ia itu kāfir. Mereka itulah yang bernama Aṣḥābu'l-Hayūlā; ertinya, yang mengi'tiqādkan a'yānu'l-thābitah itu ada berwujūd.<sup>115</sup>

The ninth sect of the Jahmiyyah is called the Zanādiqiyah. They believe and say that the World is eternal and is also non-existent, whilst God [Who is also eternal] is not non-existent. This is the belief of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī and Shamsu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī and all their disciples. Such belief is infidelity, for God says: 'God is the Creator of every thing.'

Shahdān. All the Ahlu'l-Sunnah wa'l-Jamā'ah agree in saying that whosoever believes that the non-existent is a thing then he is an unbeliever. They are those who are called the Aṣḥābu'l-Hayūlā, meaning those who believe that the fixed essences are existent beings.

Here we have a glaring example of Rānirī's distortion of Ḥamzah's concept of the relationship between God and the Universe, or if

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<sup>114</sup> 39:22, 23, 27, 28. Nowhere is it said that the Qur'ān is "not created".

<sup>115</sup> Tibyān, pp. 76-77.

not distortion it can only mean his ignorance of the true nature of Ḥamzah's teachings. The belief of the Jahmiyyah to which he refers here, that the World is eternal and is also non-existent, whilst God is eternal but existent, is also the belief of certain Philosophers, Ibn Rushd being one of its famous advocates.<sup>116</sup> But in this belief the assertion is that there are two eternal beings - God and the Universe. God is eternal, but He is without agent or cause; whereas the Universe, being likewise eternal, is with an agent and a cause. This is not what Ḥamzah believes. For Ḥamzah there is only one eternal being. This eternal being he conceives now as God, now the Universe. He draws no distinction between the contingent and the necessary. To him these distinctions are merely mental, not real, for the contingent in reality is the necessary coupled with a non-existent or subjective relation. The Universe, then, is not created from nothing, for this would mean, in a sense, that it has acquired existence. But that Rānīrī should assert that Ḥamzah believes the non-existent to be a thing (shay'), and the fixed essences (a'yānu'l-thābitah) to be existent beings in the sense the Materialists understand (i.e. as substantial reality) is absurd. The term shay' has nowhere been used by Ḥamzah in this connection. As for the a'yānu'l-thābitah, the terms Ḥamzah uses to describe them are:

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<sup>116</sup> See Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics; edited by J. Hastings. New York, Scribner, 1955, vol. 2, p. 263.

- 1) Modes of the divine Essence (shu'ūn dhātiyyah) as against intelligible being (wujūd 'ilmiyyah);
- 2) Formal (ṣuwarī) as against possessing the attributes of revelation (ṣifāt waḥyī: for example, revelation possesses an attribute, among others, of being infallibly effective in communicating to Man God's message, whereas the World, though considered as God's manifestation, is not effective in conveying to Man the Truth underlying it - revelation in this sense is an active, infallible agent, the World is passive and 'awaits' interpretation from Man);
- 3) Possible quiddities (māhiyyāt al-mumkināt) as against impossibilities (mustaḥillat);
- 4) Creation (makhlūq) as against the beloved (ma'shūq);
- 5) Mirrors (mir'āt) as against not-beings ('adamiyyāt);
- 6) The Universe or World ('ālam) as against not-being ('adam);
- 7) The lover ('āshiq) as against creator (khāliq);
- 8) The known (ma'lūm) as against the non-existent (ma'dūm);
- 9) The poor one (faqīr: i.e. the passive) as against the lord (amīr: i.e. the active);
- 10) Contingent being (jā'izu'l-wujūd) as against impossible being (mumtani'u'l-wujūd);
- 11) Latent modes of being (shu'ūn thubūtī) as against absolute nothingness or pure not-being ('adam maḥdī);
- 12) Possible not-being ('adam mumkin) as against static or permanent not-being ('adam sākin: i.e. a kind of receptacle for forms to exist). The 'adam mumkin has its beginning in the non-existent (ma'dūm).<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 77-78.

It should be clear from these examples that Ḥamzah does not conceive the a'yānu'l-thābitah in the superficial sense as a kind of indestructible stuff known to some philosophers as matter. From the philosophical point of view, the most serious charge, worthy of further attention, in Rānīrī's points against Ḥamzah is the charge of belief in the eternity of the World, and the logical consequence of denying to God His creative will. Only on the ground that this charge is true can Rānīrī brand Ḥamzah as a zindīq, for taking into consideration Ghazzālī's points in his refutation of the Philosophers, he would have said in this case that only the belief in the eternity of the World should incur upon its believers the branding of infidelity and punishment of death because of its violent opposition to Islām.<sup>118</sup> In this chapter I have attempted to expose the true nature of Rānīrī's criticisms of Ḥamzah's teachings and his method of attack, and I have stated that, on the basis of these findings, they are based upon prejudice crowned with ignorance of the true nature of Ḥamzah's mystical philosophy.

In the next two chapters, I shall attempt to explain Ḥamzah's concept of creation and irādah respectively in connection with his alleged belief in the eternity of the World and the denial of God's creative will. It must be pointed out that from the various quotations from Ḥamzah which I have given in this chapter, ideas

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118 Tahāfut, p. 249.

about Ḥamzah's concept of creation and God's creative will can be formed, as some of the passages quoted touch upon this very problem both implicitly and explicitly. But before we go on to this, I would like to return to Rānīrī's point about Ḥamzah's 'materialistic pantheism.' The fundamental issue which lies at the bottom of Rānīrī's distortion or misconception is the question of the definition of Being. Let us examine what each of them has to say about this.

According to Rānīrī:

Wujūd itu iaitu dhāt - ya'ni keadaan sesuatu shay'. Maka dhāt itu ada kalanya kelihatan dengan mata kepala seperti 'ālam, dan ada kalanya tiada kelihatan dengan mata kepala, tetapi menyabitkan dia 'aql dan shara', atau kashf dan dhawq. Ia itulah wujūd Allāh.<sup>119</sup>

Being is essence (dhāt), or the constituent determinant of a thing [i.e. quiddity]. This essence is at times perceptible to the eyes in the form of the external World or Universe, and at times not perceptible to the eyes, although it is established by the intellect ('aql) and by religion (shara'), or through mystical revelation or insight (kashf) and direct experience (dhawq). This [essence] is the Being of God.

Rānīrī endorses his agreement with the Mutakallimīn's categorization of being into two classes: Necessary Being and Contingent Being, or Real Being and Non-Being.<sup>120</sup> But he does not appear to accept the Mutakallimīn's concept in toto, for he goes on to give a definition of his own concept of being thus:

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119 Hujjah, p. 3.

120 Ibid., p. 4.

Kata Mutakallimīn wujud itu dua perkara: pertama wujud Allāh, kedua wujud 'ālam. Maka wujud Allāh itu wājibu'l-wujūd lagi qā'im sendirinya, dan wujud 'ālam itu mumkinu'l-wujūd - ya'nī: dijadikan Haqq Ta'ālā daripada 'adam kepada wujūd khārijī; lagi ia qā'im dengan Haqq Ta'ālā. Maka jadilah haqīqat keduanya berlain-lainan; ya'nī keadaan keduanya itu berlain-lainan kerana Haqq Ta'ālā itu qadīm lagi menjadikan, dan 'ālam itu muhdath lagi dijadikan. Maka nyatalah pada iṣṭilāh mereka itu bahwa wujud itu dua perkara: suatu wujūd haqīqī; kedua wujūd majāzī. Maka wujūd majāzī itu milik bagi wujūd haqīqī.<sup>121</sup>

According to the Mutakallimīn, there are two categories of being: firstly the Being of God, and secondly the being of the Universe or World. God's Being is Necessary Being and is self-existent, and the being of the World is Possible Being; that is, it is created and externalized by God from not-being [or nothingness] ('adam). Furthermore it is dependent for its existence upon God. Thus the two [beings] are in reality not identical; this is so because the Being of God endures from and to all eternity and is the principle of creation, whereas the being of the Universe is ever new and is created. From their [i.e. the Mutakallimīn] definition it is clear that being is two: the one Real Being, and the other Metaphorical Being. Metaphorical Being belongs to Real Being.

Adapun pada iṣṭilāh kami bahwa wujud itu esajua; iaitulah dhāt Allāh Ta'ālā. Dan 'ālam itu tiada berwujud dan tiada layak dinamai akan dia dengan nama wujud kerana ia 'adamu'l-mahd. Maka apabila adalah 'ālam itu 'adamu'l-mahd dan wujud Haqq Ta'ālā itu wujūdu'l-mahd, maka manatah jadi sewujud 'adamu'l-mahd dengan wujūdu'l-mahd? Hanya sanya adalah 'ālam itu mazhar dan zill; milik bagi Haqq Ta'ālā - ya'nī tempat nyata Haqq Ta'ālā dan bayang-bayang seperti upama rupa yang kelihatan dalam chermin bidal tamthīl. Haqq Ta'ālā itu upama yang pemilik chermin dan

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121 Ibid., p. 3.

'ālam itu upama rupa yang kelihatan dalamnya. Maka wujud Haqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam berlainan pun tiada dan bersuatu pun tiada, kerana berlainannya dan bersuatu itu menghendaki dua wujud mustaqil sendirinya. Maka apabila adalah wujud Allāh jua yang esa, dan 'ālam itu tiada berwujud, maka tiadalah jadi berlain-lainan. Daripada kerana inilah kami kata wujud Allāh dengan 'ālam esa. Jikalau ada 'ālam itu mawjūd kelihatan sekalipun tetapi tiada kebilangan wujudnya dari kerana ia tiada berwujud haqqīqī.<sup>122</sup>

According to our definition being is one; and that is the Essence of God Most Exalted. The Universe is non-existent and is not qualified to be considered as a category of being as it is Absolute Nothingness or Pure Not-Being ('adamu'l-mahd). Thus when the Universe is 'adamu'l-mahd, and the Being of God is Absolute Being (wujūdu'l-mahd), whence this identity of 'adamu'l-mahd and wujūdu'l-mahd? In truth the Universe is Appearance; depending for its existence upon the Being of God. It is the theatre of manifestation of the One Real Being - the image reflected in the allegorical mirror: God's Being is likened to the looker into the glass, the World is like the form reflected therein. Thus God's Being and the Universe are neither the same nor different, for its identity or non-identity would require two entities existing per se. So when it is only the Being of God that is existent, and the Universe is non-existent, there is then no possibility for comparison. That is why we say that the Being of God and the Universe is one. Even though to outward perception the Universe exists, existence cannot be attributed to it for in itself it does not possess real being.

Rānīrī concludes that the Ṣūfīs' concept of being and that of the Mutakallimīn are in reality identical.<sup>123</sup> This means that since he has already endorsed the Mutakallimīn's concept, he is equally endorsing the Ṣūfīs' concept which he defines thus:

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122 Loc. cit.

123 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

Adapun pendapat Ahlu'l-Sūfī itu pun dengan dalīl 'aql dan naql jua, lagi ditambah pula kashf dan dhawq. Maka ditilik mereka itu dengan mata hatinya dan dirasanya dengan perasaannya bahwa wujud itu esa jua - iaitulah wujud Allāh yang tiada kelihatan dengan mata kepada dalam Dāru'l-Dunyā ini; dan yang kelihatan dengan mata kepala itu iaitu 'ālam yang tiada berwujud seperti wujud Allāh. Maka wujud Allāh itu wujud haqīqī lagi muṭlaq, dan wujud 'ālam itu wujud majāzī lagi muqayyad - zill - dan milik bagi wujud Allāh. Maka akan zill itu tiada dapat dikata akan dia wujud, dan tiada dapat dikata akan dia 'adam muṭlaq; dari kerana jika dikata akan dia wujud, nischaya sekutulah ia dengan wujud Allāh; dan jika dikata akan dia 'adam muṭlaq, maka 'adam itu tiada ada sesuatu shay' jua pun, dan 'ālam itu ada ia kelihatan. Maka nyatalah 'ālam itu mazhar wujud Haqq Ta'ālā. Maka nisbah antara wujud Allāh dan 'ālam itu bersuatu pun tiada dan berlainan pun tiada kerana 'ālam itu mazhar dan milik bagi Haqq Ta'ālā.<sup>124</sup>

The Sūfīs too base their view upon the rational faculties and Tradition, but they add to this also mystical revelation or insight (kashf), and direct experience (dhawq). They see with the eyes of the internal perception and experience the existence of only One Real Being - and that is Allāh - Who is imperceptible to the eyes in this World, for that which is perceptible [to the eyes] does not possess real being as does Allāh. God's Being is Real Being and Absolute, and the being of the Universe is metaphorical and [a thing] determined; it is the shadow of God's Being. Of this shadow existence cannot be predicated; nor can absoluteness be attributed to this nothingness, for if it exists, then it would mean that the Universe is identical with God; and if its nothingness were absolute then it would mean that the Universe is nothing whatsoever. Yet the Universe is perceptible; so it is clear that the Universe is a manifestation of the Being of the Truth Most Exalted. The relationship between God and the Universe then is neither that of identity nor that of non-identity, for the Universe is a manifestation of, and belongs to God.

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124 Ibid., p. 6.

Having seen Rānīrī's version of the Mutakallimīn's and Ṣūfīs' concepts of being, and taking note that he endorses both, it is most inconsistent for him, in his own concept of being to assert that the Universe cannot be "considered as a category of being" on the grounds that it is "Absolute Nothingness" or "Pure Not-Being," for such a concept of Universe is held neither by the Mutakallimīn nor by the Ṣūfīs. The mumkinu'l-wujūd of the Mutakallimīn is not equivalent to the 'adamu'l-mahd of Rānīrī, for by this they mean a being which is logically possible; and for them everything is logically possible except the logically impossible. The term is regarded as synonymous with jā'izu'l-wujūd (Contingent Being). Rānīrī's meaning of the term 'adamu'l-mahd comes under the category of impossible being - that is a being that has no existence in any category of being. Rānīrī therefore contradicts himself when he says that the World, already defined by him as "Pure Not-Being" is also the "theatre of manifestation of the One Real Being." He does not seem to be aware of this contradiction. As for the Ṣūfīs' concept of the World, Rānīrī himself says that they do not conceive the World to be Pure Not-Being ('adam muṭlaq = 'adamu'l-mahd); it is not absolute nothingness as Rānīrī believes, for if its nothingness were absolute, then it would not exist at all for God to manifest Himself. Furthermore, Rānīrī says that the being of the World is neither identical nor non-identical with that of God. This implies that the World somehow exists and is not entirely Pure Not-Being,

for if it does not exist (being Pure Not-Being) then even the allusion to its being neither identical nor non-identical with God is inapplicable. Thus in spite of his emphasis on absolute negation of comparison between God and the World, Rānīrī in fact makes the comparison.

In the case of Ḥamzah the question of comparison does not arise for he draws no distinction between the contingent and the necessary. Rānīrī, on the other hand, makes a real distinction between God's Being and that of the World, whereas for Ḥamzah the distinction which Rānīrī considers real is merely mental: the being of the World is imaginary (wahmī); it is in reality God's Being plus a non-existent subjective relation. In this sense Ḥamzah's is a truer interpretation of the Ṣūfī concept of the World. Thus he says:

Dhāt Allāh dengan wujud Allāh esa hukumnya;  
wujud Allāh dengan wujud 'ālam esa; wujud 'ālam  
dengan 'ālam esa hukumnya: seperti ohayahanya,<sup>125</sup>  
namanya jua lain, pada haqīqatnya tiada lain.  
Pada penglihat mata esa, pada penglihat hati pun  
esa. Wujud 'ālam pun demikian lagi dengan wujud  
Allāh: esa; kerana 'ālam tiada berwujud sendirinya.  
Sungguh pun pada zāhirnya dia berwujud, tetapi  
wahmī jua, bukan wujud haqīqī; seperti bayang-  
bayang dalam chermin, rupanya ada haqīqatnya tiada.<sup>126</sup>

The Essence of God and His Being is one; His  
Being and the Being of the Universe is one; the being

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125 The pronominal nya refers to the sun. See below pp. 67-68.

126 Ḥamzah Fansūrī, p. 128.

of the Universe and the Universe is one; the like of which is, as it were, its [i.e. the sun's] light; different only in name but not in truth. To external perception it is one; to the eye of the internal perception it is also one. So is the being of the Universe in relation to God's Being - it is one; for the Universe considered independently does not exist. Although outwardly it exists it is [nothing] but Appearance and not Reality; like the image [reflected] in the mirror, though possessing form, does not possess real being.

A comparison of Ḥamzah's definition of being with that of Rānīrī reveals that there is no real distinction between the real content of what they conceive as being. Differences between what they say are those of expression. Ḥamzah as a Ṣūfī begins his definition or conceives being from the point of view of the Absolute, whereas Rānīrī, whom I consider not as a Ṣūfī but as a representative of religious officialdom, begins his definition from the relative point of view. The conclusion arrived at by both is identical: that there is only One Real Being. However, Rānīrī seems to have interpreted Ḥamzah's conception of the relationship between God and the Universe as one which resembles that of the heretical Wujūdiyyah which he explains thus:

Kata Wujūdiyyah yang mulhid bahwa wujud itu esa; iaitulah wujud Allāh. Maka wujud Allāh yang Esa itu tiada ada ia mawjūd mustaqil sendirinya yang dapat dibezakan melainkan dalam kandungan sekalian makhlūqāt jua. Maka adalah makhlūqāt itu wujud Allāh, dan wujud Allāh itu wujud makhlūqāt. Maka 'ālam itu Allāh dan Allāh itu 'ālam. Bahwa sanya adalah mereka itu menyabitkan wujud Allāh yang Esa itu dalam segala makhlūqāt, serta katanya tiada mawjūd hanya Allāh.<sup>127</sup>

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127 Hujjah, pp. 9-10.

According to the heretical Wujūdiyyah, being is one; and that is the Being of God. This Absolute Being of God does not exist by Itself by which It can be distinguished save in relation to the creatures. Hence the creatures are God's Being and the Being of God is the being of the creatures. The World is then God, and God is the World. In this way they affirm [as inseparable] God's Absolute Being with the being of the creatures, and they say that nothing exists but God.

But what Ḥamzah means when he says that "the Essence of God and His Being is one; His Being and the being of the Universe is one; ..." is not that there are two entities existing per se identified as one as Rānīrī believes. In Ḥamzah's definition, apart from God's Being which is also that of His Essence, all other similar terms such as the 'being' of the Universe, and so forth, are to be taken in the metaphorical sense. Ḥamzah himself gives us his explanation on this point:

Adapun kepada 'Ulamā' shari'at Dhāt Allāh dengan wujud Allāh dua hukumnya; wujud 'ilmu dengan 'ālim dua hukumnya; wujud 'alam dengan 'alam dua hukumnya; wujud 'alam lain, wujud Allāh lain. Adapun wujud Allāh dengan Dhāt Allāh mithl matahari dengan chahayanya; sungguh pun esa, pada penglihat mata dan penglihat hati, dua hukumnya: matahari lain, chahayanya lain.

Adapun 'alam, maka dikatakan wujudnya lain kerana 'alam seperti bulan beroleh cahaya dari-pada matahari. Sebab inilah maka dikatakan 'Ulamā': "Wujud 'alam lain daripada wujud Allāh. Wujud Allāh dengan Dhāt Allāh lain."

Maka kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk: "Jika demikian, Allāh Ta'ālā diluar 'alam atau dalam 'alam dapat dikata; atau hampir kepada 'alam atau jauh daripada 'alam dapat dikata." Pada kami, Dhāt Allāh dengan wujud Allāh esa hukumnya; wujud Allāh dengan wujud 'alam esa ...

Adapun ittifaq 'Ulamā' dengan Ahlu'l-Sulūk pada Dhāt semata. Sungguh pun Dhāt dapat di'ibaratkan, tetapi tiada lulus pada 'ibarat kerana tiada diatas

akan Dia, tiada dibawah akan Dia, tiada dahulu akan Dia, tiada kemudian akan Dia, tiada kanan akan Dia, tiada kiri akan Dia, tiada jauh akan Dia, tiada hampir akan Dia, tiada diluar akan Dia, tiada dalam akan Dia, tiada bercherai akan Dia, tiada bertemu akan Dia; tiada dengan betapanya, dan tiada dimana, dan tiada kemana, dan tiada sekarang, dan tiada sekajap mata, dan tiada ketika, dan tiada masa; tiada Ia jadi, dan tiada Ia menjadi; tiada Ia tempat, dan tiada Ia bertempat, seperti sabda Rasūlu'l-Lāh: "Kāna'l-Lāhu wa lā shay'a ma'ahu" - ya'nī: "Dahulu Allāh, tiada suatu sertaNya pun." Kata Shaykh Junayd al-Baghdādī (rahmatu'l-Lāhi 'alayhi): "Al-āna kamā kāna" - ya'nī: "Sekarang pun seperti dahulu juga." Firmān Allāh Ta'ālā: "Subhāna'l-Lāhi 'ammā yaṣifūna" - ya'nī: 'Mahasuchi Allāh! tiada dapat diperikan'; lagi firmān Allāh Ta'ālā: "Laisa kamithlihi shay'un" - ya'nī [tafṣīrnya]: 'Tiada suatu pun barang yang kita bicharakan dengan hati kita, atau dengan ma'rifat kita, sama-sama. Ma'rifat itu bukan Dhāt; keadaan Dhāt dengan periNya jua. Sebab inilah maka kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk: "Dhāt dengan keadaanNya esa." Tetapi yang kunhinya, Dhāt itu tiada siapa datang kesana. Jangankan 'awāmm, Walī dan Nabī dan Malā'ikatu'l-Muqarrabīn pun tiada datang kesana.128

According to the 'Ulamā' of the Prescribed Law, the judgment concerning the Essence of God and His Being is that they are two; [similarly,] the being of knowledge and knower are two; the being of the Universe and the Universe are two; the being of the Universe is different from the Being of God. The Essence of God and His Being is like the sun and its light; although they are one, yet to external and internal perception the judgment is that they are two: the sun is different from its light.

As to the Universe, the reason why it is said that its being is different [from that of God], is because the Universe is like the moon deriving its light from the sun. This is the reason why the 'Ulamā' say: "The being of the Universe is different from the Being of God. God's Being and His Essence are different."

The Itinerants say: "If this is the case, then God can be referred to as being 'outside' or 'in' [the Universe]; or 'near' the Universe or 'far' from it." To us, the Essence of God and His Being is one; His Being and the being of the Universe is one ...<sup>129</sup>

In reality the 'Ulamā' and the Itinerants are in complete agreement with respect to the Essence. Although the Essence can be expressed in words in reality expression falls short of the truth, for It is not 'above', It is not 'below', It is not 'before', It is not 'after', It is not to 'the right', It is not to 'the left', It is not 'far', It is not 'near', It is not 'outside', It is not 'in', It is not 'separate', It is not 'joining'; [It is] without 'how' or 'what', without 'where' [i.e. being at a place], without 'where' [i.e. being to a place], without 'now', without a 'twinkling of an eye' without 'instant', without 'time'; It does not 'become', nor is It 'becoming'; It is not a 'place' nor has It a 'place', as the Messenger of God says: "There 'was' only God, no thing ['was'] with Him." Shaykh Junayd al-Baghdādī (God's mercy be upon him!) says: "It is now as it was then." God says: 'Glory be to God! Who cannot be described'; and God says further: 'There is no thing like unto Him' [the interpretation of] which means: not one single thing which we discuss with our hearts and with our knowledge attains to knowledge of Him. Our knowledge is not [of] the Essence; [it is of] the existence of the Essence and Its modes. This is why the Itinerants say: "The Essence and Its existence is one,<sup>130</sup> but in reality none may reach the Essence. Let alone the general masses [of the Faithful], even the Saints, Prophets, and Archangels may not reach It.

The cardinal point about the distinction between the heretical and the true Wujūdiyyah is, as Rānīrī rightly explains, that with

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<sup>129</sup> See above pp. 65-66.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. Ibnu'l-'Arabī in 'Affīfī, pp. 1-9.

the former, though they too assert that there is only one being which is the Being of God, "this Absolute Being of God does not exist by Itself by which It can be distinguished save in relation to the creatures." What Ḥamzah says in the passage quoted is self-evident in denouncing such a belief. Ḥamzah clearly says that God is self-subsistent; that He is logically prior to all other beings, which means that His existence is not determined by His relation to the creatures.

Another important point in connection with this problem is the identification of essence and existence as one and the same thing. Rānirī says:

Maka nyatalah pada iṣṭilāḥ Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī bahwa wujūd dan haqīqat itu esa jua pada ma'nanya; iaitulah Dhāt Haqq Ta'ālā. Maka murād daripada haqīqat pada iṣṭilāḥ Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī itu iaitu: Al-haqīqatu mā bihi'l-shay'u huwa huwa. Ertinya: Yang haqīqat itu suatu shay' yang dengan dia [jadi] shay' itu - ia ia (ya'nī barang suatu shay' yang jadi ia daripada suatu shay'). Maka suatu shay' itu haqīqat - upama haqīqat periuk itu kisaran<sup>131</sup> dan haqīqat perahu itu tukang. Dan murād daripada haqīqat pada iṣṭilāḥ Manṭiqiyyīn itu iaitu: Al-haqīqatu mā yakūnu'l-shay'u bihi ka'l-hāyawāni'l-naṭiqi bi'l-nisbatī ilā'l-insāni. Ertinya: Yang haqīqat itu barang sesuatu shay' yang dengan dia ia, seperti hayawān nāṭiq dengan nisbah kepada insān (ya'nī haqīqat insān itu hidup yang berkata-kata). Maka nyatalah pada iṣṭilāḥ Manṭiqiyyīn haqīqat sesuatu shay' itu diri sesuatu shay'. Maka ikhtilāf ikhtiyār Mutakallimīn dan Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī pada menyabitkan wujūd Allāh dengan wujūd 'alam itu ikhtilāf lafẓī jua, bukan

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<sup>131</sup> See below p. 155.

ma'nawī; seperti kata orang 'lima belas' dengan 'tengah dua puluh'. Maka pada ma'nānya sama jua, dan pada lafaznya berlain-lainan.<sup>132</sup>

It is clear that according to the definition of the Sūfīs existence and real essence are, in point of meaning, one and the same; and that is the Essence of God. The meaning of the Sūfīs' definition of the real essence [of a thing] is that: 'Essence is what makes a thing what it is' - that is - the thing from which a thing becomes; and this 'thing' [or essence] is reality. As for example, the reality [or essence] of the pot is the wheel,<sup>133</sup> and the reality [or essence] of the boat is its maker. According to the definition of the Logicians: 'Essence is what makes a thing what it is as rationality is to man' - that is - the essence of man is his rationality. It is evident that the meaning of the Logicians' definition [of the term essence] is quiddity. The differences between the endeavours of the Mutakallimīn and the Sūfīs in their affirmation of God's Being and that of the Universe, are differences in expression, not in meaning; as people say 'fifteen' and 'twenty minus five'. The meaning is identical although the expression is not.

All that which Rānīrī says here is confused and his conclusion is false. In the first instance Rānīrī makes an effort to reconcile the Mutakallimīn's definition of essence with that of the Sūfīs by incorporating both, the premises of the former and the conclusion of the latter, into an amalgam. The Mutakallimīn would in fact define essence thus:

The real essence (al-ḥaqīqatu) of a thing and its quiddity (al-mahīyyatu) are that which constitutes the identity of a thing (mā bihi 'l-shay' u huwa huwa), as is exemplified by the application of the term "rational (nāṭiq) animal"

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132 Hujjah, pp. 6-7.

133 I would have thought, in order to be consistent, that the reality of the pot should be the potter, not the wheel!

to man in contrast to the application of the terms "laughing animal" and "writing animal"; in which case it is possible to conceive of man as not being described by the terms "laughing" and "writing", inasmuch as they [laughing and writing] are accidents. And it may be said further that that which constitutes the identity of a thing is, with respect to its being verified as having external reality, a real essence; and with respect to its being individualized, it is a certain particular thing (huwīyyah), but without respect to either of these it is a quiddity.<sup>134</sup>

From this it is clear that according to the Mutakallimīn's point of view the real essence of the pot is not the potter, nor that of the boat the maker; but that the real essence of the pot is the clay which is ultimately reducible to particles which cannot be further divided, and the real essence of the boat is the combination of wood and iron and so forth, all of which is also ultimately reducible to their respective atoms. The Mutakallimīn - the later Ash'arīs - conceive the Universe to be a series of accidents created by God, but their theory of the Universe itself is atomistic, as the following passage shows:

According to the Ash'arite school of thinkers, then, the world is compounded of what they call jawāhir - infinitely small parts or atoms which cannot be further divided. Since the creative activity of God is ceaseless the number of the atoms cannot be finite. Fresh atoms are coming into being every moment, and the universe is therefore constantly growing. As the Qur'ān says: "God adds to His creation what He wills." The essence of the atom is independent of its existence. This means that existence is a quality imposed upon the atom by God. Before receiving this quality the atom lies dormant, as it were, in the creative energy

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<sup>134</sup> Taftāzānī, p. 11. It is interesting to note that Rānīrī has translated this work into Malay under the title of Durrat al-Farā'id bi Sharh al-'Aqā'id. Cf. Winstedt, R.O., A history of classical Malay literature, JMBRAS, vol. 31, pt. 3, June 1958, p. 120.

of God, and its existence means nothing more than Divine energy become visible. The atom in its essence therefore has no magnitude; it has its position which does not involve space. It is by their aggregation that atoms become extended and generate space.<sup>135</sup>

It is clear here that the Mutakallimīn assert that the atom in its essential nature is independent of its existence, although it will remain as such only as long as the accidents occur. If God ceases to create the accidents, the atoms will cease to exist as such. From this two propositions arise: firstly, as a result of the accidents which are perpetually changed and renewed, nothing has a stable nature; secondly, atoms exist independently in order that the accidents may act upon them. The Ṣūfīs wholeheartedly accepted the first proposition, but they violently disagreed, on the other hand, with the Mutakallimīn's assertion that numerous substances - atoms exist independently upon which the accidents depend. The Mutakallimīn have defined an accident as a being which is not independent and self-existent, but depends for its existence on other accidents, or on essence or substance. The Ṣūfīs, however, believe that the Mutakallimīn's theory of accidents is contradictory, for while asserting that accidents depend upon the atoms in order to occur, they have failed, according to the Ṣūfīs, to see that the atoms, which they have put into the category of essence, will cease to exist if the accidents cease to exist.

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<sup>135</sup> Iqbāl, M., Six lectures on the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, Lahore, 1930, p. 95. Cf. also Taftazānī, p. xxv.

Thus both are in reality interdependent, and since the atoms themselves are continuously prevailed upon by the accidents, it can be said that there never was a time when the atoms are free of accidents. From the point of view of the Sūfīs, nothing exists per se, other than the One Real Being, underlying all existence. According to Jāmī, the accidents do not pertain to the atoms, but to a "single substance" - the Reality upon which depends all existence and which is the cause of all existence:

They [i.e. the Mutakallimīn] have not grasped the fact that the universe, together with all its parts, is nothing but a number of accidents, ever changing and being renewed at every breath, and linked together in a single substance, and at each instant disappearing and being replaced by a similar set. In consequence of this rapid succession, the spectator is deceived into the belief that the universe is a permanent existence. The Ash'arīs themselves declare this when expounding the succession of accidents in their substances as involving continuous substitution of accidents, in such wise that the substances are never left wholly void of accidents similar to those which have preceded them.<sup>136</sup>

The "single substance" Jāmī speaks of is God Who reveals Himself, but never during two consecutive moments, in the myriad forms of the various grades of being making them manifest to the senses. The Truth (al-Haqq), or God, is not to be identified with these variegated forms of phenomena that make up the universe of change.

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<sup>136</sup> Lawā'ih fī bayān ma'ānī 'urfāniyyah; translated by E.H. Whinefield and M.M. Qazvinī, London, Royal Asiatic Society, 1928, p. 30. Hereafter cited as Lawā'ih. Cf. Ibnu'l-'Arabī in Nicholson, p. 154.

It is that all-pervasive, all-persistent essence of these myriad grades of being. Here then we come to the Ṣūfīs' definition of essence. Jāmī says:

When one defines man as a "rational animal"; and animal as a "growing and sentient body, possessed of the faculty of voluntary movement"; and body as "a substance possessing three dimensions"; and substance as an "entity which exists per se and is not inherent in any other subject"; and entity as "an essence possessed of reality and necessary being" - all the terms used in this definition come under the category of "accidents", except this vague essence which is discerned behind these terms. For "rational" signifies an essence endued with reason; "that which is growing" signifies an essence endued with the faculty of growth;" and so on.<sup>137</sup>

Jāmī goes on to affirm that this vague essence is in fact the Truth, the Very Being - God.

To return to Rānīrī, it should be clear by now that his assertion that the differences of the Mutakallimīn and that of the Ṣūfīs in their affirmation of God's Being and that of the Universe are merely those in expression and not in meaning, is false for there is a real difference in what they mean and conceive; and this real difference has its roots in their conception of the nature of the real essence of things. But Rānīrī ignores - or does he not see? - this real distinction between the Mutakallimīn's and Ṣūfīs' point of view, for in spite of this he says:

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<sup>137</sup> Lawā'ih, p. 33.

Maka berhimpunlah<sup>138</sup> sekalian Ahlu'l-Sūfī dan segala Mutakallimīn mengatakan: "Al-ʿālamu bi jamīʿi ajzāʾihi a-rādun wa'l-ma'rūdū huwa'l-Lāhu" - ya'nī: "Yang ʿālam dengan segala suku-sukunya [itu] beberapa ʿarad, dan ma'rūd itu iaitu Haqq Ta'ālā." Maka murād daripada ʿarad itu pada istilāh mereka itu: "Al-ʿaradu lā yabqā zamānayni"<sup>139</sup> - ya'nī: "Yang ʿarad itu tiada ia kekal pada dua masa." Dan murād daripada ma'rūd itu iaitu wujūd Allāh yang azalī lagi abadi. Ialah yang qā'im sendirinya dan ialah yang mengqiyāamkan<sup>140</sup> bagi lainnya. Maka tiadalah dinamai akan ʿālam itu dengan nama wujūd; hanya sanya adalah dinamai akan dia dengan nama zalālat dan lā shay', bāṭil dan khayālī dan sarābī dan ḡillī jua.

Maka apabila adalah ḥāl ʿālam itu demikian - ya'nī tiadalah kebilangannya itu jikalau kelihatan pada penglihat mata sekalipun - maka tiadalah menduai wujūd Haqq Ta'ālā. Sebab inilah kata mereka itu bahwa Haqq Ta'ālā dengan ʿālam itu esa. Bukan maqṣūd mereka itu bahwa ʿālam<sup>141</sup> dengan Haqq Ta'ālā sewujūd dan bersuatu. Kerana itulah kata mereka itu bahwa Haqq Ta'ālā dengan ʿālam berlainan pun tiada dan bersuatu pun tiada, kerana berlainannya dan bersuatunya itu menghendaki dua wujūd. Hanya sanya adalah ia milik bagi Haqq Ta'ālā.<sup>142</sup>

All the Sūfīs and the Mutakallimīn are in concerted agreement in asserting that: "The world together with all its parts is nothing but a series

138 See below p. 170.

139 Rānirī's note on the margin says:  
Ya'nī adalah ʿarad itu berubah-ubah lagi berganti-ganti dan hilang. Maka datang yang ganti sebagainya pada tiap-tiap nafas dan ketika.

140 See below p. 171.

141 Rānirī's note on the margin says:  
Ya'nī sebab dinamai akan ʿālam itu lā shay' kerana ia tiada shay' ḥaqīqī pada tiap-tiap nafsu'l-amr dirinya, tetapi adalah shay' pada pihak dijadikan Allāh akan dia.

142 Hujjah, pp. 21-22.

of accidents; and that of which they are accidents is God." The meaning of 'accident' in their terminology is: "An accident [is a thing that] does not endure two instants of time."<sup>143</sup> The meaning of 'that upon which the accidents depend' is God's Being, Eternal, Beginningless. He is the self-subsistent One, and He is the One Who gives subsistence to others. Hence the World is not fit to be categorized as 'being' - it is called 'darkness', 'not-being', 'false', 'imagination' and 'mirage'; it is nothing but a shadow.

When that the World is such - that is, its existence cannot be categorized as 'being' even though it is perceptible - it cannot then be an other existent apart from God the Exalted. This is the reason why they say that God and the Universe is one. They do not intend it to mean that the World<sup>144</sup> and God are one being and identical. This is why they say that God and the Universe are neither the same nor different, for their identity and non-identity would require two entities existing per se. It [i.e. the Universe] belongs to God.

From all this (!) one cannot help but come to the conclusion that Rānīrī is in fact saying the same thing as what Ḥamzah has more clearly said. It has revealed to us a Rānīrī who is in that impossible situation of wanting to be both a Mutakallim and a Ṣūfī and who, deceiving himself into the belief that he has reconciled the two, actually pays his respects to and shows due reverence for the latter.

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<sup>143</sup> Rānīrī's note: The accidents change, come in succession, and disappear. Others like them come and replace them at each breath and instant.  
Cf. Lawā'ih, p. 30.

<sup>144</sup> Rānīrī's note: The reason why the World is not-being [or not-thing] is because it never becomes a real thing at each breath of its appearance, but it is a thing insofar only as God creates it.

## CHAPTER IV

The teachings of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī

Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī was a wandering mystic learned in the doctrines of the Ṣūfīs. He had travelled in the Middle East and in the Indonesian Archipelago. He visited Siam, Malaya, and Java. He had journeyed far and wide, he tells us, in quest of God whom he finally discovered within his self:

Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī didalam Makkah  
Menchari Tuhan di Baytu'l-Ka'bah  
Di Barus ke Kudus terlalu payah  
Akhirnya dapat didalam rumah.<sup>145</sup>

Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī in Makkah once stays  
Searching the Ka'bah for God he dismays  
from Barus to Kudus weary his gaze  
At last in his house he finds that He stays.

He spoke and wrote fluently Malay, and apparently Arabic and Persian, and perhaps certain other languages of the Indonesian Archipelago. From one of his stanzas he tells us that he belonged to the Qādiriyyah Order:

Ḥamzah nin asalnya Fanṣūrī  
Mendapat wujud ditanah Shahar Nawī  
Beroleh khilāfat 'ilmu yang 'ālī  
Daripada 'Abdu'l-Qādir Sayyid Jīlānī.<sup>146</sup>

I, Ḥamzah, who am of Fanṣūr a son  
At Shahar Nawī my being have won  
The knowledge sublime I acquired from one  
Called 'Abdu'l-Qādir Sayyid of Jīlān.

In another he informs us that he was of humble Malay origin:

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<sup>145</sup> Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 45. See also p. 89.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., pp. 107-108.

Hamzah miskin orang 'uryānī  
Seperti Ismā'īl menjadi qurbānī  
Bukannya 'Ajamī lagi 'Arabī  
Senantiasa wāṣil dengan Yang Bāqī.<sup>147</sup>

Naked and poor is Hamzah Fanṣūrī  
Alike to an Ishmael a sacrifice he  
Neither of Persia nor of Araby  
Yet he is at one with God constantly.

Hamzah Fanṣūrī's dates of birth and death are unknown and to my knowledge have not yet been established. But it would appear to me that he flourished during the period of Sulṭān 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh who reigned from 1588 to 1604. My opinion is based upon a short poem by Hamzah entitled Ikat-ikatan 'ilmu'l-nisā'.<sup>148</sup> From this is evident that he was apparently ordered by that Sulṭān to compose the poem - or at least he dedicated the poem to the same Sulṭān:

Hamba mengikat sha'ir ini  
Dibawah haḍrat raja yang walī ...<sup>149</sup>

There is no doubt that the "saintly king" referred to in the last line quoted was 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh, who was also known as Shāh 'Ālam<sup>150</sup> and who in Achehnese tradition was famous under the

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147 Ibid., p. 104.

148 For this poem see ibid., pp. 65-70.

149 Ibid., p. 69.

150 See Hikayat Acheh, p. 169, para. 243; also p. 192.

title Sayyid al-Mukammal,<sup>151</sup> for immediately following the above lines, he says:

Shāh 'Ālam raja yang 'ādil  
Raja quṭub yang sempurna kāmīl  
Walī Allāh sempurna wāṣil  
Raja 'ārif lagi mukammīl.<sup>152</sup>

But there is still a puzzle, as in the same poem Sulṭān Iskandar Muda, who reigned from 1607 to 1636, is also mentioned by his title Mahkota 'Ālam.<sup>153</sup> This would give the impression that Ḥamzah was still alive at least during the early part of Iskandar Muda's reign, for the prince could assume the title only when he has attained to the Sultanate and not before. Such titles were to be used posthumously, but it became a tradition for the Sulṭāns to assume their respective titles as soon as they were installed as Sulṭān. However, it seems to me that the line of reasoning accepting that Ḥamzah lived in the early part of Iskandar Muda's reign, by virtue of the fact that his posthumous title is mentioned in this poem, is untenable. Why would Ḥamzah insert Iskandar Muda's royal title when the poem was written for Shāh 'Ālam? Furthermore, Iskandar Muda, at the time the poem was composed, could not have been Sulṭān and could therefore not have used the title. There seems to be an

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151 See Djajadiningrat, p. 213. See also Hikayat Aceh, p. 98, para. 74.

152 The last word in the stanza is read mukammīl to fit into the rhyme scheme. The correct form is mukammal (referring to Sayyid al-Mukammal). See Ḥamzah Fansūrī, p. 70.

153 Ibid., p. 68.

anachronism here. My solution to this problem is that the reference to Mahkota 'Ālam in the poem could very well be a later interpolation. Interpolations of this nature are not unusual in Malay works of historical and cultural significance. The Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai and the Sejarah Melayu have been subject to interpolations of this nature. Rānīrī's Bustānu'l-Salāṭīn (the author died in 1666) interpolates mention of 'Ināyat Shāh who reigned in Aceh from 1678-1688.<sup>154</sup> Ḥamzah's poem in question may not be excluded from such a possibility in this respect. But a more convincing indication that interpolation might have occurred is to study carefully the problematic stanza itself:

Berkatalah faqīr da'īf yang budiman, amat  
'ajā'ib maqām [di luar pun; ada ia khabar di  
tanah Jawa, dari Aceh Marhūm Mahkota 'Ālam]  
dihimpunkan sekalian sharat dinazarkan  
kepada rasanya yang ni'mat diturunkan ...<sup>155</sup>

It can be seen at once that the whole stanza as it appears in the form presented is nothing but a jumble of incoherent, meaningless phrases having no relation nor relevance, both in thought and form, with the preceding and succeeding stanzas, and with the poem as a whole. But if the words I have enclosed in square brackets were to

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<sup>154</sup> See Winstedt, R.O., A history of classical Malay literature, JMBRAS, vol. 31, pt. 3, June 1958, p. 120.

<sup>155</sup> Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 68. I have not altered the arrangement of the form in which it is presented by Doorenbos. The square brackets are mine. The purpose of my inserting the brackets where they are now will shortly become clear.

be removed, and the arrangement of the form slightly rearranged, their meaning, relevance, and relationship with the whole poem is established:

Berkatalah faqīr ḍa'īf yang budiman  
Amat 'ajā'ib maqām dihimpunkan  
Sekalian sharat dinazarkan  
Kepada rasanya yang ni'mat diturunkan.

In this reading, not only the form but the spirit it conveys runs in conformity with the spirit and tone of the whole poem. From this analysis it may be concluded that, if my judgment is correct, Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī lived and flourished during the period of Shāh 'Ālam.

Ḥamzah's writings reveal that he had a masterly grasp of the Arabic and Persian languages apart from his own Malay. In them too is betrayed a marked influence of Ibnu'l-'Arabī from whom he undoubtedly derived his inspiration and whom he must have regarded as his master. But influence also from Jīlī is not lacking. He must have been well acquainted also, from what is revealed in his writings, with the thoughts of Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī, Junayd, al-Ḥallāj, Ghazzālī, Rūmī, Shamsu Tabrīz 'Irāqī, Maghribī, Jāmi and others not as famous. One example here will suffice:

Jika seorang bertanya: "Jikalau  
Dhāt Allāh kepada semesta sekalian  
lengkap, kepada najis dapatkah dikatakan  
lengkap"? Maka jawab: "Seperti panas lengkap  
pada sekelian 'ālam, kepada busuk pun  
lengkap, kepada baik pun lengkap, kepada  
jahat pun lengkap, kepada Ka'bah pun lengkap,  
pada rumah berhala pun lengkap, kepada  
semesta sekalian pun lengkap; kepada najis  
tiada ia akan najis; kepada busuk tiada ia  
akan busuk; kepada baik tiada ia akan baik;

kepada jahat tiada ia akan jahat; daripada Ka'bah tiada ia beroleh kebajikan; daripada rumah berhala tiada ia beroleh kejahatan. Selang panas lagi demikian, istimewa Allāh Sunḥānahu wa Ta'ālā, Suchi daripada segala Suchi, dimana ia akan najis dan busuk"? Maka pahami olehmu kata ini.<sup>156</sup>

Should someone ask: "If the Essence of Allāh is all-pervasive and immanent in all things, can it be said that It is also immanent in impure and foul things"? Then answer: "In the same way as the sun's light is all-pervasive and sheds itself over the impure and the foul, the good and the evil, over the Ka'bah and the idol-worshippers' Temple - over everything; without itself being affected by the impurity and the foulness, the goodness and evilness of the things it pervades; from the Ka'bah it does not gain goodness, from the Temple it does not acquire evilness; so it is even more with respect to Allāh Most Exalted, Who is the Purest of the Pure. How can the impure and the foul affect Him"? Comprehend this well.

How can one doubt the origin of the above quoted passage as from other than the Lawā'ih, where Jāmī says:

When the sun sheds his light for all to share,  
It shines on foul things equally with fair;  
Fair things do not augment its radiance,  
Nor can foul things its purity impair.<sup>157</sup>

Since the devastating attack directed against him by Rānīrī, Ḥamzah has been regarded as a false Ṣūfī - in fact a 'heretic.' But was he what Rānīrī would have us believe of him? In the preceding chapter, I have attempted to show that Rānīrī's accusations of

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156 Ibid., pp. 189-190.

157 See Lawā'ih, p. 22.

'heresy' were really not founded upon learned and critical analyses of his works; that Rānīrī really did not represent his thoughts faithfully and truly at all. I have also pointed out that the most serious charge against him that merits attention is ultimately focused upon his alleged belief in the eternity of the world - together with the logical consequence of that belief; namely the question as to whether God is the Agent and Maker of the World in the sense Ghazzālī means,<sup>158</sup> or the World comes into Being by virtue of necessity, which would negate the idea that God is its Agent and Maker. I propose hereafter in this chapter to give a brief summary of the salient features of Ḥamzah's teachings which have a bearing upon the relevant point in question, in this case, the relationship between God and the Universe or World.

According to Ḥamzah, when the Throne,<sup>159</sup> Heaven and Hell, and the entire Universe together with all its parts were yet dormant, concealed in non-existence, the Essence dwelt in solitude; without names or attributes, signless. This Essence is called Huwa [He],

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<sup>158</sup> See Tahāfut, chapters I to III. See also corresponding chapters in Averroes' Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (The incoherence of the incoherence); translated from the Arabic with introduction and notes by Simon van den Bergh, London, 1954, 2v. Hereafter cited as Tahāfut al-Tahāfut.

<sup>159</sup> Compare with Ibnu'l-'Arabī's various concepts of this term in 'Affīfī, pp. 63, 66, 82.

and this is its highest name.<sup>160</sup> The name Allāh which though a step lower in grade than Huwa is the all-embracing name; for Allāh is the name in which all divine names and attributes are comprised, in the same manner as Muḥammad is the name of a person comprising his other names by which he may be called: if he possesses knowledge he is called knower; if he writes, he is called writer; if he trades, he is called trader - and so on.

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160 Huwa as such corresponds with Jīlī's al-'Amā'. See Nicholson, pp. 83, 94-95. Al-'Amā' is translated by Nicholson - at least once - as the blindness (*ibid.*, p. 94), and on three other instances as the dark mist (*ibid.*, pp. 83, 94, 97). Johns accepts Nicholson's translation of al-'Amā' as the blindness and entirely excludes the other translation given by Nicholson (Johns, pp. 16, 111). Although the dark mist is the more correct of the two translations given by Nicholson, yet both he and Johns are mistaken in translating the term al-'Amā' as Jīlī uses it as the blindness. The reason for this error is that Nicholson and Johns ascribe to Jīlī the use of the term al-'Amā' (العمى), which means the blindness, whereas in fact Jīlī uses the term al-'Amā' (الغمام), which means the dark mist, the heavy cloud about to burst. (See Jīlī's Al-Insānu'l-Kāmil, Cairo, Muḥammad 'Alī Subaīḥ, 2 vols. in 1, vol. 1, p. 30; see also Lane, E.W., An Arabic-English lexicon, London, Williams & Norgate, 8 pts. & suppl. in 4, 1863-1885, p. 2161). For an interpretation of al-'Amā', see Nicholson, p. 95 and note 1.

Thus Allāh, Glorious and Exalted, by virtue of His creating, is called Creator; of His providing His creatures, is called Provider - and so forth.<sup>161</sup>

Now when He exists by Himself as Essence He is Necessary Being, for He is self-existent and is the cause of all existence. Cause here should not be understood in the Philosopher's sense of the term, rather in al-Ghazzālī's sense of the term - as a cause in the special sense - that is that brought about by a willing agent. From Ḥamzah's point of view, the 'Ulamā' teach that God's Being (Existence) and His Essence are two different things, just as - according to Ḥamzah - the 'Ulamā' assert that knowledge and knower are not identical. In the like manner, the 'Ulamā' maintain that the Being of God and the being of the Universe are non-identical. They demonstrate their theory by employing the metaphor of the sun and its light, which though to internal and external perception are one and the same thing remain nevertheless two different things in reality. But Ḥamzah argues that if this were so, then it could be said of God that He is situated in time and space with respect to the Universe - which is absurd. We may say that the 'Ulamā' regard reality from a relative (i.e. subjective) viewpoint whereas the Ṣūfīs would conceive reality in the opposite manner - since God alone is real, He alone is the only reality. For Ḥamzah the

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161 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 125-126. Compare with Jīlī in Nicholson, pp. 94 ff.

relationship between God and the Universe is mere metaphor; since only God exists how can there be a relationship?<sup>162</sup> But God is not identical with the Universe. We predicate of Him a relative transcendence and immanence in respect of the modes of being attributed to Him. The Universe is a reflection of the modes of His Being. Hence it is said that:

Barang kita lihat, *ẓāhir* atau *bāṭin*, sekaliannya lenyap - ombak juga; ya'ni laut tiada bercherai dengan ombaknya, ombak tiada bercherai dengan laut. Demikian lagi Allāh Subhānahu wa Ta'ālā tiada bercherai dengan 'ālam. Tetapi tiada didalam 'ālam dan tiada diluar 'ālam, dan tiada diatas 'ālam dan tiada dibawah 'ālam, dan tiada dikanan 'ālam dan tiada dikiri 'ālam, dan tiada dihadapan 'ālam dan tiada dibelakang 'ālam, dan tiada bercherai dengan 'ālam dan tiada bertemu dengan 'ālam, dan tiada hampir kepada 'ālam dan tiada jauh daripada 'ālam.<sup>163</sup>

That which we perceive, whether manifest or hidden, all disappear - they are waves. The sea is not separate from the waves and the waves are not separate from the sea. Similarly God the Glorious and Exalted is not separate from the World. But He is neither in the World nor outside it, neither above nor below it, neither to the right nor to the left of it, neither before nor behind it, neither separate from nor joined to it, neither near to nor far from it.

Ḥamzah maintains that the 'Ulamā's endeavour to expound the relationship between God and the Universe in the metaphorical terms they adopt is fraught with imperfections and may lead to absurd

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162 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 128.

163 *Ibid.*, p. 153.

conclusions, for analogy cannot reach the Essence. He emphasizes that actually the views of the 'Ulamā' with regard to this problem and those of the Itinerants (Ahlu'l-Sulūk), to which he subscribes, are identical.<sup>164</sup> In Itself the Essence is transcendent:

Adapun Dhāt itu, sungguh pun dibawa kepada ibārat, kepada kunhinya tiada siapa tahu, kerana Ia tiada dapat di'ibaratkan. Sungguh pun Esa, tiada dengan esanya; sungguh pun Tunggal, tiada dengan tunggalnya. Barang Sifāt, Dhāt, Asmā' kita nisbatkan kepadaNya 'ibārat juga.<sup>165</sup>

The Essence - although It can be described by means of verbal expression - in reality is unknowable, for It can never be expressed in words. Although It is Absolute, Its absoluteness is not related to anything; although It is One and Only, Its oneness and singleness are not related to anything. We attribute to It Essence, Attributes and Names as expressions only.

What Ḥamzah means to say is not different from what Ibnu'l-'Arabī says:

Sublimity ('uluww) belongs to God alone. The essences (a'yan) of things are in themselves non-existent, deriving what existence they possess from God, who is the real substance ('ayn) of all that exists. Plurality consists of relations (nisāb), which are non-existent things. There is really nothing except the Essence, and this is sublime (transcendent) for itself, not in relation to anything, but we predicate of the One Substance a relative sublimity (transcendence) in respect of the modes of being attributed to it: hence we say God is (huwa) and is not (lā huwa).<sup>166</sup>

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164 Loc. cit.

165 Ibid., p. 148. Cf. also, p. 129.

166 Cf. Nicholson, p. 152.

But he does not follow Ibnu'l-'Arabī all the way through with respect to the manifestation of the Absolute, for we find him repeating Jīlī's systematic scheme of the process of "self-diremption" ascribed to the Absolute:<sup>167</sup>

Ketahui olehmu bahwa kunhi Dhāt Allāh itu dinamai Ahlu'l-Sulūk lā ta'ayyun. Maka lā ta'ayyun namanya kerana budi dan bichara, 'ilmu dan ma'rifat kita tiada lulus padaNya. Jangankan 'ilmu dan ma'rifat kita; Anbiyā' dan Awliyā' pun hayrān. Olehnya itu maka sabda Nabī: "Subhānaka mā 'arafnā haqqa ma'rifatika." (ya'nī: "Amat SuchiMu!, tiada kukenal sebenar kenal akan Dikau"). Dan lagi sabda Nabī: "Tafakkarū fī khalqī'l-Lāhi wa lā tafakkarū fī Dhāti'l-Lāhi" (ya'nī: "Kamu pikirkan dalam yang dijadikan Allāh; bermula: jangan kamu pikirkan kepada Dhāt Allāh.") Kerana ini maka dinamai Ahlu'l-Sulūk lā ta'ayyun. Ma'nā lā ta'ayyun: tiada nyata.

Adapun pertama ta'ayyun empat bahagi: 'ilmu, dan wujud, dan shuhūd, dan nūr. Ya'nī ta'ayyun keempatnya inilah yang bernama ta'ayyun awal, kerana daripada 'ilmu maka 'ālim dan ma'lūm nyata; kerana wujud maka yang mengadakan dan yang diadakan nyata; kerana shuhūd maka yang melihat dan yang dilihat nyata; kerana chahaya maka yang menerangkan<sup>168</sup> dan yang diterangkan nyata. Sekalian ini daripada ta'ayyun awal jua; 'ālim dan ma'lūm, awal dan ākhir, zāhir dan bāṭin beroleh nama.

Adapun ma'lūm itulah yang dinamai Ahlu'l-Sulūk a'yān thābitah. Setengah menamai [dia] haqiqatu'l-ashyā'; setengah menamai [dia] suwar 'ilmiyyah; setengah menamai [dia] rūh idāfi. Sekalian ini ta'ayyun thānī hukumnya.

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167 Cf. Iqbāl, M., The development of metaphysics in Persia, London, 1908, pp. 150-174. Hereafter cited as Iqbāl.

168 The text reads diterangkan. I have reversed the order so that menerangkan is read before diterangkan for the sake of logical consistency.

Adapun rūh insānī dan rūh hayawānī dan rūh nabātī ta'ayyun thālith hukumnya.

Adapun ta'ayyun rābi' dan khāmis, ta'ayyun jismānī kepada semesta sekalian makhlukūqāt, kepada tiada berkesudahan dan ta'ayyun juga namanya. Tiada terhisābkan ta'ayyun itu; tetapi 'ilmu, dan wujud, dan shuhūd, dan nūr, tiada bercherai dengan sekalian ta'ayyun, kerana jika tiada yang empat ini, yang Empunya ta'ayyun tiada dapat ta'ayyun. Kerana ini maka kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk [bahwa] wujud 'ālam sekalian [itu] wujud Allāh. Adapun wujud 'ālam, sungguhpun kita lihat berwujud, tiada ia berwujud, kerana wujudnya daripada wujud Muta'ayyin. Ya'ni daripada ghāfil kita jua kita sangka 'ālam berwujud.

Adapun ta'ayyun awal Aḥad pun namanya, Wāḥid pun namanya. Apabila kita lainkan Dhāt semata sendirinya Aḥad namanya. Apabila kita sertakan şifātnya dengan 'ibāratnya, Wāḥid namanya, kerana Aḥad itulah bernama Wāḥid memegang 'ālam sekalian dari pertamanya hingga kesudahannya.169

Know that the innermost Essence of God Most Exalted is called by the Itinerants 'indeterminacy.' It is called Indeterminacy because our intelligence and skill in verbal exposition, knowledge and understanding, are unable to reach It. Let alone our knowledge and understanding, even the Prophets and the Saints are struck with awe of It. Hence the Prophet said: "Glory be to Thee! I cannot really know Thee". And the Prophet said further: "Contemplate upon His creation and not upon His Essence." This is why the Itinerants call this [Essence] indeterminate, meaning non-manifest.

The first [stage] of determinacy is fourfold: Knowledge, Being, Sight, and Light. All these four are called the First Determination, for by virtue of Knowledge the Knower and the Known become manifest; by virtue of Being That which causes to be and That which becomes are manifest; by virtue of Sight the Seer and the Seen are manifest; by virtue of Light the Illuminator and the Illuminated are manifest. All these - the Knower and the Known, the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden - are of the First Determination.

The Known is called by the Itinerants the Fixed Essences. Some call it the Essences of Things, some the Cognitive Forms, and others call it the Relational Spirit. All these are the Second Determination.

The human, animal, and vegetal spirits are the Third Determination.

The Fourth and Fifth Determinations encompass the realm of physical things in its entirety, comprising the whole Universe and all created things [therein].

Determinations never cease to occur and are without limit; but Knowledge, Being, Sight, and Light are never separate from them, for without these four, the Possessor of these Determinations is unable to determinate. This is why the Itinerants say that the being of the entire Universe is the Being of God. The World's being, though perceived as existent nevertheless does not exist for it derives existence from the determinate Being. Our lack of awareness makes us believe that the World exists.

The First Determination may be called [both] ahad or wāhid. When we regard the Essence by Itself it is called ahad, but when we regard the Essence together with its attributes and names then It is called wāhid, for ahad is wāhid sustaining the Universe and holding it together from its beginning to its end.

Employing poetic imagery, Ḥamzah compares the Essence, dwelling signless without names or attributes, to the motionless Ocean of Indeterminacy or lā ta'ayyun. The noonday brightness of human intellect is unable to venture into or fathom this Ocean - it is beyond the comprehension of the intellect. The Essence is said to determinate Itself by descents or tanazzulāt which It accomplishes in six stages or martabat; journeying from and returning to Itself completing a full cycle. The first stage of descent is whereby the Essence becomes individualized, as it were, in the fourfold determinacy which comprises Knowledge, Being, Sight, and Light.

When the Essence or Absolute Being, Who is the Knower gazes upon His own perfection, the Ocean heaves and waves appear and begin to surge and churn. The waves are not separate from the Ocean in the same manner as the phenomenon is not separate from the noumenon. These waves are the a'yānu'l-thābitah, that is, the Fixed Essences or the Essences of Things which have not yet become the things themselves (that is, the wujūd khārijī or external existence). The a'yānu'l-thābitah are therefore coexistent with God as ideas in His Mind. This stage of the Knower, when God looks upon Himself, is the stage of the Essences of Things and it is the Second Determination. The Third Determination is whereby the Fixed Essences are imbued with the Relational Spirit or rūh idāfī. This Relational Spirit is also sometimes identified with the Light of Muḥammad (nūr Muḥammad), the Universal Intellect (al-'Aql al-Kull), the Pen (al-Qalam), or the Tablet (al-Lawḥ). At this stage the Relational Spirit becomes separated from the Essence - the waves of the Ocean ebb and evaporate. Here occur particularizations into human, animal, and vegetal spirits. When the vapour gathers in the sky and forms into clouds it is the potentialities of the Fixed Essences at the point of bursting forth into actuality. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth stages of determination are the materialization of spirits into the World of Matter. The Relational Spirit together with the Fixed Essences actualize their potentialities by virtue of the Divine Command 'Be!' - the clouds burst forth into rain.

When the rain falls upon the earth it becomes water flowing in rivers, that is, the Relational Spirit together with the Fixed Essences and their original potentialities reacting to the Divine Command. The rivers flow back to the absolute Ocean which never shrinks nor grows vaster though Its waves are ever ebbing and flowing. Thus the cycle is complete.<sup>170</sup>

It appears to me that Ḥamzah's system is not identical with the Neo-Platonic system of emanations, for there seems to be a clear line of distinction between emanationism and this doctrine peculiar to the Ṣūfīs. In the system of emanations propounded by the Neo-Platonists, the emanations emanate in progressive deterioration.<sup>171</sup> They become worse and worse, so to speak, as they emanate away from the Source. Further God, the Source, remains transcendent, as it were, and not present in the emanations. There are a series of emanations that go down in a descending order, the higher creating the lower and the lower reflecting the being and perfection of the higher. The Ṣūfī interpretation of the system subscribed to here by Ḥamzah is that the 'emanations' do not progressively deteriorate as they 'emanate' away from the source, for God Himself descends (tanazzul) with 'them' in a series of descents (tanazzulāt); and He does so in such a manner that we can ascribe to Him neither transcendence nor immanence with respect to

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170 Cf. Ḥamzah Fansūrī, pp. 155, 193.

171 Inge, W.R., The philosophy of Plotinus, London, 1923, 2 vols., vol. 1, pp. 122-199, especially pp. 194-196.

His 'emanations'. In fact there are no emanations in Ḥamzah's system, but only manifestations (tajalliyāt). In making this suggestion, I am contesting the view of Johns who calls Ḥamzah's system an "emanation" system despite his awareness of the fact that the Neo-Platonic emanational theory is not the same as the theory of the Ṣūfīs.<sup>172</sup> The descent of the Absolute is nothing but the various ways in which He manifests Himself to us in the course of our knowledge of Him, not in terms of emanations.

In this sense therefore the World cannot be said to exist eternally with God, for it has no existence - it is a series of accidents, and God's dynamic creative activity annihilates it after duplicating it and creates another anew.<sup>173</sup> Ḥamzah agrees with the 'Ulamā' that the World as such is a thing created and not eternal. This he clearly says:

Adapun ittifāq 'Ulamā' dan Ahlu'l-Sulūk bahwa 'ālam sekalian makhluk; hukumnya ḥādīth kerana ia maḥzar dibawah kun fa yakūnu. Jangan dikatakan qadīm.<sup>174</sup>

Actually the 'Ulamā' and the Itinerants agree that the World is created; the judgment being that it is something new, for it comes into existence by virtue of the Divine command: "Be!" It must not be said that [the World] is eternal.

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<sup>172</sup> Johns, pp. 102, 32, 19. It seems to me that it is misleading for Johns to translate the term tajalliyāt as emanations (pp. 19, 32).

<sup>173</sup> Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 137.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 136.

It would appear at first glance that Ḥamzah rejects the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. According to Ḥamzah, if the World were created from nothing it would mean that the World has acquired existence and exists apart from God. God then would be limited in a spatio-temporal system - a view which he dismisses as a metaphysical absurdity. Similarly, though the form of man may be annihilated, since form is non-existent, his spirit endures as it is from God.<sup>175</sup> Since all things are from God and must return to Him, it cannot be - so Ḥamzah argues - that God is the nothing they are created from. According to Ḥamzah following Ibnu'l-'Arabī, things exist in the Mind of God as potentialities lying dormant, as it were, in readiness to leap into life and fulfil the Divine command. When God says "Be!", it is to something that He says this, not to nothing.<sup>176</sup> But Ibnu'l-'Arabī's view implies that the World is eternal, a view which logically follows from the notion that God's creative will is determined by the Knower to act as His nature demands; and the nature of His Knowledge - at least according to Ibnu'l-'Arabī<sup>177</sup> - is determined by the objects which He knows. But here Ḥamzah departs from Ibnu'l-'Arabī and approaches Jīlī, for if we examine the system of determinations of the Absolute

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175 Loc. cit.

176 Ibid., pp. 194-195.

177 Cf. Nicholson, pp. 150-151; Iqbāl, p. 173; 'Affīfī, p. 152.

Being as he conceives it, we will find that he not only implies but clearly indicates that the judgment that God exists in Himself (the stage of lā ta'ayyun, which he calls Huwa corresponding to Jīlī's al-'Amā') is logically prior to the judgment that things exist in His knowledge:

Adapun Dhāt semata tiada dengan sifāt, itulah yang pertama hukumnya. Apabila Ia menilik diriNya, dilihatNya diriNya dengan sekalian shu'ūnNya. Pada ketika<sup>178</sup> itu yang menilik bernama 'ālim, yang ditilik bernama ma'lūm, tilik-menilik bernama 'ilmu.<sup>179</sup>

The Essence is without attributes - this is the first judgment. When He gazes upon Himself, He sees Himself with all His modes. At that 'instant' the Seer becomes the Knower, the Seen becomes the Known, and Seeing becomes Knowledge.

In this case, as Jīlī points out:

... The former judgment involves the non-existence of things and the existence of God alone. God brought things from not-being into being and caused them to exist in His knowledge, then He brought them forth from His knowledge and caused them to exist externally.<sup>180</sup>

From this it should be clear that Ḥamzah's rejection of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in the sense he means is not an affirmation of the doctrine of the eternity of the World. What he means to expose in rejecting that doctrine is the error of conceiving the

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178 Doorenbos' reading is incorrect: ketiga. It is out of context and should be read as ketika.

179 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 130.

180 Cf. Nicholson, p. 103; Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 145.

notion of the priority of time, instead of logic, in the concept of creation. He is consistent enough in his exposition of the doctrine that God alone is eternal, together with His seven attributes of Life, Knowledge, Will, Power, Speech, Hearing and Sight. Other attributes such as Creator, Provider, and so on, become manifest only at the instance of the Divine Command. When God commands the potentialities of the Known to be they become (i.e. actualize as external existence) complete and perfect, for if they are not perfect the implication is that there is some flaw in God's knowledge and that His creative activity would have been in vain. All affairs that come under the sway of the Divine command (i.e. 'after' God's command to be) are created (makhlūq); and all that is 'before' God's command to be is neither created nor uncreated as they are modes of the divine Essence. Thus, for example, the domain of the spirit (rūḥ), as Ḥamzah deduces from his interpretation of the Quranic passage -

And they ask you about the spirit. Say: The spirit is by the commandment of my Lord, and you are given aught of knowledge but a little<sup>181</sup> .

is neither created nor uncreated.<sup>182</sup> The World and man (not his spirit) are created as they come into existence in obedience to God's creative Word, without which they will never become actualized as external existence. Neither the World nor man is coeternal with

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181 Qur'ān 17:85.

182 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 136.

God, and they cannot be 'identified' with Him. According to Ḥamzah, the 'Ulamā' conceive the Known and its potentialities to be something new, created, separated from the Essence, like the building created by the builder.<sup>183</sup> His argument is that it would follow that if He produced them from nothing they were logically unknown to Him 'before' He caused them to exist in His knowledge.<sup>184</sup> The concept of creation ex nihilo, as Ḥamzah understands it, must logically be involved in a notion of time sequence which is unacceptable with respect to God. Jīlī would say - and Ḥamzah would agree with him - that between the not-being of things and their existence in His knowledge, there is no time sequence. God knows them as He knows Himself, but He is eternal and they are not.<sup>185</sup>

It is also significant that Ḥamzah follows Jīlī in his concept of God's power (qudrah). For Ibnu'l-'Arabī, God's knowledge is determined by the things He knows as the condition of the sea is determined by the waves. But Ḥamzah says that the things He knows exist because of His knowledge of them - the condition of the waves is determined by the sea.<sup>186</sup> God's knowledge of things is not derived from the necessity of their natures - rather it is His

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183 Ibid., p. 138. Cf. Tahāfut, p. 70.

184 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 138, 135-136.

185 Cf. Nicholson, p. 103.

186 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 137, 143. Cf. Jīlī in Nicholson, p. 102.

knowing them that caused them to become objects of His knowledge. The judgment that God has knowledge of things presupposes His possession of the power to have knowledge and exercise His creative Word upon the things known, decreeing that every individual thing should be what its nature required it to be.<sup>187</sup>

What has been said would suffice us to conclude that Ḥamzah, in conformity with the teachings of the Sūfīs, never held the belief in the eternity of the World as Rānīrī holds him out to do. The World is not even the a'yanu'l-thābitah. It is only a reflection of them - an idea in the Mind of God. Only when God wills it to be does it become, from our point of view, actualized as external existence. However, Ḥamzah follows Ibnu'l-'Arabī again in saying that God acts according to the demands of His nature.<sup>188</sup> All action is the necessary result of God's infinite nature as eternally known to Him. God then is the only One Who acts. All other acts including human action are metaphorical, for action implies that it proceeds from choice, will, and knowledge of the thing willed. According to al-Ghazzālī:

... If we assume an event which is based on two facts, the one voluntary, the other involuntary, the mind relates the act to the voluntary fact. Language expresses itself in the same way, for if a man were to throw another into a fire and kill him, it is the man who would be called his killer, not the fire. If, however, the term were used in

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187 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 133.

188 Ibid., pp. 139-140, 143-144, 146.

the same sense of the voluntary and the non-voluntary, why should the killing be related to the voluntary, by language, usage, and reason, although the fire was the proximate cause of the killing and the man who threw the other into the fire did nothing but bring man and fire together? Since, however, the bringing together is a voluntary act and the influence of the fire non-voluntary, the man is called a killer and the fire only metaphorically so. This proves that the word 'agent' is used of one whose act proceeds from his will ...189

Now, Ḥamzah's concept of agent and will is similar to what Ghazzālī has explained:

... Seperti seorang pandai besi. Ada sebuah besi padanya, pusaka daripada nini moyangnya. Isti'dād besi itu layak akan keris. Maka dipandangnya dengan 'ilmunya besi itu layak akan keris, maka ditempanya keris. Setelah sudah ditempanya maka dipakainya. Beberapa lama maka menikam orang dengan keris itu, dengan ikhtiyār tuan keris, tiada dengan ikhtiyār keris. Daripada awal datang kepada akhir, ikhtiyār empunya keris, tiada ikhtiyār keris ...190

... Take the example of an ironsmith. He has with him a piece of iron, a heritage from his ancestors. The potentiality of the iron is that it is suitable for fashioning into a keris.191 He perceives with his knowledge that the iron is suitable for fashioning into a keris, and so he forges it into a keris. Having forged it into a keris, he uses it. After a while he stabs a person with the keris. The act proceeds from the wielder of the keris, and not from the keris. From the beginning to the end [of the event] the act proceeds from the wielder of the keris, not the keris ...

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189 Cf. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 95; Tahāfut, p. 67.

190 Ḥamzah Fansūrī, p. 145.

191 A Malay dagger.

Ḥamzah denies free-will as applied to man. A man is what he is according to the nature of his predetermined capacity or potentiality (isti'dād).<sup>192</sup> Even God's choice in creating good and evil, belief and unbelief, works in accordance with (muwāfaqat) this law of potentiality which He Himself has made necessary and unchangeable.<sup>193</sup> If God's will and power must work in accordance with this law of potentiality, does it not therefore imply that will and power is really denied Him? Ḥamzah's answer to this is an emphatic 'no'. He says that, taking his cue from the Quranic passage, -

And if Allāh please He would certainly make you a single nation, but He causes to err whom He pleases and guides whom He pleases<sup>194</sup> -

God has the power to will what may seem contrary to the law of potentiality,<sup>195</sup> but that God does not wish to exercise this power in order to preserve His justice and perfection.<sup>196</sup> Ḥamzah's understanding of what the 'Ulamā' mean when they say that God is

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192 Ibnu'l-'Arabī uses the term isti'dād in the same sense. Cf. 'Affīfī, p. 152.

193 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 146, 197-200.

194 Qur'ān 16:93.

195 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 145, 199-200.

196 Ibid., pp. 198, 200.

all-powerful is that nothing is impossible for God to do. To Ḥamzah the impossible cannot be done by God for the simple reason that it is irrational to affirm such a thing.

In order to give a clearer picture of Ḥamzah's concept of power and will (irādah), I propose in the next chapter to embark upon the subject following the linguistic approach. This is, I think, important, for by revealing the nature of the conceptual structures of the words he uses in connection with the qudrah and the irādah, we will infallibly arrive at knowing exactly what Ḥamzah has in mind, without falling into the tantalizing possibility of reading our own interpretations into what he says.

## CHAPTER V

Hamzah Fanṣūrī's concept of  
the irādah as demonstrated  
in the conceptual structure  
of the Malay word hendak.

(a) The conceptual structure of the word hendak

The word hendak ( هندق ) devoid of affixes conveys a variety of meanings: to want, wish, desire, intend; but whatever the variety there definitely seems to be a consistent sense of will underlying it. It will become clear as we proceed that the word hendak has a limited field of application. In its concrete sense it is applied only to the animate, and not to the inanimate. Animals too are assumed to possess want, desire, intention; but whenever hendak is applied to inanimate things then the meanings it conveys are metaphorical. For the sake of systematic analysis, I will begin with the application of the word hendak in the animal world. In the sentence

Kuching itu hendak makan.  
(That cat wants to eat).

the actions of the cat are done in such a way (i.e. overtly) that we know he wants food. In the mind the cat, by virtue of a peculiar action on his part, is dominant. There seems to be no difference between English and Malay in the conceptual structure of the word want as applied in the above example. Hendak is often applied to animals with the purpose of describing human behaviour. The proverbs describe an upstart as

- (i) Pachat hendak manjadi ular.  
(A leech eager to become a snake).
- (ii) Pipit hendak telan jagong.  
(A sparrow straining to swallow a corn-cob).

- (iii) Pipit hendak meminang anak enggang.  
(A sparrow yearning to be betrothed  
to a hornbill).

Or an equivalent to the pot calling the kettle black:

Udang hendak katakan ikan.  
(The lobster wanting to reproach the fish  
[for being dirty]).

Again, in the above examples, it can be conceived that the subject is dominant in the mind, for their peculiar actions determine that they be so conceived. Although the animals are assumed to be in possession of the sense of wanting, desiring, intending, yet their wanting, desiring, intending are restricted; and this can be clearly conceived by the very manner in which hendak is applicable to them. Whenever the word hendak is applied to animals, the subject is dominant in the mind, but this is not necessarily the case when hendak is applied to human beings - a fact that is significant in making clear the distinction (as far as it is conveyed in the conceptual structure of the word hendak) between human and animal will. We have seen how hendak applied to animals makes the subject dominant in the mind, and how this is so by virtue of the overt activity of the subject. The same conceptual pattern of the subject dominating the mind is demonstrated in the application of the verb hendakkan.<sup>197</sup> The application of hendak to human beings as a kind of challenge too makes the subject dominant

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<sup>197</sup> See below pp. 118-119.

in the mind.<sup>198</sup> Again the reason is because the subject's activity is intense - whether overt or invert - to such a degree that action becomes almost instinctive. Similarly hendakkan when applied to human beings implies a desire that seems to arise out of natural instinctive behaviour rather than will. In both these cases of the application of hendak and hendakkan to the animal and human world another important point to note is that the duration of the experience is discontinuous and short. This is why according to Malay linguistic consciousness as conceived in the application of the word hendak and its derivatives such behaviour, animal or human, cannot properly be conceived as will - it rather borders upon instinct. It is in the application of the verb hendakkan that, properly speaking, man approaches animal experience and behaviour. Such a verb is never applied to God for it is debasing and philosophically absurd; just as the noun kehendak is never applied to animals for from the point of view of concrete experience such an application is impossible.<sup>199</sup>

The sentence in English:

Where are you going?

is to be translated into Malay as:

Engkau hendak kemana?

which actually has the meaning:

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198 See below pp. 109-110.

199 See below pp. 122-125.

Where do you want to go?

or

Where are you wanting to go?

The word hendak in this sense is a one-person, one-term relation word. Further, there is a basic difference in conceptual structure between English and Malay as conveyed in this sentence, for according to Malay linguistic consciousness the object, and not the subject, is dominant in the mind here. To the Malay questioner, what is dominant in his mind is the object of the action of the one who is asked the question, which may be the market, a wedding party, the school and many other alternatives. In the questioner's mind, the one who is asked the question is thrust into the background. But of course the subject may also be dominant in the mind in certain cases. Supposing that the sequence of the sentence is rearranged so that the word hendak is said first:

Hendak kemana engkau.

then it may or may not be a question, depending upon how it is said and upon the circumstances preceding the saying of it. If it is a question, like one asked by Tun Teja to the ladies of Melaka:

Hendak kemana tuan-tuan sekalian ini?<sup>200</sup>  
(Where do you all want to go?)

then the meaning it conveys is generally identical with the one explained above. If, however, it is not a question it can mean:

Where can you go [now]?

implying a kind of challenge to one whom it is directed. If Ahmad were to say this to 'Ali, then here 'Ali would be dominant in Ahmad's mind as against the first case. It were as though 'Ali had been forced into a situation - natural or artificial - where the courses of action were extremely limited, and the time to decide which course to take short. There is a sense of urgency. In the first case, it is implied that the one who is asked the question had taken a decision, as to what course of action he would take, at leisure, and that at the time when he was asked the question he had already decided, so that his action was pre-planned. In the second case, 'Ali's decision is demanded without his being aware of the situation beforehand: a problematic situation is experienced and its solution is demanded there and then. In both these instances, the application of the word hendak describes the reality experienced

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200. Hikayat Hang Tuah, Djakarta, 1956, p. 219. This is one of the most important and widely read of Malay literatures. It was written about the 17th century (an exact date is not found), and it tells of the heroic exploits of Hang Tuah, the Malay Laksamana (Admiral) of Melaka. Most of the stories connected with Hang Tuah are quite legendary. Hang Tuah, according to the story, is said to be a contemporary of Gajah Mada, the famous Mapatih (Chief Minister) of Majapahit (14th century). Hereafter cited as Hikayat Hang Tuah.

faithfully. The existence of knowledge and choice is presupposed. Another thing is that in the second case the intensity of 'Alī's action would be greater than in the first case, and it is this expected intensity of action on 'Alī's part that makes him dominant in Ahmad's mind. A portion of the last lines of Asrul Sani's poem illustrates the second case:

Elang laut telah  
hilang kelunas kelam  
topan tiada bertanya  
hendak kemana dia ...<sup>201</sup>

In this poem, the poet speaks of a sea-hawk winging her way at dusk to her craggy nest where her young ones await her return. When the nest at last comes within sight, a sudden tempest intercepts; her wings fail her and she is hurled into the raging waters and drowns. It is obvious that the tempest had intercepted the sea-hawk many times before, each time suddenly, challenging her to struggle against his might. But this time she had succumbed to his might and is now lost in the murky depths where lie the rotting keels of wrecked boats. Now, as the last two lines suggest,

the tempest does not ask  
where is she intending to go?

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201 Elang Laut, by Asrul Sani. Quoted from Kesusasteraan Indonesia III, B. Simorangkir Simandjuntak, Djakarta, 1953, p. 134. Asrul Sani belongs to that important group of avant-garde poets and writers who appeared in 1945. This group of modern poets and writers became famous under the name of Angkatan '45, led by Chairil Anwar (1922-1949). Together with Chairil Anwar, Asrul Sani and Idrus hold a position of eminence among modern Indonesian poets and writers. Asrul Sani, born in Rao, Western Sumatra, in 1926, is also a short story writer. The Angkatan '45 influenced Indonesian literature from 1945 till about the time of the end of the Revolution. Much of their work, whose language and form depicts the times, has been markedly influenced by Western cultural forces. Kesusasteraan Indonesia III will hereafter be cited as Kesusasteraan Indonesia III.

The tempest had never really asked her a question, on the contrary, he had flung her a challenge, every time, couched in a rhetorical question.<sup>202</sup> When we say:

Orang itu hendak kena pukul nampaknya.  
(That man seems to be asking for a beating).

the subject is again dominant in the mind, and his action must be such that he warrants a beating. But this sentence has another possible meaning which changes what the mind conceives. If the word pukul (to beat) is not stressed, as it would be in the above case, then the mind does not conceive the man and his action, but also one or more persons in addition to him who are about to beat him in consequence of his action. Here it is the event that is dominant in the mind.

We have said in the beginning that when the word hendak is applied to inanimate things the meanings it conveys are metaphorical. In the sentence

Gunung itu hendak meletup.

hendak is to be understood as conveying the meaning is about to: The mountain (volcano) is about to burst (erupt). Here again what is dominant in the mind of one who says it is not the mountain, but the event of bursting or erupting and the imminence of the event. Applied in this way hendak is a metaphor. Again:

Orang itu tertawa bagai hendak pecah perutnya.

That man laughed so that his belly were  
wont to burst.

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202 See above p. 109.

In this too the event is dominant and hendak is applied metaphorically. In fact it is significant that, from the philosophical as well as semantical point of view, when used metaphorically - that is, as applied to the inanimate - hendak always impresses the event, not the subject or object, upon the mind.

Further illustrations from several famous classics in Malay literature will show clearly the meaning of hendak:

- (i) Maka ada kira-kira pukul empat petang  
keluarlah hendak berlayar.<sup>203</sup>

At about four o'clock in the evening  
[we] set out intending to sail [i.e.  
intent upon sailing].

Here hendak conveys the meaning of more than just simply setting out to sail because the weather was fine and it was therefore good for sailing. In that case hendak would simply be based upon a decision of wanting which arose out of desire requiring no prompting. But here it is the contrary; hendak arose out of the intention to

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203 Hikayat Pelayaran Abdullah: (dari Singapura ke Kelantan); Press of the Am. Miss. Singapore, 1838, p. 16. The author, 'Abdu'l-Lāh bin 'Abdu'l-Qādir Munshī (1796-1854), is of Arab-Indian descent and is regarded as the father of modern Malay literature. He wrote and edited many well-known literary works in prose, among them:

- (i) 1831 [?]: Sejarah Melayu (from the old text, re-edited in 1839-40).  
(ii) 1835: Hikayat Galilah dan Daminah, translated from the Tamil. Originally in Sanskrit from the Pancatantra.  
(iii) 1837: Kitab Adat segala Raja-raja Melayu dalam segala Negeri. (A collection of Malay customs and traditions).  
(iv) 1837 [?]: Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah, revised and re-edited in 1849.  
(v) 1854: Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah ke negeri Juddah (not completed).

Hereafter cited as Hikayat Abdullah.

proceed sailing, even though the headwind was driving them back and the mainstay had snapped asunder twice.<sup>204</sup>

- (ii) ... saya sekalian orang bahru belum tahu adat, hendak berjalan-jalan kepasar menchari bekal-bekal.<sup>205</sup>

... we are all new people (here), (we) do not yet know the custom, (we) want to walk around in the market looking for provisions.

In this case hendak is simply want. 'Abdu'l-Lāh asks a policeman about the country, which is new to him, and about its laws and regulations so that when he goes to the market he would be aware of them.

- (iii) Maka sebentar itu juga datanglah sebuah sampan hilir dari sungai, ada tujuh-delapan orang-orang raja hendak menyambut perahu saya itu.<sup>206</sup>

At the same time a sampan [kind of junk] arrived coming downstream from the river with seven or eight of the Raja's men [who came] for the purpose of welcoming my boat [or purposing to welcome my boat].

- (iv) Maka ketika memberikan surat itu maka saya pinta persembahkan juga kebawah duli hendak menghadap sendiri.<sup>207</sup>

At the moment of handing over the letter, I requested it be conveyed to the Raja that I insist on personal audience.

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<sup>204</sup> Hikayat Abdullah, p. 15.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

- (v) "Kapitan China dan segala anak bini China-China semuanya ditangkapnya, dimasukkannya kedalam kubu, sebab ia takut Kapitan China itu belot. Dan jurutulisnya dibubuhnya rantai gajah dibatang lehernya kerana ia hendak lari. Tiada diberinya berjumpa dengan seorang pun. Maka sekarang bagaimana hendak berjumpa dengan dia; jikalau hendak mati bolehlah berjumpa."208

"The Captain of the Chinese and all the wives and children of the Chinese were all of them arrested [by the ruler of Kelantan] and imprisoned in the fortress because he [i.e. the ruler of Kelantan] feared that the Captain of the Chinese would take sides [with us]. He [i.e. the ruler] put elephant chains around his [i.e. the Captain of the Chinese's] secretary's neck because he [i.e. the secretary] wanted to run away. He [i.e. the secretary] is not permitted to meet anyone. So now how can you meet him?; if you want to die, then you can meet [him]."

- (vi) "Ketahui olehmu, bahwa aku memanggil engkau ini, aku hendak bertanya bichara kepadamu: bahwa anakku yang tiada taranya seorangpun anak raja-raja pada zaman ini, itulah hendak aku persembahkan kepada raja Iskandar."209

"Know that I now summon you to draw near to me [because] I wish to discuss with you [a certain question]: that my daughter, who has no equal

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208 Ibid., p. 83.

209 Sejarah Melayu, p. 5.

among the daughters of the kings of this age, she it is whom I wish to present to Alexander."

- (vii) Maka sahut Hang Jebat: "Firasatku bahwa aku tiada dapat membunuh engkau, engkau pun tiada dapat membunuh aku pada hari ini. Adapun aku saja akan matilah rupanya, tetapi negeri Melaka ini habis binasa olehku. Itulah maka aku hendak turun mengamuk, tiada dapat, kerana engkau tiada jauh daripada pintu ini. Jika terbuka pintu ini, sekarang juga aku turun dari istana."

Hang Jebat replied: "My premonition is that I shall not be able to kill you, likewise you shall not be able to kill me today. It seems to me that I alone must die, but [first, the people of] Melaka will be eliminated by me. That is why I wish to descent and run amuk, [but] cannot, because you are not far from the door. If the door is open, I descend from the palace right now."

When the enclitic particle -lah is joined after hendak, then it gives emphasis to the word, and its meaning becomes it is desired, should, must:

- (i) "Adapun anak kita ini lagi budak, jika ada salah dan bebal perbaiki; jika ia jahat, hendaklah diantarkan kembali kepada kita."<sup>211</sup>

"This our son is yet a child, if he does wrong and is feeble-minded improve him; if he is evil, it is desired that he be sent back to us."

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210 Hikayat Hang Tuah, p. 340.

211 Ibid., p. 67.

Here the Raja Sang Purba entrusts his son Sang Jaya Nantaka, who is his heir, to the tutelage of the Bendahara and Temenggung. In this case hendaklah means it is desired, for it is the Raja's command that his son be sent back to him, on the condition expressed, and not the command of social etiquette, which is implied if should is applied, or of parental responsibility, which is implied if must is applied instead.

- (ii) Sesungguhnya hendaklah kita pun mengambil ibarat daripada hikayat itu adanya.<sup>212</sup>

Verily we too should take [heed of] the parable from the story.

These are the words of 'Abdu'l-Lāh during the course of his voyage from Singapore to Kelantan in 1838. He tells us of the story of the monkey and the weaver-bird. The monkey takes shelter from a storm under the weaver-bird's nest. The weaver-bird reproaches the monkey for being lazy not to make his own shelter. The monkey gets angry and tears the weaver-bird's nest to shreds. The parable teaches that it is vain to 'throw pearls to swine.' Hendaklah then means should, for the parable is meant to give advice to people in general. The consequences of not taking the advice may not necessarily be injurious to those who are heedless of it - although in the parable the weaver-bird's nest got torn to shreds on account of its giving advice, yet in real life giving good counsel to the

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212 Hikayat Abdullah, p. 12.

foolish and feeble-minded would not necessarily result in injury. Rather it would result in simply a wasting of effort. If hendaklah is to mean must, then what must be heeded is more emphatic than what should, for if what must be heeded is not practised, then the implication is that the consequences of such action would be injurious to the actor. Hendaklah in this sense becomes almost a condition for a course of action:

Mengumpat dan memuji hendaklah pikir  
Disitulah banyak orang yang tergelinchir.<sup>213</sup>

If you indulge in or want to do malicious  
gossip and praise [you] must think [first].  
It is there where many people fall [or slip].

By now these various examples given will suffice, I trust, to make clear the conceptual structure of the word hendak. Hendak definitely conveys the sense of voluntary action arising out of knowledge and choice, that is none other than will. This structure seldom changes with the application of affixes and compound affixes, as will be demonstrated in the following analysis.

(b) Derivatives and their conceptual structures

Derivatives of the word hendak are formed by means of affixes such as -kan and -i (suffix), ke- (prefix), meng- (prefix), and ber- (prefix). They may also be formed by means of compound affixes such

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213 Puisi Lama; S. Tadkir Alisjahbana, Djakarta, 1954, p. 80.

as di + ke ending with the suffix -i, or se + ke. In the case of the suffix -kan, originally it was derived from the word akan, which conveys a variety of meanings such as - if applied as a preposition - towards, as for, concerning, in order to, about; and - if applied as an auxiliary - shall, will. The suffix -kan has come to denote direction towards an object or time. Hendakkan means to desire towards. It is a two-person relation word, as can be seen from this example:

Jikalau sungguh tuanhamba hendakkan hamba ...

If you really have desire towards [or for] me ...

or

If you really love me ...

We must imagine one person (whatever the sex may be) saying this to another (who might even be of the same sex). But for the sake of convenience let us conceive here a woman saying this to a man who desires or loves her. It may be possible that only the man is active in his love or desire for the woman. She is the passive object. She may not even love or desire him. The direction is then one-way. It is implied that the man's desire for the woman is experienced at that time when the woman is in his presence (although this is not a necessary condition, for the object desired may be absent to the desiring subject). It is further implied that the woman is brought or brings herself to the man rather than the man going to her:

[s]←----- [o]→

In the mind the subject is dominant. Again in the sentence

Kuching itu hendakkan ikan.

That cat is yearning for the fish.

we have more or less the same conceptual pattern: the cat is dominant in the mind for he is active, his action denotes that he desires the fish which is within his sight. The inanimate is therefore excluded in the application of the verb hendakkan whose field of usage is limited only to living beings. Some examples of the application of hendakkan and the meaning underlying it can be further illustrated by these quotations from the Malay Annals:

- (i) Adapun apabila Sultan Mahmud hendakkan Seri Dewa Raja sangat datang, maka Tun Isap Berakah dititahkan baginda memanggil Seri Dewa Raja.<sup>214</sup>

Whenever Sultān Mahmūd wishes for Seri Dewa Raja to come immediately, His Majesty would command Tun Isap Berakah to summon Seri Dewa Raja.

- (ii) "Jikalau raja Melaka hendakkan aku, perbuatkan aku jambatan emas satu, jambatan perak satu, dari Melaka datang ke Gunung Ledang ini; akan peminangnya, hati nyamuk tujuh dulang, hati kuman tujuh dulang, air mata setempayan, air pinang muda setempayan, dan darah raja semangkuk dan darah anak raja yang bernama Ahmad itu semangkuk ..."215

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214 Sejarah Melayu, p. 215.

215 Ibid., p. 236.

"If the Raja of Melaka has desire for me, build for me a golden bridge and a bridge of silver that span from Melaka to Gunung Ledang; for the engagement gift, seven trayfuls of mosquitoes' heart, seven trayfuls of maggots' heart, a large jar of tears, a large jar of young areca-nut juice, a bowl of the Raja's blood and a bowl of blood from the Raja's son named Ahmad ..."

When the suffix -i is applied it should be to hendak with the prefix ke-: kehendaki. It is used interchangeably with hendakkan as the term kehendakkan is not found. Both are verbs and the distinction between them conceptually is quite fine. In kehendaki, which means (object) desired, the object desired is absent, and the -i implies that the subject looks for the object desired:

[s] —————> [o]

In the case of certain words other than hendak this can be easily explained:

Dekat	=	near
Dekati	=	to go near to (the object)
Dekat <u>kan</u>	=	to bring near to (the subject)

- (i) "Jikalau beristeri sama anak raja-raja ini, adalah raja-raja lain pun demikian juga; yang kita kehendaki barang yang tiada pada raja yang lain, itulah hendak kita peristeri. Akan sekarang kita hendak meminang puteri Gunung Ledang; Laksamana dan Sang Setia kita titahkan."216

"If I marry a daughter of these Rajas, other Rajas have the same [choice of wives]; she whom I desire should be one who is not to be found with other Rajas, such is the one whom we wish to take to wife. We now wish to ask for the hand of the Princess of Gunung Ledang; the Laksamana and Sang Setia we command [to carry out the proposal]."

The words are those of Sultān Maḥmūd of Melaka as he addresses his dignitaries. His wife is dead and he is planning to marry again. The object of his desire is the fabulous Princess of Gunung Ledang. The fact that he speaks of the Princess shows that he must have contemplated the idea of marrying her for some time. He is now hoping to win the object of his desire and if he were to win her, he would cherish her thereafter. The desire is continuous. It goes forth from the subject (Sultān Maḥmūd) to the object (Princess of Gunung Ledang). The Princess' reply to his official proposal conveyed by his representatives (page 120) makes use of the verb hendakkan. She is the passive object. She does not, in this case, seem to betray any desire for the Sultān - she may not love him. She has to bring herself or be brought to him. In fact she will give herself up if only certain conditions are fulfilled. From this example it is clear that the conceptual distinction between the verbs kehendaki and hendakkan, in addition to what has already been established, is the distinction in time. Kehendaki implies a continuous desire; hoped for before achieving the object and cherished after it has been achieved. In the case of hendakkan, the implication is that the desire is experienced in a brief span of time, and although it may be rekindled, it nevertheless is discontinuous.

By means of prefixing the particle di- to the word kehendaki is formed dikehendaki, which is a kind of passive voice of kehendaki, meaning desired. Here is an example:

"Patik sekalian sembilan orang ini semuanya patut jadi Bendahara, barang siapa yang dikehendaki duli Yang Dipertuan itulah jadi Bendahara."<sup>217</sup>

"The nine of us here are all worthy to become Bendahara, whosoever is desired by the Yang Dipertuan he shall become Bendahara."

There is no need here to elaborate upon this paragraph any further, as the analysis is sufficient for the purpose set forth in this chapter. In the next paragraph too, I will dwell only briefly with the next word for the same reason.

The word hendaki is not found by itself. It is formed to convey a definite meaning only when the prefix meng- is attached to it: menghendaki, meaning requiring, would require.

Maka wujud Haqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam  
berlainan pun tiada dan bersuatu pun  
tiada, kerana berlainannya dan bersuatu itu  
menghendaki dua wujud mustaqil sendirinya.<sup>218</sup>

Thus God's Being and that of the Universe  
are neither the same nor different, for its  
identity or non-identity would require two  
entities existing per se.

With reference to the Divine Will as conceived according to linguistic consciousness couched within the word hendak, the most important are kehendak (hendak + prefix ke-), sekehendak (hendak + compound prefix se + ke-) and berkehendak (hendak + compound prefix ber + ke-). Kehendak is a word meaning wish, will, desire; and it

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217 Ibid., p. 225.

218 Hujjah, p. 4.

is not applied to animals unless metaphorically (the same applies to the other two words in this category). The fact that it is not applicable to animals in the real sense is because linguistically it is conceived that there is in man a power of willing which does not exist in animals - insofar as we are conscious of it. In this modern pantun the word kehendak is applied in a general way:

Ruh jasmani beta serahkan  
Boleh dibuat sesuka hati  
Apa kehendak beta berikan  
Asal chinta dapat kutiti ...<sup>219</sup>

which literally translated is:

My body's spirit I surrender [to you]  
[You] may do with it what you will  
Whatever [your] wish I will grant [you]  
If only love['s path] I can traverse.

The meaning of kehendak here is quite straightforward. If Awang were to say this to Salmah, then what is dominant in Awang's mind is the object of Salmah's wish or desire. Kehendak here means what (ke) is wanted (hendak). Here are some examples from Malay literature:

- (1) "Apa kehendak tuanhamba sekalian pintalah pada kita: jikalau apa sekalipun tiada kita tahani."<sup>220</sup>

"Whatever your wish [or desire] all of you please ask from us: even if it be anything we will not refuse [or reject or deny]."

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219 Kesusasteraan Indonesia III, p. 65.

220 Sejarah Melayu, p. 213.

Here kehendak conveys an exact meaning as contained in the first example mentioned. Kehendak can also mean purpose:

- (ii) "Perahu dari mana datang ini dan siapa nama panglimanya, apa kehendak datang ini?"<sup>221</sup>

literally: "Boats [or ships] coming from where are these and what is the name of their commander, whatever is the purpose of this coming?"

Strange boats are here approaching Melaka. The people sound the alarm and make preparations for defense against what they think is an invasion. The fleet turns out to be a goodwill mission from India. To the people of Melaka then, and to the Shāhbandars who directed the above question to the strange visitors, the object (i.e. the purpose) not the subject (i.e. the ships and strangers) was dominant in their minds. But in the following case the conceptual structure changes:

- (iii) "Laksamana tiada, itulah maka berani Hang Jebat melakukan berat ringan barang kehendaknya didalam istana Raja ini, kerana dilihatnya, tiada siapa yang melebihi dia."<sup>222</sup>

"The Laksamana is absent, that is why Hang Jebat dares to make heavy or light whatever is his desire in this Raja's palace, for he sees that there is none who surpasses him [in rank]."

In example (iii) the subject is dominant in the minds of the people who say this of Hang Jebat, for he is conceived as the doer of what he desires. In this sense too is kehendak applied to God.

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221 Hikayat Hang Tuah, p. 382.

222 Ibid., p. 310.

Dengan taqdīr Allāh melakukan  
kehendakNya atas hambaNya ...

By the decree of God Who works  
His will upon His creatures ...

Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī applies kehendak in this way when he comments upon  
the Quranic verse (16:93):

Wa law shā'a'l-Lāhu laja'alukum ummatan  
wāḥidatan walākin yuḍillu man yashā'u wa  
yahdī man yashā'u.

Jika hendak menjadikan kamu ummat suatu,  
dapat, tetapi menyesatkan dengan kehendakNya,  
menunjukkan jalan yang betul dengan kehendakNya.<sup>223</sup>

Had [He] wished to make you a single nation  
He could, but [He] causes one to err by His  
will, and [He] causes one to be guided on  
the right path by His will.

And commenting upon the ḥadīth:

Lā tataḥarraku ḡarratun illā bi iḡni'l-Lāhi

he says it means:

Tiada bergerak suatu ḡarrat jua pun  
melainkan dengan kehendak Allāh jua.<sup>224</sup>

Not one single atom moves except by  
God's will.

The word hendak with the compound prefix ber + ke becomes a  
verb. It belongs to the same category as kehendaki and hendakkan.  
The ber denotes, in the case of abstract things, the idea of  
having, possessing:

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223 Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 145.

224 Ibid., p. 199.

Orang itu tiada berilmu.

That man possesses no knowledge.

or in the case of tangible things, it denotes the idea of with:

Orang itu berpakaian hitam.

That man is [clothed] with a black dress.

or the ber may denote a state of action:

Dia datang berlari.

He came [or comes] running.

Berkehendak is a two-person relation word and is applicable in the non-metaphorical sense only to human beings. In the following sentence berkehendak means to be in the state of desiring:

Mereka sedang berkehendak.

They are in the state of desiring  
[loving one another].

When applied to human beings, berkehendak suggests a mutual relationship. It is necessary that two human beings are involved; and both are dominant in the mind. Applied in this way it implies a horizontal relationship between the same level of being. The relationship is not conceived as mutual only when a human being desires something abstract, as shown in this example:

Maka jikalau kiranya raja-raja yang  
bijaksana dan yang bangsawan yang  
berkehendak kemenangan dunia akhirat itu ...<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Hikayat Abdullah, p. 45.

Thus if it is true that the Rajas who are wise and noble and who are desiring success in this world and the next ...

When berkehendak is applied to God, the conceptual structure of a horizontal relationship between the same level of being changes. It becomes a vertical relationship, for the level of being is not the same, and the subject, God, is always dominant in the mind. In this manner, we find Ḥamzah Fansūrī translating the Quranic verse (36:82):

Innamā amruhu idhā arāda shay'an an yaqūla lahu kun fa yakūnu.

Bahwasanya titahNya, tatakala berkehendak kepada sesuatu, bahwa berkata baginya "jadi engkau!" - maka menjadi.<sup>226</sup>

Verily His Command, when [He] is in the state of intending a thing, is that [He] says to it "Be!" and it becomes.

In the case of the word hendak with the compound prefix se + ke (sekehendak), which always takes the pronominal nya, the meaning it conveys is that of unrestricted power. A very important distinction between the word sekehendak and the word hendak and its other derivatives should be made clear. In the case of hendak and its other derivatives, the concept of voluntary action arising out of knowledge and choice is quite clearly set forth. But in the case of sekehendak, though voluntary action is emphasized, yet it is implied that this action does not arise out of knowledge and

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226 Ḥamzah Fansūrī, p. 194.

choice. The idea of knowledge and choice is absent. The action is rather one that is spontaneous, capricious. Power is emphasized, but without wisdom. The following quotation will illustrate what I mean:

Maka adakah diluluskan Allāh akan seorang mengambil harta seorang dengan tiada relanya? - atau seorang mengambil anak isteri seorang dengan kekerasannya? - atau seorang membunuh akan seorang dengan tiada sebenarnya? - atau seorang membuat barang sekehendak hatinya atas hamba Allāh sebab ia raja?<sup>227</sup>

Would [you think] that it be permitted [or tolerated] by God for one person to take the wealth of another without the other's consent? - or one person to take by force the wife and children of another? - or one person killing another without just cause? - or one person doing whatever his heart desires upon a creature of God [simply] because he is king?

These are the words of 'Abdu'l-Lāh who upon his return to Singapore from his voyage to Kelantan felt very much distressed at what he saw in Pahang and Kelantan. In Kelantan, the Rajas were then fighting among themselves for the throne. 'Abdu'l-Lāh particularly blamed the Rajas for their selfish attitude towards life. Their greed knew no bounds with respect to consideration for others, and in this respect their behaviour was incredibly capricious. In this I think the word sekehendak describes the character of one to whom it is applied and reveals its true meaning.

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227 Hikayat Abdullah, pp. 155, 157.

(c) Conceptual distinction between hendak and mahu (ماهو)

In order to comprehend completely the meaning underlying the word hendak, it is, I think, important that it should be compared and contrasted with another word whose meaning seems linguistically to be identical, but whose conceptual structure is definitely contrary to that of hendak. This word is mahu (ماهو) which means want, desire, wish. The general concept underlying mahu is not - as in the case of hendak - a sense of voluntary action arising out of knowledge and choice: what we call will; on the contrary, the action, in mahu, is not voluntary, although it may arise out of knowledge of what is desired or wanted. It is not voluntary because what is wanted or not wanted in mahu is always determined by a proposition. Hence mahu implies not really wanting, desiring, or wishing; rather accepting or declining to accept, whether it be positive or negative as the case may be. It implies not will, but determination; and even choice, as implied in mahu, is determined. This I shall demonstrate in the following analysis.

The field of application of the word mahu is restricted in the concrete sense only to human beings and animals - that is, like hendak, to the animate. Whenever it is applied to inanimate things, then its meanings are metaphorical. We say:

Kuching itu tidak mahu makan.

That cat does not want to eat.

It is presupposed that the cat has been offered food. The cat's action is therefore really determined by two factors: (i) the offer, which starts his action, and (ii) a certain physical condition, like for example, not feeling hungry, which terminates his action. If we apply the word hendak instead of mahu:

Kuching itu tidak hendak makan.

That cat does not want to eat.

we must conceive that the food has not been offered to the cat. The situation conceived would be something like this: The cat is not in the scene and we are hidden observers. We see a plate of food in what is to be the stage where the action is to be played. The cat appears on the stage and sees the plate of food. He approaches and, having sniffed it, turns away and ignores the food. We who observe would describe the cat's refusal of the food as 'tidak hendak makan.' Although, as I have pointed out earlier (page 107), animal will (as conceived in the application of hendak) borders upon instinct, it can at least be shown that in this case when hendak is applied, the cat's action is determined not by two, but by only one factor: a certain physical condition which determines his choice (as in (ii) above). The example I have given above is the application of mahu in the negative form (mahu seems mainly to take the negative form). In its positive (affirmative) form, the meaning structure is the same. Supposing we say:

Kuching itu mahu makan.

That cat wants to eat.

then it is still presupposed that the cat has been offered food before but refused to eat it due to some reason or other, and that now, finally, he accepts.

The application of mahu in the human world maintains the same essential idea of determination. We can say:

Aku hendak pergi ...

I want to go ...

or

Aku mahu pergi ...

I want to go ...

But it is implied in the second example that a proposition has been offered by another person to go somewhere and that I have accepted the offer, whereas in the first case the wanting to go somewhere is voluntary and does not depend upon an offer. Asrul Sani's poem about the sea-hawk can again furnish us with an example of the meaning underlying the word mahu:

Sekali ini jemu dan keringat  
tiada akan punya daya  
tapi topan tiada mahu  
dan mengembus kelam luas.<sup>228</sup>

The sea-hawk, as mentioned earlier, is winging her way back to her young ones. This time she is weary and feels herself without strength to go on, but for her young ones - but for the call of love. She pleads with the tempest to let her pass -

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228 Kesusasteraan Indonesia III, p. 13<sup>4</sup>.

but the tempest does not want  
[to accept her plea]  
and the murky expanse blows forth.

In 'Abdu'l-Lāh's voyage to Kelantan, the following sentence occurs:

Maka katanya: "Lekas sekarang! malam  
ini sekochi mahu berlayar."<sup>229</sup>

So he said: "Hurry now! tonight the  
sloop will sail..

What is said here is not metaphorical; it is plain colloquial speech and has a concrete meaning. But something is wrong; the word underlined should be hendak rather than mahu. The above sentence from the linguistic point of view is clearly incorrect, and the reason is that it was spoken by Baba Po Eng, a Chinese merchant who - from many such instances recorded by 'Abdu'l-Lāh - was clearly not conversant with the Malay language and unable to grasp the subtle distinctions which only those possessing a linguistic consciousness would be able to master. 'Abdu'l-Lāh himself would have said "malam ini sekochi hendak berlayar."<sup>230</sup>

The saying:                   Makan tak hendak tidur tak mahu.

Unwilling to eat, unwilling to sleep.

usually applied to describe the condition of distracted persons - especially those in love - must be taken to convey the idea that in the second half of the phrase the bed was offered and refused, or

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229 Hikayat Abdullah, p. 9.

230 Ibid., p. 15. See also the example on p. 112 (i) above.

sleep advised and the advice unheeded, for the word mahu is applied here not simply for the purpose of variation in expression. More examples from Malay literature will reveal beyond doubt the conceptual structure of the word mahu as outlined in this analysis:

- (i) Maka jawab segala anak-anak perahu:  
"Saya semuanya tidak mahu; biarlah  
mati dalam laut ini, kerana chuma-  
chumalah lelah saya semua lima enam  
hari ini kalau balik ..."231

Then all the members of the crew  
answered: "We all do not want to;  
even if we perish in this sea, for  
our efforts these last five or six  
days will be in vain if we [now]  
return ..."

In the above is given the reply of the crew of the boat in which 'Abdu'l-Lāh was sailing to Kelantan. They were experiencing very strong winds and were afraid to set out from their sheltered position near the island into the open sea. A Chinese merchant who was with them proposed that they return to the calm waters near the island, but the crew refused.

- (ii) Maka adalah saya lihat orang-orangnya  
dalam seratus barangkali sepuluh saja  
yang ada bekerja; yang lain itu lalai  
saja sepanjang hari dalam hal miskin dan  
jahat. Melainkan adalah pada seorang  
empat lima jenis senjata sentiasa hari  
tiada bercherai daripada tubuhnya. Dan  
ada yang setengah tabiat mereka itu hendak  
berchantik saja; memakai kain baju dan  
seluar yang bagus-bagus, tetapi tiada  
mahu ia menchari jalan kehidupan.232

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231 Ibid., p. 17.

232 Ibid., p. 21.

I saw that of a hundred of its people perhaps only ten have work to do; the others laze about during the whole day in a condition of misery and evil. [They have nothing] except that by each person four or five weapons are worn the whole day, never separate from their bodies. And there are some whose behaviour is only to beautify themselves; wearing fine clothes, but who do not want to seek a livelihood.

The application of mahu here clearly implies that these people have been asked to seek a livelihood but refused. Mahu here is almost synonymous with agree or accept.

- (iii) Maka beberapa saya memberi nasihat kepadanya tiada juga ia mahu pergi. Maka habis-habis katanya: "Bunuh sama saya pun saya tidak mahu pergi. Siapa berani pergilah."233

Even though I gave him advice [i.e. with persuasion] he still refused to want to go. Then finally he said: "Even if you kill me I will not go, who dares can go!"

Here the same Chinese referred to in (i) (who seemed to be the coward in the group, and who became a laughing stock for his cowardice and superstition) refused to be persuaded to continue the journey to Kelantan. He believed if he joined the rest to continue the journey, he would not return alive. He was resolute in his refusal to proceed. In the sentence above the words tiada juga mahu ia pergi really mean 'he still refused to agree to go.'

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233 Ibid., p. 35.

- (iv) Maka jawabnya: "Ada dahulu orang disebelah memanggil keluar hendak berperang mendadak. Orang disini tiada mahu."234

He replied: "In the past [some] people from the other side called to us [or challenged us] to come out, wanting to give sudden battle. People here did not want to [accept].

- (v) Melainkan sebab takut akan raja, mahu tiada mahu dikerjakannya adanya.235

It is because of fear of the king; whether they want it or not [want it] they have to do it.

- (vi) Maka jawab saya: "Terima kasih, Tengku, satu pun saya tiada mahu melainkan melihat-lihat saja."236

I replied: "Thank you, Prince, I do not want anything except only to have a look around."

- (vii) Beberapa lamanya, Baba Po Eng pula hendak membayar separuh saja: empat puluh ringgit. Tiada juga saya mahu. Kemudian datanglah ia hendak membayar enam puluh ringgit. Tiada juga saya mahu.237

After a while, Baba Po Eng also wants to pay me half the amount: forty dollars. I refused to accept. Then finally he came wanting to pay me sixty dollars. I [still] do not want [to accept].

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234 Ibid., p. 107.

235 Ibid., p. 111.

236 Ibid., p. 125.

237 Ibid., p. 155.

- (viii) "Katakan kepada si Ali Hati, mengapa ia berkata demikian. Jika pada si Ahmad pun ia diperbaikinya; jika padaku pun, ia aku perbaiki juga. Kerana aku tiada mahu membunuh dia ..."  
Maka sembah Tun Ali Hati: "Jikalau ada karunia, patik itu minta bunuh jua, kerana patik itu tiadalah mahu memandang muka orang yang lain ..."  
Maka beberapa pun Sultan Mahmud hendak menghidupi Tun Ali Hati tiada juga Tun Ali Hati mahu hidup.<sup>238</sup>

"Say to 'Ali Hati: 'Why does he say such things? If he has been well treated by Ahmad, by me too, him shall I treat well, for I do not want to kill him ...'"  
Tun 'Ali Hati said: "If there is grace [in you] I still request to be killed, because I do not want [any more] to look at the faces of other people."  
Thus no matter how much Sultān Mahmūd wanted to let Tun 'Ali Hati live, Tun 'Ali Hati still did not want to live.

- (ix) Maka segala orang bersoraklah: "Hai si Jebat durhaka, mengapa maka engkau takut hendak turun? Jika engkau tiada mahu turun, kunaiki istana ini."<sup>239</sup>

Then all the people shouted: "Ho Jebat, you rebel! wherefore are you afraid of wanting to come down? If you do not want to come down, we will climb into the palace."

- (x) Maka jawab saya: "Jikalau Baba pulang, pasti saya orang kedua pun mahu pulang juga ..."<sup>240</sup>

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238 Sejarah Melayu, p. 305.

239 Hikayat Hang Tuah, p. 319.

240 Hikayat Abdullah, p. 33, 35.

So I replied: "If Baba return, [then] it is certain that the two of us also want to return too ..."

All these examples reveal beyond doubt that mahu is conceptually distinct from hendak. It has been demonstrated that hendak presupposes the initiation of voluntary action in the actor; the actor possesses will. That actions originate from the actor without any external influence forcing the actor into action - other than, of course natural influences. But in the case of mahu, conceptually it implies that actions arise out of the force of external, created or man-made influences. Though a man is pre-supposed to possess will, yet this will is dependent upon created man-made challenges. A situation is created and being offered - and acceptance or refusal of this offer is the positive or negative mahu.

(d) Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī's concept of the irādah

It is significant that Ḥamzah denies the application of the word sekehendak with reference to God's will. This is because he conceives God's will to be an act of wisdom and not that of a capricious tyrant. Ḥamzah's polemic against the 'Ulamā' on this point is why call God Just if He "berbuat barang sekehendakNya"<sup>241</sup> -

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<sup>241</sup> Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī, p. 198.

does whatever He pleases or wills? The 'Ulamā' answer:

"Seperti orang berkambing banyak; setengah disembeliknya, maka dikubaknya, maka direbusnya, maka ditununya, maka dipachaknya. Ia juga yang empunya, bukan benda orang lain. Jika benda orang lain disembeliknya maka ẓālim hukumnya."<sup>242</sup>

"The analogy is like one who owns many goats; some are slaughtered by him, then skinned, then boiled, then roasted and pierced with skewers. It is he who owns them - [and they are] not the possession of other people. If [they are] other people's possession [and they] are slaughtered by him, then unjust [is] the verdict [against him]."

The 'Ulamā''s answer betrays that their conception of sekehendak is that the doing of whatever one pleases is justified on the condition that what one does at will one does to one's own. Logically they imply that sekehendaknya means the subject doing what he desires to the object which belongs to the subject. Whether the object is a willing or unwilling recipient of the subject's action is not discussed. But compare this with 'Abdu'l-Lāh's application of sekehendak when he describes the character of the Malay Rajas (page 128). There it would seem to imply that if a person takes the wealth of another without the other's consent, or takes by force the wife and children of another, or takes the life of another without just cause, then he is committing a wrongful and unjust action - but only if he takes without consent, by force, without just cause. Supposing he takes another's wealth with the

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<sup>242</sup> Ibid., p. 198. Compare with al-Ash'arī, chapter on 'Discussion of the imputation of justice and injustice to God,' especially p. 99, para. 170.

owner's consent, another's wife and children not by force, another person's life with just cause, then the word sekehendaknya will no longer be applicable to him. 'Abdu'l-Lāh there implies that it is not good and just even for a king, because he is king, to impose upon his people whatever his heart desires. Here is revealed another meaning in the conceptual structure of sekehendak in addition to what has been explained before (pages 127-128). The 'Ulamā' conceive that it means the doing of whatever one pleases upon one's own possessions. 'Abdu'l-Lāh's passage reveals that if one's own possessions are the willing objects of one's desire (kehendak), then logically sekehendak cannot be applied to one; it is only if the objects of one's desire are the unwilling recipients of one's action that sekehendak can be applied to one, for it is the very essence of sekehendak to include within its meaning structure the sense of force, of imposition. Sekehendak is then the imposition of one's kehendak upon the kehendak of others. Linguistically at least Ḥamzah is more correct than the 'Ulamā' in his application of the word sekehendak. According to Ḥamzah the word cannot be applied to God, for it would mean that He is unjust since He purposely allows the otherwise unwilling unbelievers to disbelieve, punishing them with Hell for their disbelief.<sup>243</sup> Ḥamzah conceives God to act not as He pleases in the sekehendaknya sense, rather God acts in conformity with the potentialities of things in His knowledge. From His attribute of

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<sup>243</sup> Ḥamzah Fansūrī, pp. 197-198.

Beauty is created the believer, from that of His Glory the unbeliever, each according to their potentialities. The believer believes and the unbeliever disbelieves not because God pleases that they be so, but because of their very natures; and because of their very natures too each will return to its found of origin.<sup>244</sup>

Kata 'Ulamā': "Apabila demikian hukumnya, tiada berguna lagi irādat dan qudrat kerana barang menjadi sendirinya dengan hukum isti'dādnya, tiada dengan hukum irādat dan qudrat."<sup>245</sup>

The 'Ulamā' say: "When such is the case [then God's] will and power are no more of use, for things become by virtue of their potentialities, not by virtue of will and power."

Ḥamzah's answer to this is that God has will, and His will works in conformity with knowledge of the things willed.<sup>246</sup> The things willed are not nothing (as the 'Ulamā' who hold the doctrine of creation ex nihilo assert); they are the fixed essences or the potentialities of things. They cannot exist as actuality unless God wills them to become (as actual existence), according to what their natures determine, by virtue of the command 'Be!' What comes forth as the result of the Divine command is what we call

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<sup>244</sup> Ibid., pp. 198-199.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid., p. 199.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., p. 199.

creation, or the external world together with all its parts. What still lie dormant, as it were, in the Divine Knowledge, ready to leap into being at His command, are neither created nor uncreated - they are modes of the Divine Essence.<sup>247</sup> In this way Ḥamzah denies both the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and that of the coexistence of the world with God. Creation has its beginning in time and comes into being by virtue of God's creative command. It is this creative command that is God's act of willing. When God wills a thing to be it comes, complete and perfect, for if it does not become complete and perfect then it would mean that God still has to perfect and complete it; and this implies that God wills without prior knowledge of the thing willed, which is absurd.<sup>248</sup> It is very important at this stage to note the significance of Ḥamzah's consistency in translating the fourth form Arabic verb arāda, which occurs in the Qur'ān (36:82; see also page 127) as berkehendak. This is of course consistent with his mystical philosophy. Berkehendak applied here to God's act of willing is an extremely powerful expression. God is conceived as willing upon the thing willed (i.e. the potentiality of a thing which is still not separate from the Essence) intending what it shall become in such a manner that at His command it 'detaches', as it were, and becomes

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid., pp. 135-137.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., pp. 135-136. Compare with Ibn Rushd in Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 88.

'externalized' as part of creation. The thing willed is present to God before His command acts upon it and transforms it into being. When applied to God, the relationship between God and the thing willed is a vertical one (page 127). But the important concept here is that berkehendak conveys the idea that God wills something which is present to Him. A comparison between Hamzah's translation and that of 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf of Singkel<sup>249</sup> of the same Quranic passage will illuminate what I attempt to convey. 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf's translation of the same passage (36:82) is:

Innamā amruhu idhā arāda shay'an  
an yaqūla lahu kun fa yakūnu.

Hanya sanya pekerjaanNya apabila  
dikehendakiNya menjadikan suatu,  
bahwa dikatakan baginya "Ada  
engkau!" - maka ada suatu itu.<sup>250</sup>

'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf translates arāda as dikehendaki meaning is desired, and this manner of describing God's will in the passive voice deprives much of the emphasis on the factitive or causative nature of the action or will. Another interesting factor is that in the verb kehendaki, the object desired is absent. The -i implies that the

<sup>249</sup> 'Abdul Ra'ūf (c. 1620-1693) was regarded as one of the most eminent Sūfīs of Aceh and the rest of the Malay-speaking world. But he was more of a religious teacher and an 'Alim rather than a Sūfī in the sense Hamzah was. Though he did not appear to join in the polemic against Hamzah begun by Rānīrī, he seemed to be on the side of Rānīrī. For more about him, see EI, Leiden, 1960, p. 88.

<sup>250</sup> This is from 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf's Malay translation and commentary of the Qur'ān based on al-Bayḍāwī's. I am quoting the fourth edition published in Cairo in 1901, vol. 2, p. 446. 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf's translation of the whole Qur'ān into Malay with commentary is, I think, the first of its kind to be done in the Malay-speaking world.

object desired is sought after by the subject (page 120). Thus in expressing it in the passive voice by means of prefixing the particle di to kehendaki, the implication is that the thing willed or desired is not present to God - or that God creates from nothing. The implications brought forward by this explanation are made more plausible by virtue of the fact that 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf translates kun as ada which means exist (i.e. to be in the sense of appearing) and not jadi as Ḥamzah does, which means be (i.e. to be in the sense of becoming). It is only to something that jadi refers, whereas ada conveys the meaning of making something appear when it was not there before.

Finally, another important point elucidating Ḥamzah's conception of the irādah, when he says that God's will works in conformity with His knowledge of the things willed, is his conception of qudrah. Like the philosophers, to whose views on this point even al-Ghazzālī concedes,<sup>251</sup> Ḥamzah asserts that God cannot do what is logically impossible. However, like al-Ghazzālī, he accepts this without denying to God infinite possibility for exercising His power.

Suatu tamthīl lagi seperti orang  
sempurna lengkap dengan kekayaannya.  
Dapat diubahnya kekayaannya: gajah  
dijadikannya kuda, atau kuda  
dijadikannya gajah; atau kambing

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251 Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, pp. 328-329.

dijadikannya anjing, atau anjing  
dijadikannya kambing. Tetapi ia  
tiada mahu mengubah dia, kerana  
apabila ia mengubah dia binasa  
kamālnya.<sup>252</sup>

Another analogy is like the person  
who is complete and perfect in his  
wealth and power. He can change  
his power: the elephant he can  
transform into a horse, and the horse  
into an elephant; or the goat into a  
dog, and the dog into a goat. But he  
does not want to change and transform  
them, for if he does so then his  
perfection is destroyed.

What is implied here is that if we discard the notion of a necessary  
causal sequence and attribute everything to the Creator's caprice,  
then the configurations of things would cease to exist in the sense  
that they would not possess recognizable natures; knowledge would  
possess no meaning. Furthermore, if the Creator transforms  
elephants into horses and goats into dogs, then it would mean,  
unless it is His caprice, that the Creator has not created something  
perfect in the first instance and that what He created is in need  
of perfection - an admission of lack of knowledge on the Creator's  
part. Supposing the person in Ḥamzah's analogy effects the trans-  
formations mentioned, can his will in doing so be properly called  
will? The passage shows that it cannot, for the word mahu implies  
that the person has been challenged to display his power. If he

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<sup>252</sup> Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 200. The word kekayaan I have translated  
not so much as wealth but power, for this is what is meant in the  
context of the discussion.

wills the transformations, then although his will works in conformity with his knowledge of the things willed, it is not based upon his choice; for here the challenge has determined his choice.

The analysis thus far presented in this chapter is an attempt to bring into focus concepts underlying the word hendak and its derivatives, and its implication with respect to Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī's concept of the irādah. As far as the scope is concerned, this presentation would suffice. From what has been analyzed, it seems not illogical to conclude that by virtue of linguistic facts and semantic precision, Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī's consistency in his application of key words gives more weight and plausibility to his arguments.

## CHAPTER VI

Romanized Malay edition of the text  
of the Hujjatu'l-Siddiq li daf'i'l-Zindiq.

Hujjatu'l-Şiddīq li daf'i'l-Zindīq  
karangan

Al-Shaykh Nūru'l-Dīn al-Rānirī

(Naskhah Maxwell No. 93)

[Royal Asiatic Society, London]

Bismi 'l-Lāhi 'l-Raḥmāni 'l-Raḥīmi

Hamdan li ilāhina huwa bi'l-ḥamdi ḥaqīqun  
fi baḥri nawālihi kānati 'l-dārātu gharīqatan.<sup>253</sup>

Segala puji-pujian bagi Allāh. Ialah yang mustahaq dengan kepujian.  
Adalah segala arwāḥ beroleh limpah daripadaNya anugerahNya.

Wa an'ama 'alayhā bijūdihi 'l-tawfīqa ulā'ika  
mina 'l-nabiyyīna wa 'l-ṣiddīqīna.

Dan dianugerahNya akan mereka itu dengan anugerah tawfīq; mereka  
itulah daripada segala Nabī dan 'Ārif bi 'l-Lāh.

Fa ḥaqqaqū<sup>254</sup> bi ḥaqqihim ḥaqqā 'l-taḥqīqi wa  
maiyyazū 'l-ḥaqqā mina 'l-bāṭili bi 'l-taṣdīqi.

Maka ditahqīqkan mereka itulah akan Tuhannya dengan sebenar-benar  
taḥqīq, serta dibezakannya jalan yang benar daripada jalan yang  
bāṭil dengan taṣdīq.

Wa ḥaqqaqū ḥaqā'iqahum bi 'l-taḥqīqi fa  
ḥarrarū 'ulūmahum wa baiyyanū 'l-ṭarīqah.

Dan ditahqīqkan mereka itulah segala 'ilmu ḥaqā'iq dengan daqīq.  
Maka ditāṣnifkan mereka itu 'ilmunya dan dinyatakan jalan agama.

Fa man ḥaṣala lahu 'l-tawfīqu 'l-raḥīqu tabi'ahum  
wa illā laṣāra 'l-mulḥida wa 'l-zindīqa.

Maka barangsiapa senantiasa beroleh tawfīq nischaya diikutnyalah  
jalan segala Nabī dan Ṣiddīq, dan jika tiada diikutnya akan  
i'tiqād mereka itu nischaya jadilah ia daripada qawm mulḥid dan  
zindīq.

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253 The text reading ghazīq is corrupt.

254 The text reading ḥaqqaga is corrupt.

Wa'l-ṣalātu wa'l-salāmu 'alā'l-nabiyyi'l-shafi'i wa 'alā ālihi wa ṣahbihi min ahli'l-wathiqi.

Dan rahmat Allāh dan salāmNya atas Nabī Muḥammad yang amat penyayang atas ummatnya, dan atas segala keluarganya dan ṣahābatnya [2] yang amat keperchayaan.

Wa ba'du. Dan kemudian daripada itu.

Fa yaqūlu sāqī<sup>255</sup> 'l-rasūli al-shaykhu Nūru'l-Dīni ibni 'Aliyyin ibni Ḥasanjī ibni Muḥammadin Ḥamīdin al-Rānīriyyu al-Shāfi'iyyu.

Maka berkata yang mengedarkan piala minuman Rasūlu'l-Lāh s.a.w.<sup>256</sup> iaitu Shaykh Nūru'l-Dīn bin 'Alī bin Ḥasanjī bin Muḥammad Ḥamīd nama bangsanya, dan Rānīrī nama negerinya tempat kediamannya, dan Shāfi'i madhhabnya.

Falammā takhālafa ba'du'l-muta'aṣṣibīna wa'l-mu'ānidīna mina'l-sufahā'i fī baḥṭhi'l-wujūdi wa nisbati'l-'ālamī bi'l-ḥaqqi ta'ālā.

Maka tatakala ikhtilāflah setengah daripada Ahlu'l-Ta'sīb<sup>(1)</sup> dan Mu'ānid<sup>(2)</sup> daripada segala yang jāhil pada memithalkan wujud Allāh dan pada menisbatkan 'ālam dan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā.

Fa altamasa minnī ba'du'l-ajalli min aṣhābinā.

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(1) Ya'nī, menegakkan agama yang salah.

(2) Ya'nī, mem[b]antah kepada mem[b]enarkan agama yang salah.

Ḥāshiyah minhu.

255 The text reading sāqī is incorrect.

256 S.a.w. is the usual abbreviation for ṣallā'l-Lāhu 'alayhi wa sallama. I use this abbreviation throughout this edition whenever it occurs.

Maka memintak pada aku setengah daripada orang yang besar-besar daripada segala ṣaḥābatku.

Ḥafīẓahu'l-Lāhu wa thabbathu fī dīni'l-islāmi  
bibarakāti sayyidinā Muḥammadin 'alayhi'l  
ṣalātu wa'l-salāmu.

Dipeliharakan Allāh Ta'ālā kiranya akan dia dan ditetapkannya akan dia pada agama Islām dengan berkat Penghulu kita Nabī Muḥammad s.a.w.

Fa 'allaftu wa tarjamtu hādhihi'l-risālata  
bi'l-jāwiyyati min kutubi'l-ṣūfiyyati wa ghayrihim.

Maka kuta'lifkan dan kujāwikan risālah ini daripada segala kitāb Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī dan lain daripada mereka itu.

Wa sammaytuhā ḥujjata'l-ṣiddīqi li daf'i'l-zindīqi.

Maka kunamai akan risālah ini: Ḥujjatu'l-Ṣiddīqi li daf'i'l-Zindīqi, ertinya: Dalīl [3] segala 'Ārif pada Menolakkan I'tiqād segala Zindīq. Maka kusebutkan dalam risālah ini i'tiqād dan madhhab empat ṭā'ifah, iaitu: Mutakallimīn dan Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī dan Ḥukamā' Falāsifah dan Wujūdiyyah yang mulhid pada menyatakan wujud Allāh dengan 'ālam itu berlainankah atau bersuatu seperti yang lagi akan tersebut kenyataannya.

Maka sekarang kumulai pada menyatakan ma'nā wujud itu: iaitu dhāt - ya'nī keadaan sesuatu shay'.<sup>(3)</sup> Maka dhāt<sup>(4)</sup> itu ada kalanya

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(3) Ertinya diri sesuatu.

(4) Ya'nī, iaitu ḥuḍūr 'abd senantiasa dengan ingat akan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā seperti dirasainya segala asrār Allāh. Ḥāshiyah minhu.  
'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

kelihatan dengan mata kepala, tetapi menyabitkan dia<sup>(5)</sup> 'aql dan shara' atau kashf<sup>(6)</sup> dan dhawq. Ia itulah wujud Allāh.

Kata Mutakallimīn wujud itu dua perkara: pertama wujud Allāh, kedua wujud 'ālam. Maka wujud Allāh itu wājibu'l-wujūd lagi qā'im sendirinya, dan wujud 'ālam itu mumkinu'l-wujūd - ya'nī dijadikan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā daripada 'adam kepada wujūd khārijī; lagi ia qā'im dengan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Maka jadilah ḥaqīqat keduanya berlain-lainan - ya'nī keadaan keduanya itu berlain-lainan kerana Ḥaqq Ta'ālā itu qadīm lagi menjadikan, dan 'ālam itu muḥdath lagi dijadikan. Maka nyatalah pada iṣṭilāḥ mereka itu bahwa wujud itu dua perkara: suatu wujūd ḥaqīqī, kedua wujūd majāzī. Maka wujūd majāzī itu milik baqi wujūd ḥaqīqī. Maka jikalau tiada berlainan keduanya nischaya jadilah bersuatu. Maka barangsiapa mengi'tiqādkan bahwa Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan [4] 'ālam itu esa maka jadilah ia kāfir, kerana ketahuan

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(5) Ya'nī, firmān Allāh dan ḥadīth Rasūlu'l-Lāh dan ijmā' segala 'Ulamā'. Hāshiyah minhu.

(6) Ya'nī, iaitu diperoleh 'abd daripada segala tajallī Ḥaqq Ta'ālā; iaitu memushāhadahkan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan anugerah daripada Ḥaqq Ta'ālā, dan diperolah 'abd beberapa asrār iaitulah fā'idah tajallī dan kashf. Hāshiyah minhu. 'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

daripada perkataannya yang demikian itu bahwa wujud Allāh dan 'ālam jadi suatu ḥaqīqat dan sewujūd [seperti] kata Ahlu'l-Sūfī.<sup>257</sup>

Bahwa kami pun qabūllah akan i'tiqād dan perkataan Mutakallīmīn itu. Adapun pada iṣṭilāḥ kami bahwa wujud itu esa jua; iaitulah dhāt Allāh Ta'ālā. Dan 'ālam itu tiada berwujud dan tiada layak dinamai akan dia dengan nama wujud kerana ia 'adamu'l-mahd. Maka apabila adalah 'ālam itu 'adamu'l-mahd dan wujud Ḥaqq Ta'ālā itu wujūdu'l-mahd<sup>(7)</sup> maka manatah jadi sewujūd 'adamu'l-mahd dengan wujūdu'l-mahd? Hanya sanya adalah 'ālam itu mazhar dan zill; milik bagi Ḥaqq Ta'ālā - ya'nī tempat nyata Ḥaqq Ta'ālā, dan bayang-bayang<sup>258</sup> seperti upama rupa yang kelihatan dalam chermin bidal tamthīl. Ḥaqq Ta'ālā itu upama yang menilik chermin dan 'ālam itu upama rupa yang kelihatan dalamnya. Maka wujud Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam berlainan pun tiada dan bersuatu pun tiada, kerana berlainannya dan bersuatu itu menghendaki dua wujud

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(7) Ya'nī, semata-mata wujud ḥaqīqī. Ḥāshiyah minhu.

257 The last four words: [seperti] kata Ahlu'l-Sūfī - should actually be written after the word kerana in the sentence in order that the meaning intended be conveyed correctly. Otherwise the whole meaning undergoes a complete change which Rānīrī would certainly reject as it would be quite meaningless - and if meaningful at all, it would be contradictory to what he intends to say. Hence the reading of the whole sentence should be:

Maka barangsiapa mengi'tiqadkan bahwa Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam itu esa, maka jadilah ia kāfir, kerana-  
[seperti] kata Ahlu'l-Sūfī - ketahuan daripada  
perkataannya yang demikian itu bahwa wujud Allāh dan  
'ālam jadi suatu ḥaqīqat dan sewujūd.

258 The text is corrupt.

mustaqil<sup>(8)</sup> sendirinya. Maka apabila adalah wujud Allāh jua yang esa, dan 'ālam itu tiada berwujud, maka tiadalah jadi berlain-lainan. Daripada kerana inilah kami kata wujud Allāh dengan 'ālam esa. Jikalau ada 'ālam itu mawjūd kelihatan sekalipun tetapi tiada kebilanggan wujudnya dari kerana ia tiada berwujud ḥaqīqī. Seperti kata [5] orang raja dengan balatenteranya itu esa jua. Jikalau ada wujud balatenteranya banyak sekalipun tiada kebilanggan. Hanya yang kebilanggan itu wujud raja jua. Dan lagi pula, tamthīl bayang-bayang dengan yang empunya bayang-bayang; pada penglihat dua wujud, tetapi tiada dikata akan dia dua wujud kerana bayang-bayang itu tiada kebilanggan wujudnya. Su'āl (jika [di]tanyai orang): "Bahwa bayang-bayang dengan yang empunya bayang-bayang itu seorang-kah atau dua?" Jawāb: "Bahwa bayang-bayang dengan yang empunya bayang-bayang itu seorang jua kerana bayang-bayang itu tiada kebilanggan wujudnya. Hanya sanya adalah bayang-bayang itu mazhar yang empunya bayang-bayang jua. Maka sebab itulah dikata orang bahwa empunya bayang-bayang dengan bayang-bayangnya itu esa - tiada dua dan tiada lain."

Maka adalah maqṣūd kata Mutakallimīn dan Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī itu suatu jua - tiada berlainan antara dua ṭā'ifah itu. Shahdān. Bahwa pendapat Mutakallimīn itu dengan dalīl 'aql dan naql jua. Ditiliknya kepada 'ālam<sup>(9)</sup> maka dilihatnya ada ia mawjūd yang muḥdath lagi

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(8) Upama yang menilik chermin dan 'ālam itu.

(9) Ya'nī, firmān Allāh dan ḥadīth Rasūlu'l-Lāh dan ijmā' segala 'Ulamā'. Ḥāshiyah minhu. 'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

berubah-ubah. Dan ditiliknya dengan mata hatinya kepada wujud Ḥaqq Ta'ālā pun ada mawjūd yang qadīm. Maka dithābitkannya dua wujud: suatu jā'izu'l-wujūd, kedua wājibu'l-wujūd. Maka jā'izu'l-wujūd itu iaitu Makhlūq dan wājibu'l-wujūd itu iaitu Khāliq. Maka adalah nisbah antara keduanya itu nisbah Khāliq dan Makhlūq jua. Maka sebab itulah dikatakan mereka itu berlain [6] -lainan keduanya supaya jangan pada sangka<sup>259</sup> 'awāmm bahwa wujud Allāh dengan wujud 'ālam itu sewujūd seperti i'tiqād qawm mulhid dan zindīq.

Adapun pendapat Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī itu pun dengan dalīl 'aql dan naql jua, lagi ditambah pula kashf dan dhawq.<sup>260</sup> Maka ditilik mereka itu dengan mata hatinya dan dirasanya dengan perasaannya bahwa wujud itu esa jua - iaitulah wujud Allāh yang tiada kelihatan dengan mata kepala dalam Dāru'l-Dunyā ini; dan yang kelihatan dengan mata kepala itu iaitu 'ālam yang tiada berwujud seperti wujud Allāh. Maka wujud Allāh itu wujud ḥaqīqī lagi muṭlaq, dan wujud 'ālam itu wujud majāzī lagi muqayyad - ḡill - dan milik bagi wujud Allāh. Maka akan ḡill itu tiada dapat dikata akan dia wujud, dan tiada dapat dikata akan dia 'adam muṭlaq; dari kerana jika dikata akan dia wujud, nischaya sekutulah ia dengan wujud Allāh; dan jika dikata akan dia 'adam muṭlaq, maka 'adam itu tiada ada sesuatu shay' jua pun, dan 'ālam itu ada ia kelihatan. Maka nyatalah 'ālam itu

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259 The text reading sangkah is incorrect.

260 The text reading zawq is incorrect.

mazhar wujud Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Maka nisbah antara wujud Allāh dan 'ālam itu bersuatu pun tiada dan berlainan pun tiada kerana 'ālam itu mazhar dan milik bagi Ḥaqq Ta'ālā.

Maka nyatalah pada iṣṭilāḥ Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī bahwa wujud dan ḥaqīqat itu [7] esa jua pada ma'nānya; iaitulah dhāt Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Maka murād daripada ḥaqīqat pada iṣṭilāḥ Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī itu iaitu:

Al-ḥaqīqatu mā bihi'l-shay'u - huwa huwa.

Ertinya: Yang ḥaqīqat itu suatu shay' yang dengan dia [jadi] shay' itu - ia ia (ya'nī barang suatu shay' yang jadi ia daripada suatu shay').

Maka suatu shay' itu ḥaqīqat - upama ḥaqīqat periuk itu kisaran,<sup>261</sup> dan ḥaqīqat perahu itu tukang. Dan murād daripada ḥaqīqat pada iṣṭilāḥ Manṭiqiyyīn<sup>262</sup> itu iaitu:

Al-ḥaqīqatu mā yakūnu'l-shay'u bihi  
kā'l-ḥayawānī'l-nāṭiqi bi'l-nisbati ilā'l-insāni.

Ertinya: Yang ḥaqīqat itu barang sesuatu shay' yang dengan dia ia, seperti ḥayawān nāṭiq dengan nisbah kepada insān (ya'nī ḥaqīqat insān itu hidup yang berkata-kata).

Maka nyatalah pada iṣṭilāḥ Manṭiqiyyīn<sup>263</sup> ḥaqīqat sesuatu shay' itu diri sesuatu shay'. Maka ikhtilāf ikhtiyār Mutakallimīn dan Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī pada menyabitkan wujud Allāh dengan wujud 'ālam itu ikhtilāf lafẓī jua, bukan ma'nawī; seperti kata orang 'lima belas' dengan 'tengah dua puluh'. Maka pada ma'nānya sama jua, dan pada lafaznya berlain-lainan.

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261 The text reading kisāwan (ksāwn) is corrupt.

262 The text reading manṭiqīn is incorrect.

263 The text reading manṭiqīn is incorrect.

Apabila kau ketahuilah i'tiqād dan madhhab Mutakallimīn dan Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī, maka sekarang kunyatakan pula i'tiqād dan madhhab Ḥukamā' Falāsifah. Kata ṭā'ifah Falāsifah bahwa wujūd Allāh dan 'ālam keduanya qadīm kerana [8] ia terbit daripada wujūd Allāh dengan ta'thīrnya, tiada dengan ikhtiyār Ḥaqq Ta'ālā; seperti keluar<sup>(10)</sup> panas matahari daripada dhāt matahari. Maka tiadalah kuasa matahari menahani panasnya; selama ada matahari adalah panasnya. Demikian lagi selama ada dhāt Allāh adalah 'ālam; tiada bercherai dan tiada tanggal daripada dhāt Allāh, daripada azal datang kepada abad berhubung dan bertemu selama-lamanya. Dan lagi pula katanya bahwa Allāh Ta'ālā tiada kuasa atas segala sesuatu, dan tiada kuasa Ia menjadikan sesuatu yang lain daripada [yang] sudah keluar daripadanya. Dan tiada Ia berkuasa pada mengubah 'ālam yang sudah ada ini. Dan lagi pula katanya bahwa tujuh petala langit dan tujuh petala bumi tiada dijadikan Allāh Ta'ālā akan keduanya daripada tiada kepada ada, lagi baqā' abadī. Dan lagi pula katanya bahwa mintak tulung kepada Allāh itu mem[p]usakai

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(10) Ya'nī, keluar 'ālam daripada dhāt dengan kuasa dirinya, tiada dengan dijadikan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā akan dia. Ḥāshiyah minhu.

nafsan<sup>264</sup> jua, kerana 'abd itu sanantiasa dalam limpah tulung jua. Adapun fā'idah berbuat 'ibādat itu menjadikan diri serupa dengan Allāh sekira-kira kuasa jua. Dan lagi pula katanya bahwa Allāh Ta'ālā jua yang 'āshiq dan ma'shūq akan diriNya. Maka adalah segala perkataan dan i'tiqād mereka itu ḍalālat lagi kāfir - na'ūdhu bi'l-Lāhi minha!

Apabila kan ketahuilah i'tiqād dan madhhab ṭā'ifah Falāsifah maka kunyatakan pula i'tiqād dan madhhab ṭā'ifah Wujūdiyyah [9]. Maka adalah Wujūdiyyah itu dua qawm: suatu Wujūdiyyah yang muwaḥḥid, kedua Wujūdiyyah yang mulḥid; seperti Murji'ah itu dua qawm: suatu Murji'ah marḥūmah, kedua Murji'ah mal'ūnah.<sup>(11)</sup> Maka Murji'ah marḥūmah itu iaitu segala ṣaḥābat Rasūlu'l-Lāh 'alayhi'l-salām, dan Murji'ah mal'ūnah itu iaitu suatu qawm yang daripada qawm tujuh puluh dua yang ḍalālat lagi isi neraka. Demikian lagi

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(11) Ya'nī, dinamai Murji'ah mal'ūnah itu kerana adalah i'tiqād mereka itu dan katanya: "Kami harap akan segalamu tiada kamu dimasukkan Allāh kedalam neraka jikalau kamu berbuat dosa kabīr sekalipun." Hāshiyah minhu.

264 The text reads memushakai nafsān. The word nafsān is problematic. Does it mean two selves or one (nafsan)? The former interpretation would seem to refer to Ibn Sīnā's theory of the two natures of man which corresponds to his theory of the two types of prayers (Cf. Arberry, A.J., Avicenna on theology, London, 1951, pp. 50-63). I am inclined to think, however, that the word is in the Arabic singular accusative case. The Malay scribe would write nafsan in the same manner as it appears in the text. In place of the tanwīn an, the alif is written after the sīn to denote the accusative case, and the nūn to indicate the sound. Hence the alif and the nūn represent the tanwīn an.

Wujūdiyyah yang muwahhid itu iaitu segala Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī (dijadikan Haqq Ta'ālā kiranya kita daripada qawm mereka itu!), dan Wujūdiyyah yang mulhid itu iaitu segala Zindīq - na'ūdhu bi'l-Lāhi minha! Adapun sebab dinamai Wujūdiyyah itu wujūdiyyah kerana adalah bahath dan perkataan dan i'tiqād mereka itu pada wujūd Allāh.

Maka sekarang kunyatakan i'tiqād dan madhhab Wujūdiyyah yang mulhid dan Wujūdiyyah yang muwahhid supaya [dapat] kubesakan antara i'tiqād keduanya. Kata Wujūdiyyah yang mulhid bahwa wujūd itu esa; iaitulah wujūd Allāh. Maka wujūd Allāh yang Esa itu tiada ada ia mawjūd mustaqil sendirinya yang dapat dibezakan melainkan dalam kandungan sekelian makhlūqāt jua. Maka adalah makhlūqāt itu wujūd Allāh dan wujūd Allāh itu wujūd makhlūqāt. Maka 'ālam itu Allāh dan Allāh itu 'ālam. Bahwa sanya adalah mereka itu menyabitkan wujūd Allāh yang Esa [10] itu dalam wujūd segala makhlūqāt; serta katanya tiada mawjūd hanya Allāh. Dan lagi di'tiqādkannya pada ma'na kalimat lā ilāha illā'l-Lāhu 'tiada ada wujūdku hanya wujūd Allāh'. Maka dikehendaknya ma'nānya 'tiada ada wujūdku melainkan wujūd Allāh wujūdku ini.' Dan lagi pula katanya: "Kami dengan Allāh sebangsa dan sewujūd." Dan lagi pula katanya bahwa Allāh Ta'ālā

ketahuan dhātNya dan nyata kayfiyyatNya<sup>(12)</sup> dan kammiyyatNya<sup>(13)</sup> daripada fihaq ada Ia mawjūd pada khārij pada zamān dan makān. Inilah perkataan dan i'tiqād kāfir yang nyata, seperti kata Shaykh Muḥyī'l-Dīn ibnu'l-'Arabī (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!) dalam kitāb Futūḥātu'l-Makkiyyah pada menyatakan i'tiqād segala Ahlu'l-Khawaṣṣ ditolakkannya dan dibaṭalkannya akan madhhab Wujūdiyyah itu.

Katanya:

"Min hunā ayḍan zallat aqdāmu t̄ā'ifatin 'an majra'l-tahqīqi fa qālū mā thammā illā mā narā fa ja'alū'l-266 'ālama huwa'l-Lāha wa'l-Lāha nafsa'l-'ālamī wa laysa hādḥā bi mashḥadin li kawnihi mā yataḥaqqaqūna bihi taḥaqquqa ahlihi fa law taḥaqqaqū bihi mā qālū dhālika."

ya'nī: "Daripada perkataan inilah tergelinchir i'tiqād sesuatu qawm daripada jalan yang sebenarnya, dari kerana kata mereka itu: "Tiada ada mawjūd melainkan barang yang kami lihat." Maka dijadiannyalah 'ālam itu Allāh dan Allāh itu diri 'ālam. Segala-gala i'tiqād ini tiada benar kerana wujud Allāh itulah yang jadi mereka itu dengan dia (ya'nī, wujud Allāh itulah yang menjadikan mereka itu). Maka jikalau benar ma'rifat [11] mereka itu akan dia, nischaya tiada dikata mereka itu seperti yang demikian."

(12) Ya'nī, murād kayfiyyat itu iaitu warna dan rasa dan bahu, dan hangat dan sejuk, basah dan kering, dan barang sebagainya daripada ṣifāt jisim. Hāshiyah minhu.

(13) Ya'nī, murād daripada kammiyyat itu iaitu besar dan kecil, pendek dan lebar, dalam dan berat,<sup>265</sup> dan barang sebagainya. Hāshiyah minhu. 'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

265 The text reading buat is corrupt.

266 The text reading fa ja'altu is incorrect.

Maka adalah mereka itu malu akan segala Ahlu'l-Islām, dan takut disalahkan kebanyakan madhhab dan agama. Jika dikata mereka itu dengan nyatanya 'kamilah Allāh dan Allāh itu kami' tiada diqabūlkan oleh sekelian mereka itu akan perkataannya. Maka dilindungi lah dirinya dibalik dinding yang berpesuk-pesuk supaya jangan kelihatan perkataan-perkataan yang jahat dan i'tiqād yang ḡalālat. Maka disamarkannya dengan katanya: "Bahwa sanya Allāh Ta'ālā itu diri kami dan wujūd kami dan kami diriNya dan wujūdNya itu jua." Maka yang demikian itu tiada terlindung pada sekelian Budiman yang bijaksana, dan tiada ter[sem]bunyi pada segala 'Ārif yang kāmīl.

Shahdān. Adalah perkataan dan i'tiqād mereka itu seperti perkataan dan i'tiqād qawm 'Alī Ilāhiyyah dan Ismā'īliyyah daripada qawm Rāfiḡī; katanya bahwa Ḥaqq Ta'ālā itu tanazzul lalu jadi 'Alī ibnu Abī Ṭālib (karrama'l-Lāhu wajhahu!) Dan seperti i'tiqād qawm Yahūdī; katanya bahwa Nabī Allāh 'Uzayr itu anak Allāh; seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

'Qālati'l-Yahūdu 'Uzayrun ibnu'l-Lāhi.'

ya'nī: 'Kata Yahūdī 'Uzayr itu anak Allāh.'

Dan seperti perkataan dan i'tiqād qawm Naṣārā bahwa Nabī Allāh 'Īsā itu anak Allāh; seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

'Wa qālati'l-Naṣārā al-Masīḡu ibnu'l-Lāhi.' [12]

Setengah daripada mereka itu [mengi'tiqādkan] bahwa Allāh itu menigai tiga; seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

'Wa ḡad kafara'l-ladhīna ḡalū inna'l-Lāha thālithu thalāthatin.'

ya'nī: 'Sanya telah kāfirlah mereka itu [yang] mengata[kan]  
adalah Allāh itu menigai tiga.'

Dan kata setengah daripada mereka itu bahwa Nabī Allāh 'Īsā itulah  
Allāh. Dan lagi pula kata qawm Naṣāra bahwa Allāh turun daripada  
lāhūt kedalam nāsūt - iaitu lembaga yang Ia jadi daripada 'ālam  
ajsam - maka kembali pula Ia kepada lāhūt. Maka perkataan dan  
i'tiqād mereka itu kāfir, seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

'Laqad kafara'l-ladhīna qālū inna'l-Lāha  
huwa'l-Masīhu ibnu Maryam.'

ertinya: 'Bahwa sanya telah kāfirlah mereka itu yang  
mengata[kan] bahwa sanya Allāh itulah 'Īsā ibnu Maryam.'

Dengar olehmu, hai Budiman!, firmān Tuhan yang dalam Qur'an  
mengatakan peri kejadian insān dua puluh dualapan tempatnya. Bayān.  
Seperti kata Ṣāhibu'l-Zubad (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!):

"Wa qad dhakara'l-Lāhu'l-insāna fī thamāniyatin wa  
'ishrīna mawḍī'an wa qāla innahu makhlūqun."<sup>267</sup>

ya'nī: "Sanya disebutkan Allāh Ta'ālā akan insān itu pada  
dua puluh dualapan tempat. Maka firmānNya bahwa  
insān itu makhlūq."

Maka inilah beza antara perkataan wujud Allāh itu wujud makhlūq,  
dan wujud makhlūq itu wujud Allāh, dan insān [13] itu Allāh, dengan  
perkataan Naṣārā katanya Nabī 'Īsā itulah Allāh. Maka yang demikian  
itu tiada ter[sem]bunyi pada segala Budiman yang berīmān. Kata  
Shaykh 'Alī ibnu Ḥamīd al-Mahā'imī (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!)  
dalam kitāb Irā'atu'l-Daqā'iq:

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267 The text reading ghulūqun is corrupt.

"Fa man qāla'l-'aqlu aw al-nafsu aw al-ṭabī'atu'l-kulliyātu aw mā<sup>268</sup> dūnaha mina'l-kawākibī<sup>269</sup> wa'l-'anāṣiri wa'l-mawālidi ilāhun bi i'tibāri maẓhariyyatiha lahu fa qad akhta'a kamā akhta'a<sup>270</sup> man qāla li yadī Zaydin innahu Zaydun wa 'in kānat yaduhu min jumlati maẓāhirihi fa 'in kāna mukhtī'an fī iṭlāqi'l-ilāhi 'alā mā laysa bi ilāhin fa qad kafara wa tazandaqa ..."

ya'nī: "Barangsiapa mengi'tiqādkan 'aql atau nafs atau segala ṭabī'at atau barang sebagainya daripada segala bintang dan segala 'anāṣir dan ḥayawānāt dan nābātāt dan jumādāt itu Haqq Ta'ālā dengan i'tibār<sup>271</sup> maẓharNya, maka salahlah ia seperti yang mengatakan 'tangan Zayd itulah Zayd' - dan jika ada tangannya itu daripada jumlah segala maẓharnya sekalipun. Apabila adalah salah i'tiqādnya pada mengatakan yang lain daripada Haqq Ta'ālā itu Haqq Ta'ālā maka sanya jadilah ia kāfir dan zindīq ..."

" ... Wa 'in qulnā'l-zāhiru fī kulli'l-'ālamī wujūdu'l-ḥaqqi wa asmā'ihī fa laysa wujūduhu min ḥaythu huwa zāhirun fī kulli wāḥidin [14] min ahadi'l-ashyā'i bi kamālihi ..."

" ... Dan jikalau kami kata yang zāhir pada 'ālam itu wujūd Haqq Ta'ālā, atau asmā'Nya sekalipun, maka sekali-kali tiada ada wujūd Allāh daripada fihaq zāhir itu ada wujūdNya mawjūd pada tiap-tiap makhluk ..."

" ... Wa li'l-qawli bi waḥdati'l-wujūdi<sup>272</sup> fī'l-kulli lā yajūzu'l-qawlu bi ilāhiyyati kulli wāḥidin mina'l-ashyā'i ..."

268 The text reading awwamā is corrupt.

269 The text reading kawāb is corrupt.

270 The text reading khata'a is corrupt.

271 The text reading i'tiyār is corrupt.

272 The text reading wāḥidati is incorrect.

"Adapun murād daripada kata Ahlu'l-Sūfī:  
wahdatu'l-wujūd<sup>273</sup> fī'l-kulli - ya'nī keesaan  
wujūd Allāh dengan 'ālam itu, bukan maqṣūd mereka  
itu akan tiap-tiap segala perkara yang tersebut  
itu Haqq Ta'ālā ..."

" ... Idhi'l-kalāmu ayy kalāmu man qāla bi  
wahdati wujūdi'l-kulli innamā huwa fī anna'l-  
majmū' ayy majmū' wujūdāti'l-ashyā'i amrun  
wāhidun wa huwa zuhūru'l-ḥaqqi fī'l-kulli lā  
anna kulla wāhidin mina'l-mawjūdāti huwa'l-  
majmū'u'l-ladhī zahara fīhi'l-ḥaqqu bi  
kulliyatihi ..."

" ... Kerana maqṣūd Ahlu'l-Sūfī dengan katanya  
'wahdatu'l wujūd al-kulli' - ya'nī keesaan 'ālam  
dengan suku-sukunya itu - maqṣūd mereka itu  
hanya sanya adalah majmū' wujūd segala ashya'  
itu suatu pekerjaan jua; iaitulah zuhūr Haqq  
Ta'ālā pada 'ālam. Bukan maqṣūd mereka itu  
bahwa sanya tiap-tiap daripada segala mawjūdāt  
itulah majmū' 'ālam yang zahir dalamnya Haqq  
Ta'ālā dengan dhātNya dan ṣifātNya dan asmā'Nya ..."

Dan lagi pula katanya dalam kitāb Imhād<sup>274</sup> [15] al-Naṣīḥah:

"Wahdatu'l-wujūdi mā bihi'l-taḥaqququ wa  
huwa wāhidun."

ya'nī: "Esa wujūd itu iaitu suatu shay' yang dengan  
dia jadi shay' yang lain."  
(ertinya yang menjadikan segala sesuatu itu iaitu esa).

Kata Ṣāhibu Latā'ifi'l-I'lām (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!):

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273 The text reading wahidatu is incorrect.

274 The text reading mahād is corrupt.

"Waḥdatu'l-wujūd mā huwa bihi tataḥaqqaqu  
ḥaqīqatu kullī mawjūdīn wa dhālika lā  
yaṣīḥu an yakūna amran<sup>275</sup> ghayra'l-ḥaqqi  
'azza<sup>276</sup> sha'nuhu.

ya'nī: "Bahwa waḥdatu'l-wujūd itu iaitu barang suatu  
shay' yang dengan dia jadi sesuatu shay'.  
Maka yang menjadikan itu sekali-kali tiada  
sah dikata wujud melainkan akan wujud Allāh jua."

Maka barang siapa hendak menta'wilkan<sup>277</sup> Allāh itu 'ālam dan 'ālam  
itu Allāh - dan lagi katanya insān itu Allāh - maka sanya ialah  
mendustakan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dan RasūlNya, dan membenarkan i'tiqād  
Yahūdī dan Naṣārā. Lagi dii'tiqādkan mereka itu Islām ajā'ib;  
sekali-kali betapa perinya hendak dita'wilkan akan perkataan yang  
sejahat-jahat dan i'tiqād yang semata-mata ḍalālat lagi kāfir -  
na'ūdhu bi'l-Lāhi minhā! - yang tiada terderita tujuh petala langit  
dan bumi mendengar dia, seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

'Takādu'l-sanawātu yatafaṭṭarna minhu wa  
tanshaqqu'l-arḍu wa takhirru'l-jibālu<sup>278</sup> haddan  
an da'ū li'l-raḥmāni waladan.'

ya'nī: 'Hampirlah tujuh petala langit belah-belah,  
cherak-cheraklah tujuh petala bumi, dan  
runtuhlah [16] segala bukit berhamburan  
tatakala mendengar kata Yahūdī dan Naṣārā ada  
bagi Tuhan yang bernama Raḥmān itu anak.'

Apabila kau ketahuilah perkataan dan i'tiqād Wujūdiyyah yang  
mulhid maka sekarang kubayānkan pula perkataan dan i'tiqād

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275 The text reading amrun is incorrect.

276 The text is corrupt.

277 The text reading menta'wilkan is incorrect.

278 The text reading tahirru is incorrect.

Wujūdiyyah yang muwahhid lagi Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī (dijadikan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā kiranya kita daripada qawm mereka itu!) Kata Wujūdiyyah yang muwahhid bahwa wujūd Allāh itu esa jua; tiada berbilang dan berhad, tiada bersegala dan setengah, tiada berhimpun dan bersuku-suku, tiada khāṣṣ dan 'āmm, tiada jawhar dan jisim - serta demikian ada dijadiakannya segala perkara yang tersebut itu.

Shahdān. Bahwa wujūd Allāh itu sekali-kali tiada berubah dan tiada jadi segala perkara itu kerana Ia al'āna kamā kāna - ya'nī, adalah Ia sekarang seperti adaNya dahulu jua; ya'nī tatakala belumpai<sup>279</sup> dijadikan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā segala perkara, tiada Ia jadi segala perkara itu. Ya'nī, demikian lagi tatakala sudah dijadiakannya segala perkara itu pun tiada jadi Ia serupa dan sewujūd dengan segala perkara itu. Ya'nī, bahwa wujūd Allāh itu tertentu pada dhāt Allāh jua, sekali-kali tiada jadi Ia wujūd makhluq, dan wujūd makhluq itu sekali-kali tiada jadi ia wujūd Allāh. Seperti kata Shaykh Muḥyī'l-Dīn Ibnu'l-'Arabī (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!) pada setengah taṣnifnya:

"Wājibu'l-wujūd huwa'l-wujūd [17] al-muṭlaq."

ya'nī: "Wājibu'l-wujūd itulah wujūd yang muṭlaq."  
(ya'nī wujūd Allāh itu bukan wujūd yang muqayyad).

Maka adalah wujūd Allāh [tiada] ketahuan kayfiyyatNya dan kammiyyatNya, dan tiada dapat dibahathkan dan ditafahḥuṣkan<sup>280</sup> daripada

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279 Pai is archaic form meaning lagi.

280 The text reading tafāḥuṣkan is incorrect.

haqīqatNya dan kunhi dhātNya. Seperti firmān Allāh Ta‘ālā:

'Wa yuhadhdirukumu'l-Lāhu nafsahu.'

ya'nī: 'Dipertakut Allāh akan kamu daripada sampai  
ma'rifat kamu kepada kunhi dhātNya.'

Dan sabda Nabī s.a.w.:

"Kullukum fī dhāti'l-Lāhi ḥumqīyyūna."

ya'nī: "Adalah sekalian kamu pada ma'rifat  
dhāt Allāh aḥmaq."

Dan kata nabī Allāh Dāwūd a.s.:

"Subḥāna man ja'ala i'tirāfa'l-'abd bi'l-'ajzi  
'an shukrihi shukran kamā ja'ala i'tirāfahu bi'l-  
'ajzi 'an ma'rifatihi ma'rifatan."

ya'nī: "Mahasuchi Tuhan yang menjadikan iqrār 'abd  
dengan melemahkan dirinya daripada membawa  
shukur akan dia dengan sempurna shukur,  
seperti dijadikan iqrār 'abd dengan melemahkan  
dirinya daripada sampai ma'rifatnya pada kunhi  
dhāt Allāh dengan sempurna ma'rifatnya."

Kata Abū Bakr al-Siddīq r.a.:

"Subḥāna man lam yaj'al likhalqihī sabīlan<sup>281</sup>  
illā ma'rifatihi illā bi'l-'ajzi 'an ma'rifatihi."

ya'nī: "Mahasuchi Tuhan yang tiada menjadikan bagi  
makhlūqNya jalan kepada ma'rifat dhātNya  
melainkan daripada melemahkan diri daripada  
ma'rifat akan Dia."

Maka nyatalah tiada diḥāṣil ma'rifat 'abd dan tawḥīdnya akan Haqq  
Ta'ālā melainkan dengan sekira-kira anugerah Tuhannya [18] akan  
dia. Seperti kata Shaykh Shiblī (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!) akan  
seorang laki-laki:

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281 The text reading sabīlun is incorrect.

"Tadrī [limā] lam yaṣīḥ<sup>282</sup> tawḥīdaka faqāla lā qāla liannaka taṭlubuhu bika fa law taṭlubuhu bihi lā<sup>283</sup> wajadtuhu."

ya'nī: "Tahukah engkau kerana apa [tiada] ṣaḥ tawḥīdmu? Maka sahut laki-laki itu: 'Tiada hamba tahu.' Maka kata Shaykh Shiblī: 'Dari kerana bahwa sanya engkau menuntut tawḥīd itu dengan dikau (ya'nī dengan daya upayamu jua), maka jikalau kau tuntutan akan tawḥīd itu dengan anugerah Haqq Ta'ālā nischaya kau peroleh akan dia."

Inilah rahasia sabda Nabī s.a.w.:

"Lā ya'rifu'l-Lāha illā'l-Lāhu lā yadhkuru'l-Lāha illā'l-Lāhu lā yarā'l-Lāha illā'l-Lāhu."

ya'nī: "Tiada [ada yang dapat] mengenal Allāh melainkan Allāh, dan tiada [ada yang dapat] menyebut Allāh melainkan Allāh, dan tiada [ada yang dapat] melihat Allāh melainkan Allāh. (Ya'nī tiada dikenal 'abd akan Haqq Ta'ālā melainkan dengan semata-mata anugerahNya akan dia, dan tiada dapat disebut 'abd akan Haqq Ta'ālā melainkan dengan semata-mata anugerahNya, akan dia, dan tiada dapat dilihat 'abd akan Haqq Ta'ālā melainkan dengan semata-mata anugerahNya akan dia)."

Maka adalah i'tiqād segala Wujūdiyyah yang muwaḥḥid pada ma'nā kalimat lā ilāha illā'l-Lāh 'tiada mawjūd hanya Allāh.'

Ya'nī: 'Lā wujūd li shay'in ḥaqīqatan illā'l-Lāhu.'

ertinya: 'Tiada wujūd bagi sesuatu shay' pada ḥaqīqatnya melainkan tertentu bagi Haqq Ta'ālā.'

ya'nī: 'Mā fī'l-wujūdi illā huwa nafiyyu'l-mashriki 'an wujūdihi [19] wa ithbātu waḥdatihi fī wujūdihi bilā ghayrihi.'

ertinya: 'Tiada ada wujūd pada ḥaqīqat melainkan [wujūd] Haqq Ta'ālā jua; iaitu menafikan sekutu daripada wujūd Allāh dan mengithbātkan keesaan Haqq Ta'ālā pada wujūdNya jua dengan tiada ada wujūd ḥaqīqī bagi yang lainnya.'

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282 Text reading taṣīḥ is incorrect.

283 Text reading li is corrupt.

Maka bahwa sanya wujud segala makhluk qill lagi wujud majāzī jua. Dan aṣlī dan ḥaqīqī itu iaitu wujud Ḥaqq Ta'ālā jua. Sekali-kali tiada wujud ḥaqīqī pada wujud yang majāzī. Hanya sanya adalah ia hapus dan lenyap lagi 'adam apabila dibandingkan dengan yang ḥaqīqī. Seperti kata Shaykh Junayd (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!):

"Al-muḥdathu idhā qūrīna bi'l-qadīmī lam yatabaqqā<sup>284</sup> lahu atharun."

ya'nī: "Wujud yang muḥdath itu apabila dibandingkan dengan wujud yang qadīm nischaya tiadalah tinggal baginya bekas (ertinya hapuslah dan fanā'lah ia)."

Maka adalah segala muwahḥid itu menghapuskan dalam mushāhadahnya akan segala wujud makhluk pada banding mushāhadahnya akan wujud Allāh yang ḥaqīqī lagi muṭlaq. Serta kata mereka itu 'tiada ada mawjūd yang ḥaqīqī hanya Allāh.' Maka nyatalah mā siwā Allāh itu 'adamu'l-mahd - sekali-kali tiada berwujud ḥaqīqī, kerana ittifāqlah segala perkataan 'Ārif dan Muḥaqiq pada ishārat dan 'ibārat, pada dhawq dan wijdān. Dan -

"Mā siwā'l-Lāhi 'adamu'l-mahd min ḥaythu dhātihī wa lā yūsafu bi wujudin ma'a'l-lāhi ta'ālā." [20]

ya'nī: "Bahwa sanya adalah mā siwā Allāh itu 'adam mahd daripada fiḥaq dhātNya, dan tiada dapat diperikan akan 'adam mahd itu ada ia mawjūd [ber] serta [dengan] Allāh."

Kata Shaykh Ibn 'Aṭā'i'l-Lāh (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!)

"Fa mā siwā'l-lāhi ta'ālā 'inda ahli'l-tawḥīdi wa'l-ma'rifati lā yūsafu bi wujudī wa lā faqada a'zalan wujudā ma'ahu ghayruhu li thubūti aḥadiyyatihi wa lā faqda li ghayrihi li annahu lā yafqīdu<sup>285</sup> illā mā wujīda."

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284 The text reading yabtaqī is incorrect.

285 The text reading yufaqqīdu is incorrect.

ya'nī: "Mā siwā Allāh itu pada Ahlu'l-Tawhīd dan Ahlu'l-Ma'rifah tiada dapat diperikan dengan wujud, dan tiada dapat diperikan dengan 'adam muṭlaq, dari kerana sekali-kali tiada sesuatu wujud shay' serta Haqq Ta'ālā lain daripada dhātNya; kerana thābitlah keesaan wujud Allāh pada dhātNya jua. Dan tiada mā siwā Allāh itu 'adam muṭlaq dari kerana bahwa sanya tiada jua dijadikan Haqq Ta'ālā akan sesuatu shay' melainkan barang yang dijadikanNya."

Seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā yang Mahatinggi:

'Kullu shay'in hālikun illa wajhahū.'

ya'nī: 'Tiap-tiap shay' itu binasa melainkan dhāt Allāh.'

Seperti sabda Nabī s.a.w.:

"Alā kullu shai'in mā khala'l-lāha<sup>286</sup> bāṭilu wa kullu na'imin lā maḥālata zā'ilu."<sup>287</sup>

ya'nī: "Tiadakah kuketahui tiap-tiap segala sesuatu barang yang lain daripada Allāh itu sia-sia jua adanya."

ertinya: "Tiada dibagiNya wujud haqīqī, dan tiap-tiap ni'mat itu tidak dapat tiada hilang jua."

Sanya shahdān. [21] Amat beza antara perkataan Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī bahwa Haqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam itu esa, dan antara perkataan Wujūdiyyah yang mulhid bahwa Haqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam itu esa. Maka maqṣūd Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī daripada perkataan itu iaitu bahwa sanya Haqq Ta'ālā jua yang mawjūd lagi tertentu wujudNya pada dhātNya jua, sekali-kali tiada wujudNya pada 'ālam; seperti kata mereka itu:

"Al-wujūdu huwa'l-Lāhu."

ya'nī: "Wujūd itu iaitu Allāh."

Dan seperti kata Shaykh Muḥyī'l-Dīn ibnu'l-'Arabī (qaddasa'l-Lāhu

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286 The text reading ahalla is corrupt.

287 The text reading zānidu is incorrect.

sirrahu!) dalam kitāb Fuṣūṣu'l-Hikam:

"Wa'l-wujūd 'l-ḥaqqu innamā huwa'l-lāhu'l-ḥaqqu khāṣṣatan min ḥaythu dhātuhu 'ainuhu dhātuhu."

ya'nī: "Yang wujud itu iaitu Haqq Ta'ālā. Hanya sanya ialah Allāh sebenarnya lagi tertentu Ia daripada fiḥaq dhātNya: itulah wujudNya."

Dan lagi pula katanya:

"Wa inna'l-'ālama laysa illā tajalliyahu."

"Dan bahwa sanya 'ālam itu tiada ada ia melainkan tajallī Haqq Ta'ālā (ya'nī maẓharNya)."

Dan lagi pula katanya:

"Fa'l-'ālamu mutawahhamun mā lahu wujūdun ḥaqīqiyyun."

"Maka 'ālam itu iaitu yang diwahmikan jua, tiada ada baginya wujud ḥaqīqī."

Maka berhimpunlah<sup>288</sup> sekalian Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī dan segala Mutakallimīn mengatakan:

"Al-'ālamu bi jami'i ajzā'ihī a'rāḍun wa'l-ma'rūdu huwa'l-lāhu."

ya'nī: "Yang 'ālam dengan segala suku-sukunya [itu] beberapa 'araḍ, dan ma'rūd itu iaitu Haqq Ta'ālā."

Maka murād daripada 'araḍ itu pada iṣṭilāḥ mereka itu [22]:

"Al-'araḍu lā yabqā zamānayni." (14)

ya'nī: "Yang 'araḍ itu tiada ia kekal pada dua masa."

Dan murād daripada ma'rūd itu iaitu wujud Allāh yang azalī lagi

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(14) Ya'nī adalah 'araḍ itu berubah-ubah lagi berganti-ganti dan hilang. Maka datang yang ganti sebagainya pada tiap-tiap nafas dan ketika. Ḥāshiyah minhu.

288 The text reading berhimpunkan is incorrect.

abadī. Ialah yang qā'im sendiriNya dan Ialah yang mengqiyāmkān<sup>289</sup> bagi lainnya. Maka tiadalah dinamai akan 'ālam itu dengan nama wujud; hanya sanya adalah dinamai akan dia dengan nama ḡalālat<sup>290</sup> dan lā shay', bāṭil dan khayālī dan sarābi dan ḡillī jua.

Maka apabila adalah ḡāl 'ālam itu demikian - ya'nī tiadalah kebilangan keadaannya itu jikalau kelihatan pada penglihat mata sekalipun - maka tiadalah menduai wujud Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Sebab inilah kata mereka itu bahwa Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam itu esa. Bukan maqṣūd mereka itu bahwa 'ālam<sup>(15)</sup> dengan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā sewujūd dan bersuatu. Kerana itulah kata mereka itu bahwa Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam berlainan pun tiada dan bersuatu pun tiada, kerana berlainannya dan bersuatunya itu menghendaki dua wujud. Hanya sanya adalah ia milik bagi Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Su'āl (jika ditanyai seseorang): "Bahwa matahari yang dilangit dengan matahari yang kelihatan didalam chermin esakah atau dua?" Jawāb: "Bahwa matahari yang dilangit dengan matahari yang didalam chermin esa jua." Su'āl (jika ditanyai seseorang): "Bukankah ketahuan daripada perkataan ini bahwa matahari yang dilangit dengan matahari yang didalam chermin itu sewujūd?" Jawāb: "Bahwa [23] sekali-kali tiada sewujūd matahari

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(15) Ya'nī sebab dinamai akan 'ālam itu lā shay' kerana ia tiada shay' ḡaḡīḡī pada tiap-tiap nafsu'l-amr dirinya, tetapi adalah shay' pada fihaq dijadikan Allāh akan dia. Ḥāshiyah minhu.

289 The text reading peqiyāmkān is incorrect.

290 The text reading ḡalālat is corrupt.

yang dilangit dengan matahari yang didalam chermin. Maka yang demikian itu tiada ter[sem]bunyi pada segala Budiman yang tajam 'aqlnya, kerana matahari yang didalam chermin itu tiada kebilangan adanya, dan hanya yang kebilangan itu matahari yang dilangit jua. Maka jikalau ada wujud matahari yang dilangit itu pada matahari yang didalam chermin nischaya berhubunglah dan sewujudlah keduanya. Maka yang demikian itu sekali-kali tiada diterima 'aql. Dan jikalau ada sesuatu suku daripada wujud matahari yang dilangit, atau chahayanya ada pada matahari yang kelihatan didalam chermin nischaya hangat dan tertunulah chermin itu. Dan lagi pula jikalau ada wujud matahari yang dilangit itu pada matahari yang kelihatau didalam chermin itu betapa luas pada 'aql, kerana matahari yang dilangit itu kira-kira tiga puluh kian dunia ini besarnya, dan chermin itu qadar sejari jua besarnya. Maka betapa dapat chermin yang luas sejari meluluskan matahari dilangit yang besarnya tiga puluh kian dunia ini! Maka nyatalah bahwa matahari yang kelihatan didalam chermin itu bayang-bayang dan tempat kenyataan dan bekas matahari yang dilangit jua."

Adapun maksud Wujūdiyyah yang mulhid mengatakan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam esa jua, iaitu dikehendaknya wujud Allāh dan 'ālam sewujud. Maka Allāh itu 'ālam dan 'ālam itu Allāh - na'ūdhu bi'l-Lāh [24] daripada beri'tiqād yang demikian itu!

Shahdān. Adalah mushāhadah segala 'Ārif yang kāmīl mukammal akan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam itu seperti kata Ṣāhibu Miftāhi'l-Ghayb (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!):

"Wa amma'l-kummalu wa'l-mumakkanūna lā yanfūna'l-  
'ālama 'alā naḥwi mā yanfīhi ahlu'l-shuhūdi'l-(16)  
ḥāliyyi wa lā yuthbitūnahu<sup>291</sup> 'alā naḥwi ithbāti  
ahli'l-ḥijābi ma'a i'tirāfihim bi'l-ḥaqqi wa'l-  
'ālamī wa tamyīzihim bayna'l-ḥaqqi wa mā siwāhu."

ya'nī "Adalah segala yang kāmīl yang Ahlu'l-Tamkīn  
tiada dinafikan 'ālam seperti yang dinafikan  
Ahlu'l-Shuhūd al-Hālī, dan tiada diithbātkan  
mereka itu akan 'ālam seperti yang diithbātkan  
Ahlu'l-Hijāb; serta digabulkan mereka itu akan  
Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dan 'ālam, dan dibezakan mereka itu  
antara Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam.

Tanbīh. Ketahui olehmu, hai Tālib!, bahwa perkataan  
shaṭḥiyyāt<sup>(17)</sup> yang terlanchar lisānnya setengah 'Ārif, padaḥāl  
ghalābah maboknya, seperti katanya: "Anā'l-Lāhu!" dan "Anā'l-  
Ḥaqqu!" dan barang sebagainya yang ketahuan daripada perkataan itu  
bahwa Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan makhluk suatu ḥaqīqat dan sewujūd. Maka  
yang demikian itu (ḥāsha'l-Lāhu) sekali-kali tiada maqṣūd dan tiada

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(16) Itu tinggal dalamnya: iaitulah mem[b]eri manfa'at dan  
shaṭḥiyyāt yang pada istīlāḥ Ahlu'l-Sūfī itu iaitu barang yang keluar  
daripada lisānnya setengah Ahlu'l-Lāh itu tatakala ghalābah mabok  
mereka itu. Maka yang demikian itu tiada mufakat dengan ḥukum  
shara' dan ḥaqīqat. Hanya semata-mata dengan dia perangai bashar-  
iyyah jua, tiada dengan ikhtiyār mereka itu pada perkataan  
shaṭḥiyyāt itu. Ḥāshiyah minhu. 'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

(17) Adapun murād daripada shaṭḥiyyāt itu pada lughat, buang;  
seperti dibuang periuk yang mendidih akan biuhnya yang tiada berman-  
fa'at dan tinggalkan barang yang beri manfa'at. Demikian lagi qalb  
segala Ahlu'l-Lāh itu upama periuk yang mendidih dan shaṭḥiyyāt itu  
buih aḥwālnya, ia itulah yang terang lagi tiada beri manfa'at segala  
asrār.

291 The text reading yushbitūnahu is corrupt.

disengaja<sup>292</sup> mereka itu akan perkataan shaṭhiyyāt itu. Hanya sanya berlaku atas lisān mereka itu dengan tiada ingat akan dirinya serta [25] terlanchar lisān yang lawas<sup>293</sup> tatakala maboknya, dan yang mengigau tatakala tidur dan idami dengan sesuatu pekerjaan, dan yang ter'ādat akan sesuatu perkataan<sup>(18)</sup> seperti orang yang latah. Maka terlanchar lisānnya dengan tiada ikhtiyārnya. Demikian lagi segala ḥāl Ahlu'l-Lāh pada shaṭhiyyātnya; kerana adalah ghālib pada penglihat mereka itu, fanā' [akan] dirinya dan akan segala mā siwā'l-Lāh, serta mathqūl dan karam ia pada tiap-tiap ketika pada siang dan malam dalam mushāhadahkan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Lalu berlaku atas lisānnya segala mereka itu daripada segala asmā' Allāh hingga ter'ādatlah pada lisānnya: "Huwa'l-Lāhu! - Huwa'l-Lāhu!" atau "Huwa'l-Ḥaqqu! - Huwa'l-Ḥaqqu!" Maka tertukarlah 'Huwa' itu dengan 'Anā'. Maka yang demikian itu diperlakukan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā atas lisān mereka itu, dan dengan tiada ikhtiyārnya. Maka adalah pada iṣṭilāḥ Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī dinamai akan yang mengata[kan] shaṭhiyyāt itu

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(18) Adapun murād daripada mabok itu pada iṣṭilāḥ Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī iaitu tiada ingat 'abd akan dirinya dan akan mā siwā'l-Lāh sebab ghalābah kekerasan wāridnya tajallī Ḥaqq Ta'ālā padanya. Hāshiyah minhu. 'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

292 The text reads sahaja (archaic form of sengaja).

293 The text is corrupt.

maghlūbu'l-ḥāl dan marfū'u'l-qalam pada Ḥaqq Ta'ālā jua. Dan dibiarkan mereka itu akan dia hanya pada perkataan 'Anā'l-Ḥaqqu' dan barang sebagainya jua. Tetapi pada ḡāhir shara<sup>(19)</sup> dihukumkan akan dia<sup>(20)</sup> dan tiada diberikan mereka itu akan dia<sup>(21)</sup> pada segala i'tiqād yang mulḥid dan zindīq dan segala perbuatan yang tiada dikeridā'i Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Jikalau pada ḥāl [26] fanā'nya dan maboknya sekalipun tiada gugur daripadanya taklīf, iaitu amr dan nahī, kerana adalah Ḥaqq Ta'ālā qā'im dengan memerintahkan 'aqlnya dan dipeliharakanNya akan dia daripada segala perbuatan

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(19) Ya'nī: tiada disiksa Ḥaqq Ta'ālā akan dia pada hari qiyāmat, kerana ia mengata[kan] shaṭḥiyyāt itu tiada dengan ikhtiyārnya, lagi kerana keluar daripada lisānnya sebab ghalābah kekerasan ḡāhir Ḥaqq Ta'ālā atasnya. Seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

'Innī anā'l-Lāhu!'

daripada puhun ḡaytūn dibukit Ṭūrisīna. Maka adalah yang mengata[kan] shaṭḥiyyāt itu mu'min pada Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Hāshiyah minhu.

'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

(20) Ya'nī jikalau tiada dibunuh akan dia. Hāshiyah minhu.

'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

(21) Ya'nī segala i'tiqād yang bersalahan dengan Kitāb Allāh dan ḥadīth Rasūlu'l-Lāh dan ijmā' segala 'Ulamā', atau diḥalālkananya barang yang diḥarāmkan Allāh. Ya'nī dihukumkan mereka itu akan dia dengan murtad dan zindīq, dan jikalau tiada dibunuh akan dia.

Hāshiyah minhu. 'Afā'l-Lāhu 'anhu.

yang ma'siat. Serta [di] anugerahiNya tawfīq akan dia pada mengerjakan segala farḍ, pada ḥāl ghalābah maboknya serta fanā' fi'l-Lāh. Kata Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn Faḍli'l-Lāh demikianlah ketahuan [ma'nānya] daripada perkataan segala 'Ārif bi'l-Lāh.

Hai Tālib!, sekali-kali tiada jadi wujud Haqq Ta'ālā itu wujud makhlūq dan wujud makhlūq itu sekali-kali tiada jadi wujud Haqq Ta'ālā jikalau fanā' fi'l-Lāh dan baqā' bi'l-Lāh sekalipun. Seperti kata Shaykh 'Alī ibn Aḥmad al-Maḥā'imī (qaddasa'l-Lāhu sirrahu!) didalam kitābnya Irā'ātu'l-Daqā'iq sharḥ Mir'atu'l-Haqā'iq:

"Biannahu wa in balagha mā balagha lā takhruju min ḥaddi'l-ḥaqā'iqi'l-kawniyyati wa lā yablughu ratbatan ilāhiyyatan wa 'in šara fāniyan fi'l-Lāhi aw bāqiyān bihi khilāfi mā tawahhama ba'ḍu'l-sufahā'ī."

ya'nī: "Bahwa sanya jikalau wāṣil 'abd dengan kesudah-sudahan wāṣil kepada Haqq Ta'ālā sekalipun maka sekali-kali tiada ia keluar daripada ḥad makhlūq, dan tiada jadi diperwujudnya akan wujud Allāh jikalau jadi ia fanā' fi'l-Lāh [atau] baqā' bi'l-Lāh sekalipun - bersalahan dengan yang di i'tiqādkan setengah jāhil yang zindīq."

Shahdān. Barang siapa [27] mengata[kan] perkataan shaṭḥiyyāt atau dii'tiqādkannya pada ḡāhir 'ibārat perkataan itu dengan tiada hapus<sup>294</sup> [dalam] ghalābah maboknya<sup>(22)</sup> seperti ḥāl segala Ahlu'l-Lāh itu, maka jadilah ia mulḥid dan zindīq; lagi kāfir pada Allāh

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(22) Ya'nī ingat akan dirinya dengan ikhtiyārnya.

294 The text reading khāf or ḥāf conveys no meaning.

pada ṣāhir shara', dan dihukumkan akan dia didalam dunyā dengan bunuh dan didalam ākhirat senantiasa kekal dalam neraka selamanya.

Rabbanā lā tuzigh qulūbanā ba'da idh haḍaytanā  
wa hab lanā min ladunka raḥmatan innaka anta'l-wahhāb.

Ertinya: Hai Tuhan kami!, jangan kiranya Kau palingkan hati kami kemudian daripada sudah Kau tunjuk pada kami jalan yang benar, dan anugerah kiranya akan kami daripada haḍratMu raḥmat. Bahwa sanya Engkau jua yang amat menganugerah.

Wa ṣalla'l-Lāhu 'alā sayyidinā Muḥammadin wa ālihi wa ṣaḥbihi wa sallam. Taslīman kathīran kathīran. Biraḥmatika yā arḥama'l-rāḥimīn.

Tammat pada Hījratu'l-Nabīyyi ṣalla'l-Lāhu 'alayhi wa sallam seribu seratus dualapan puluh enam tahun kepada tahun waw, kepada dua belas hari bulan Sha'bān, kepada hari Aḥad pada waktu ba'da ṣalāti'l-zuhri. Wa kātibuhu akhī 'Abdu'l-'Azīz.

## CHAPTER VII

English translation of the text

The Proofs of the Truthful in Refuting the Zindīqs

by

Al-Shaykh Nūru'l-Dīn al-Rānirī

Maxwell Text no. 93

[Royal Asiatic Society, London]

Bismi'l-Lāhi'l-Rahmāni'l-Rahīm

In the name of God the Merciful the Beneficent.

Hamdan li Ilāhin huwa bi'l-hamdi ḥaqīqun fī bahri nawālihi  
kānati'l-dārātu gharīqatan. Every praise be to God - to Whom all  
praise is due! All souls are submerged in the ocean of His  
generosity. Wa an'ama 'alayha bijūdihi'l-tawfīqa ulā'ika mina'l-  
nabiyyīna wa'l-ṣiddiqīna. And through His generosity He has  
bestowed upon them His succour. They are those from amongst the  
Prophets and the Truthful. Fa ḥaqqaqū bi ḥaqqihim ḥaqqal-  
taḥqīqi wa maiyyazū'l-ḥaqqa mina'l-bāṭili bi'l-taṣdīqi. God has  
established their veracity by true confirmation, and they had, by  
the affirmation of their faith, separated truth from falsehood.  
Wa ḥaqqaqū ḥaqā'iqahum bi'l-tadqīqi fa harrarū 'ulūmahum wa  
baiyyinū'l-ṭarīqah. They investigated the objects of their sublime  
research scrupulously as even thus did they record their knowledge  
and make clear the way of religion. Fa man ḥasala lahu li  
tawfīqi'l-raḥīqu tabi'ahum wa illā laṣāra'l-mulḥida wa'l-zindīqa.  
And so, whosoever has the fine succour of God then he would  
assuredly follow them, but as for him who fails to follow them,  
verily he is from amongst the Deviators and the Zindīqs. Wa'l-  
ṣalātu wa'l-salāmu 'ala'l-nabiyyi'l-shafīqi wa 'alā ālihi wa  
ṣaḥbihi min ahli'l-wathīqi. And prayers and peace be upon the  
compassionate Prophet, and upon his Followers and his Companions [2]  
who are people of certainty [in their belief].

Wa ba'du.<sup>295</sup> Fayaqūlu sāqī'l-rasūli al-shaykhu Nūru'l-dīni ibni 'Aliyyin ibni Ḥasanjī ibni Muḥammadin Ḥamīdin al-Rānīriyyu al-shāfi'iyyu. Thus now speaks the cup-bearer who passes around the cup of the Messenger of Allāh (on whom be peace!) Shaykh Nūru'l-Dīn ibn 'Alī ibn Ḥasanjī ibn Muḥammad Ḥamīd by name, of the land of Rānīr and of the school of Shāfi'i. Falammā takhālafa ba'du'l-muta'aṣṣibīna wa'l-mu'ānidīna mina'l-sufahā'i fī baḥthi'l-wujūdi wa misbatī'l-'ālamī bi'l-ḥaqqi ta'ālā. When some of those from among the ignorant and wicked who set up false beliefs, who are prejudiced towards religion [*i.e.* Islam],<sup>(1)</sup> and those who are obstinate,<sup>(2)</sup> disputed concerning the question of [God's] Being; identifying God with the Universe or World - fa altamasa minnī ba'du'l-ajalli min aṣḥābinā - some of my friends who are among the many of the high ranking personages in the land [of Aceh?] requested me [to write a treatise in clarifying for them the issue involved]. Ḥafīzahu'l-Lāhu wa thabbathu fī dīni'l-islāmi bi barakāti sayyidinā Muḥammadin 'alayhi al-ṣalāti wa'l-salāmi. May Allāh preserve them, and through the blessings of our lord Muḥammad (on whom be peace!) may they be guided to, and confirmed in, the religion of Islām!

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(1) Those who set up false beliefs (Ahlu'l-Ta'sīb).

(2) Those who prevented the correction of false beliefs (Ahlu'l-Mu'ānid).

295 I.e. Now then! This is the customary phrase which indicates that the writer has finished his formal introduction and is ready to confront his subject more directly.

Fa 'allafu wa tarjamtu hādhihi'l-risālatā bi'l-jāwiyyati min kutubi'l-ṣūfiyyati wa ghayrihim. I now translate and set into Jāwī this treatise, the contents of which I have culled from all the books of the Ṣūfīs and of others. Wa sammaytuhā ḥujjata'l-ṣiddīqi li daf'i'l-zindīqi. This treatise I entitle: Ḥujjatu'l-Ṣiddīq li daf'i'l-Zindīq - which means The Proofs [3] of the Truthful in Refuting the Zindīqs. Herein I shall mention and make comparisons between the beliefs of the four groups, namely: the Mutakallimīn and the Ṣūfīs, the Philosophers and those who uphold the doctrine of a heretical Wujūdiyyah, in order to expose their respective views on the relationship between God and the Universe or World; whether He is identical with it or whether this is not so, as will be explained in the following pages.

Let me begin by elucidating the meaning of [the term] being. Being is essence (dhāt), or the constituent determinant of a thing.<sup>(3)</sup> This essence<sup>(4)</sup> is at times perceptible to the eyes in the form of the external World or Universe, and at times not perceptible to the eyes, although it is established by the intellect<sup>(5)</sup> ('aql) and by religion (shara'), or through mystical

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(3) That is, quiddity.

(4) The 'presence' of the creature is through constant remembrance of God as the mysteries of God are experienced by him.

(5) I.e. the Qur'ān, the ḥadīth of the Messenger of God, and the ijmā' of the 'Ulamā'.

revelation or insight<sup>(6)</sup> (kashf), and direct experience (dhawq). This [essence] is the Being of God.

According to the Mutakallimīn, there are two categories of being: firstly, the Being of God, and secondly, the being of the Universe or World. God's Being is Necessary Being and is self-existent, and the being of the World is Contingent Being; that is, it is created and externalized by God from not-being ('adam). Furthermore it is dependent for its existence upon God. Thus the two beings are in reality not identical; this is so because the Being of God endures from and to all eternity and is the principle of creation, whereas the being of the Universe is ever new and is created. From their [i.e. the Mutakallimīn] definition it is clear that being is two: the one, Real Being, and the other, Metaphorical Being. Metaphorical Being belongs to Real Being. If [Metaphorical Being and Real Being] both are identical, then they are one. Whosoever holds and believes that the Most Exalted Truth [4] and the Universe are one and the same then he is an unbeliever, for - as the Ṣūfīs say - their words betray that they believe the Being of God and the being of the Universe to be one reality and one being.

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(6) That which the creature achieves through God's manifestations; that is, to contemplate God through His grace. The creature attains to several mysteries, these being the benefits of [His] manifestation, and mystical insight or revelation.

We are in complete agreement with the Mutakallimīn concerning their belief in this matter. According to our definition, being is one; and that is the Essence of God Most Exalted. The Universe is non-existent and is not qualified to be considered as a category of being as it is Absolute Nothingness or Pure Not-Being ('adamu'l-mahd). Thus when the Universe is 'adamu'l-mahd, and the Being of God is Absolute Being (wujūdu'l-mahd),<sup>(7)</sup> whence this identity of 'adamu'l-mahd and wujūdu'l-mahd? In truth the Universe is Appearance; depending for its existence upon the Being of God. It is the theatre of manifestation of the One Real Being - the image reflected in the allegorical mirror: God is likened to the looker into the glass, the world is like the form reflected therein. Thus God's Being and the Universe are neither the same nor different, for its identity or non-identity would require two entities existing per se.<sup>(8)</sup> So when it is only the Being of God that is existent, and the Universe is non-existent, there is then no possibility for comparison. That is why we say the Being of God and the Universe is one. Even though to outward perception the Universe exists, existence cannot be attributed to it - for in itself it does not possess real being. As people say [5] the king

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(7) I.e. absolutely real being.

(8) I.e. [one,] the looker into the glass and [two,] the world [reflection].

and his armies are one and the same. Although his armies are numerous in number, yet they do not count, for the king's existence alone is real. Furthermore it is likened to an image in the mirror and the possessor of that image; to external perception they are two, but in point of fact it cannot be said of them that they are two, for the image in the mirror cannot be considered as existent. Question (if people should ask): "Are the image in the mirror and the possessor of that image two beings or one and the same?"

Answer: "The image in the mirror and the possessor of that image are one and the same, for the image is not considered as existent. In point of fact the image is merely a manifestation of its possessor. That is why people say that the image in the mirror and the possessor of that image are one and the same - neither two nor any other."

What the Mutakallimīn mean when they say this is in reality the same as what the Ṣūfīs mean. There are no differences of opinion between the two groups [on this point]. Shahdān.<sup>296</sup> The contention of the Mutakallimīn is based upon reason and Tradition,<sup>(9)</sup> for they perceive externally that the World exists and is subject

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(9) I.e. the Qur'ān, the ḥadīth of the Messenger of God, the ijma' of all the 'Ulamā'.

296 The use of shahdān before sentences is very common in classical Malay literature. It is most probably an abbreviation of shahida anna ... He testifies that ... Cf. also Wilkinson, p. 434.

to change, and they perceive internally that God's existence is eternal and not subject to change. So they affirm the [existence of] two beings: the one Contingent Being (jā'izu'l-wujūd), and the other Necessary Being (wājibu'l-wujūd). Contingent Being is Creation and Necessary Being Creator. The relationship between the two of them [i.e. the Contingent and the Necessary] is that of Creation and Creator. Thus they [i.e. the Mutakallimīn] say that the two beings are not identical [6] in nature, so that the generality of people would not slip into the error of believing that they are one and the same, as those who hold the doctrine of a heretical Wujūdiyyah and the Zindīqs believe.

The Ṣūfīs too base their view upon the rational faculties and Tradition, but they add to this also mystical revelation or insight (kashf), and direct experience (dhawq). They see with the eyes of the internal perception and experience the existence of only One Real Being - and that is Allāh - Who is imperceptible to the eyes in this world, for that which is perceptible [to the eyes] does not possess real being as Allāh does. God's Being is Real Being and Absolute, and the being of the Universe is metaphorical and [a thing] determined; it is the shadow of God's Being. Of this shadow existence cannot be predicated, nor can absoluteness be attributed to this nothingness, for if it exists then it would mean that the Universe is identical with God, and if its nothingness were absolute then it would mean that the Universe is nothing

whatsoever. Yet the Universe is perceptible; so it is clear that the Universe is a manifestation of the Being of the Truth Most Exalted. The relationship between God and the Universe then is neither that of identity nor that of non-identity, for the Universe is a manifestation of, and belongs to God.

It is clear that according to the definition of the Ṣūfīs existence and real essence are [7], in point of meaning, one and the same; and that is the Essence of the Truth. The meaning of the Ṣūfīs' definition of the real essence [of a thing] is that: 'Essence is what makes a thing what it is' - that is - 'the thing from which a thing becomes'; and this 'thing' [or essence] is reality. As for example, the reality [or essence] of the pot is the wheel, and the reality [or essence] of the boat is its maker. According to the definition of the Logicians:<sup>297</sup> 'Essence is what makes a thing what it is as rationality is to man' -

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297 The Logicians may be distinguished from the Mutakallimīn (Loquentes or Dialecticians or Theologians) in that their method of inquiry was through logic (manṭiq). In this they were more akin to the Philosophers, although they differed with the Natural Philosophers in that they sought to comprehend things from principles. They were interested in the Idea or Essence of things. To them God is first of all the Necessarily Existing Being as against the Wise Creator of the Natural Philosophers. The Mutakallimīn, however, employed dialectics (kalām) in their method of enquiry (Cf. De Boer, T.J., The history of philosophy in Islam, translated into English by E.R. Jones, London, 1961, pp. 42-43; 106-128. Hereafter cited as De Boer. Cf. also EI article Kalām). Rānirī here confuses the definitions of the Mutakallimīn and the Logicians. That the real essence of man is his rationality is also the view of the Mutakallimīn (Cf. Taftāzānī, p. 11). To the Logicians the existence of a thing is the thing itself (Cf. De Boer, p. 113).

that is - 'the essence of man is his rationality'. It is evident that the meaning of the Logicians' definition [of the term essence] is quiddity.

The differences between the endeavours of the Mutakallimīn and the Ṣūfīs in their affirmation of God's Being and that of the Universe are differences in expression not in meaning; as people say 'fifteen' and 'twenty minus five'. The meaning is identical although the expression is not.

When you have comprehended the beliefs of the Mutakallimīn and the Ṣūfīs, I shall now proceed to expose the beliefs of the Philosophers. According to the Philosophers,<sup>298</sup> the Being of God and the Universe are both co-existent from and to all eternity, for [8] it [i.e. the Universe together with all its parts] is an emanation from God. It emanates of its own accord, without any act [of willing] on God's part - like the emanation<sup>(10)</sup> of heat [i.e. light] from the sun coming from its essence; as long as the sun exists so will the heat [i.e. light]. Hence in like manner, as long as the Essence of God exists, so will the Universe - never separate nor existing per se apart, as it were, from the Divine

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(10) I.e. the world emanates from the Essence [of God] by its own free will, without being willed into existence by God.

298 The contentions of the Philosophers in their doctrine of the eternity of the World is exposed by Ghazzālī in the Tahāfut, chapters I-III. Cf. also corresponding chapters in Tahāfut al-Tahāfut.

Essence from and to all eternity in absolute communion. Furthermore they say that God has no power whatsoever over all [that which emanates from Him], and that He has no power to create anything other than and apart from [that] which emanates from Him. He has no power to change the Universe that already is. Furthermore they say that the seven layers of heaven and the seven layers of earth are not created ex nihilo and that they too exist from and to all eternity. They also say that to ask for God's help is to esteem oneself [*i.e.* soul] for indeed the creature is always under His mercy.<sup>299</sup> The fruits of worship are nothing but assimilation to God insofar as this is possible.<sup>300</sup> They further say that God Most Exalted is the Lover and the Beloved with respect to Himself.<sup>301</sup>

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299 Ibn Sīnā summarises this idea in a quatrain ascribed to him:

'Tis we who on God's Grace do most rely,  
Who put our vices and our virtues by,  
For where Thy Grace exists, the undone done  
Is reckoned, and the done undone thereby.

Rānīrī would agree with Abū Sa'īd ibn Abī'l-Khayr's reply:

O steeped in sin and void of good, dost try  
To save thyself, and thy misdeeds deny?  
Can sins be cancelled, or neglect made good?  
Vainly on Grace Divine dost thou rely!

Browne, E.G., A literary history of Persia, Cambridge, 1956, 4 vols., vol. 2, p. 267.

300 Cf. Tahāfut, pp. 168-171; also Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, pp. 293-300.

301 Cf. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 184.

Such utterances as they have let out and their entire belief are utter ignorance and downright rejection of the truth - may God preserve us from them!

When you have comprehended the views and beliefs of the Philosophers, I shall now proceed with the [exposition of the] views and beliefs of the Wujūdiyyah [9]. The Wujūdiyyah are of two groups: the one the true (muwahhid) Wujūdiyyah, and the other the false (mulhid) Wujūdiyyah; in the same manner as the Murji'ah<sup>302</sup> are divided into two groups: the first group is the Murji'ah marhūmah, and the second is the Murji'ah mal'ūnah.<sup>(11)</sup> The Murji'ah marhūmah are the Companions of the Prophet (on whom be peace!), and the Murji'ah mal'ūnah are from amongst the seventy-two heretical sects [all of] which are the contents of Hell. Similarly, the Wujūdiyyah which is from amongst the muwahhid group are all the Ṣūfīs (may Allāh count us from among them!), and the Wujūdiyyah of the mulhid group are all the Zindīqs (may God preserve us from them!). The reason why the Wujūdiyyah are known as wujūdiyyah is because in their discussions, sayings and belief they

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(11) They are called the Murji'ah mal'ūnah because they believe [erroneously] that we must postpone judgment on those who commit grave sins.

302 Cf. EI article Murjī'a; also Tibyān, p. 84.

are wont to dwell upon the question of God's Being [or Existence].

Let me now elucidate the beliefs of both the groups of the Wujūdiyyah so that I may draw a distinction between them. According to the heretical Wujūdiyyah, being is one; and that is the Being of God. This Absolute Being of God does not exist by Itself by which it can be distinguished save in relation to the creatures.<sup>303</sup> Hence the creatures are God's Being and the Being of God is the being of the creatures. The World is then God and God is the World. In this way they affirm [as inseparable] God's Absolute [10] Being with the being of the creatures, and they say that nothing exists but God. Furthermore they believe the formula lā ilāha illā'l-Lāh to mean: 'There is no being save God's Being.' They desire its meaning to be: 'There is no being in me save God's Being which is my being.' They further say that: "We are of the same being and substance as God," and that God's Essence can be known, and His qualities<sup>(12)</sup> and dimensions<sup>(13)</sup> clearly visible by virtue of His external existence in space and time. [Indeed] these are the

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(12) I.e. by qualities we mean colour, taste, smell, warmth and coldness, dryness and all such things that are the attributes of physical bodies.

(13) By dimension is meant largeness and smallness, shortness and width, depth and weight, and so on.

303 Cf. Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī, p. 125. The idea that God does not exist by Himself by which He can be distinguished save in relation to the creatures is rejected by Ḥamzah.

sayings and beliefs of those who are clearly unbelievers. Shaykh Muḥyī'l-Dīn ibnu'l-'Arabī (may God sanctify his secret!) in his book the Futūḥātu'l-Makkiyyah, wherein he deals with the exposition of the belief of all the adepts in the mystical doctrine, [positively] rejects and invalidates the school of [the heretical] Wujūdiyyah. He says:

... From these sayings the belief of a group has strayed from the path of truth for they say: "Nothing exists save that which we see." So they have made out the Universe to be God, and God the Universe itself. All such beliefs are erroneous, for the Being of God is that upon which [all other] beings depend for their existence. (That is, God's Being creates their existence). If indeed their gnosis were perfect they would not have said such a thing.

[In reality] they are ashamed of the people of Islām and they fear that they might be proved wrong by the generality of the schools and by religion. If they openly declare: "We are God and God is us" they will not be accepted by them [i.e. the people of Islām]. So they hide themselves behind veils that their evil words and strayed belief may not be seen [i.e. heard and known]. And they couch their words: "God is indeed ourselves and our beings and we are His Self and His Being" in [crafty] disguise. But such deception does not escape [the understanding of] the wise, and are not hidden from those who are perfect in their understanding.

Shahdān. Their sayings and beliefs are like the sayings and beliefs of the 'Alī Ilāhiyyah<sup>304</sup> and the Ismā'īliyyah<sup>305</sup> of the Rāfiḍī<sup>306</sup> who say that God descended and became incarnated in 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (may God glorify his countenance!). They are also like the Jews who say that God's prophet 'Uzayr is the son of God, as God Most Exalted says: 'The Jews say that 'Uzayr is the son of God.'<sup>307</sup> And their sayings and belief are like those of the Christians who say that Jesus is the son of God, as God Most Exalted says: 'And the Christians say that the Messiah is the son of God.'<sup>308</sup> [12] Some of them [*i.e.* the Christians believe] that God is the Third of Three, as God says: 'They have become unbelievers who say that verily God is the Third of Three.'<sup>309</sup> And some of them say that the Prophet Jesus is in fact God. Furthermore the Christians maintain that God descended from the realm of Divinity (lāhūt) into that of Humanity (nāsūt - that is He assumed a physical form in the realm of bodies), and that having done so He

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304 Cf. EI articles 'Alī Ilāhī (vol. 1 of the 1960 edition), Ghulāt, Ahli-Haqq, Kizil-bash.

305 Cf. EI articles Ismā'īliya, Sab'iya.

306 Cf. EI article Rāfiḍite (Rawāfiḍ).

307 Qur'ān 9:30. Cf. Tibyān, p. 34.

308 Ibid., 9:30.

309 Ibid., 5:73. Cf. Tibyān, p. 40.

proceeded to return to the sphere of Divinity.<sup>310</sup> Such sayings and beliefs are a rejection of the truth, for God says: 'They have disbelieved who say that God is Jesus son of Mary.<sup>311</sup> Harken!, O wise, to what God has said in the Qur'ān wherein the creation of man is mentioned in twenty-eight places. Bayān.<sup>312</sup> The author of the Zubad<sup>313</sup> (may God sanctify his secret!) says: "And God has mentioned concerning man in twenty-eight instances; and He says that man is created."

Here then is the clear distinction drawn between the statement that God's Being is the being of the creatures, and the being of the creatures is God's Being, and man [13] is God, and the statement of the Christians that Jesus is God. All these [erroneous statements] are not concealed from the learned and wise. Shaykh 'Alī ibn Ḥamīd al-Mahā'imī in his book entitled Irā'atu'l-Daqā'iq<sup>314</sup> says:

Whosoever believes that the intellect and the soul (self) or nature in its entirety - the universals - and what is below [the grade of] these; such as the stars and all the elements, the animal, vegetal and mineral kingdoms, are God with regard

310 Cf. Tibyān, p. 37.

311 Qur'ān 5:72.

312 Bayān: exposition. A warning to the reader that an exposition follows immediately. Cf. also Wilkinson, p. 137.

313 Cf. Brockelmann, C., Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, Leiden, 1898-1942, Supplementband II, p. 113. Hereafter cited as GALS II.

314 Cf. GALS II, p. 310-11.

to their manifestation, then he is in error in the same manner as he who says that 'Zayd's hand is Zayd' - even though Zayd's hand is the totality of his manifestation. When he is in abject error in affirming what is not God to be God, then he becomes an unbeliever and a Zindīq ...

And even if we say that what is manifested and externalized in the World is God, or His attributes, it does not in the least mean that God's Being is external existence manifesting Itself with all Its perfection in each of the individual things ...

The meaning of the (Ṣūfī) saying 'unity of existence' is that the totality of existence of all things is one; and that is the manifestation of God in the Universe. They did not mean that each one of the entire beings [existences] forms a totality in the Universe wherein God is manifested together with His Essence, His Attributes, and His Names.

Furthermore he [i.e. al-Yahā'imī] says in his book Imhādu'l-Naṣīḥah:<sup>315</sup>

The unity of being is that whereby things are actualized; and this is one.

The author of the Laṭā'ifu'l-I'lām<sup>316</sup> (may God sanctify his secret!) says:

The unity of being is that by which the existence of things are actualized. That which actualizes [the existence of things] is never valid to be regarded as 'being' except with reference to the Being of God.

Thus whosoever wishes to interpret God as the Universe and the Universe as God, and man - so they say - is God, then he has committed perfidy against God and His Messenger, and has upheld as true the beliefs of the Jews and the Christians. They believe in

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315 Cf. GALS II, p. 113. This work, however, is not recorded.

316 Cf. GALS II, p. 280. Also mentioned in the Tibyān, p. 95.

a kind of strange Islām to dare to give an interpretation to such evil words and strayed and utterly unbelieving belief - may God preserve us from them! - which cannot be tolerated by the seven layers of heaven and earth. God says:

The heavens are apt to split asunder and the earth crack and the mountains to fall [16] apart when they heard the sayings of the Jews and the Christians that the God Who is called Merciful begat a son.<sup>317</sup>

When you have comprehended the sayings and belief of the heretical Wujūdiyyah I shall now proceed to expound the sayings and beliefs of the true Wujūdiyyah which represent the Ṣūfīs (may God count us from amongst their group!). According to the true Wujūdiyyah God's Being is One; neither numbered nor limited, neither in wholes nor in halves, neither united nor in parts, neither personal nor impersonal (private nor general), neither atom nor body - and such like.

Shahdān. God's Being is immutable, changeless, and all those attributes mentioned [above] cannot be predicated to Him, for to Him 'it is now as it was then' - that is, when nothing was yet created He was not those things. Furthermore when He created all the things He was not those things and His Being was not identical with theirs. Verily God's Being rests solely upon His Essence. He is never the being of the creatures and the creatures' being is never God's Being. As Shaykh Muḥyī'l-Dīn ibnu'l-'Arabī (may God

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317 Qur'ān 19:90-91.

sanctify his secret!) says: "The Necessary Being is the Absolute Being" [17] - that is God's Being is not created being (muḡayyad). God's Being, qualitatively and quantitatively, is [un]known and His existence and His very Essence cannot be discussed or investigated. As God says 'wa yuhadhḡhirukumu'l-Lāhu nafsahu'<sup>318</sup> - that is, 'God has struck you with awe from attaining to knowledge of His very Essence.' And the Prophet (on whom be peace!) says: "Verily you are all as fools with respect to knowledge of His Essence." And the Prophet David (on whom be peace!) says: "Glory be to Him Who has made the admission of man to his incapacity to thank Him with adequate thankfulness, just as He has made his admission of failure to know Him with perfect knowledge." Abū Bakr (may Allāh accept him!) says: "Glory be to Him Who has made naught but the only way for His creatures to know Him the inability to know Him."

It is therefore clear that for the creature to strive to attain perfect knowledge of and unity with God is vain except if and when He wills. [18] As Shaykh Shiblī (may God sanctify his secret!) says with respect to a certain young man: "Knowest thou why thy striving for unity (tawḡīd) is [in]valid?" The young man replies "I do not know, sire." Then Shaykh Shiblī continues: "'Tis because thou seekest His unity through thineself (i.e. with thine own endeavour). If thou seekest His unity through His grace then

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<sup>318</sup> Ibid., 3:27, 29: Allāh makes you cautious of (retribution from) Himself. The text simply means that Allāh warns you against disobedience to Himself, and not - as in Rānirī's version - against attaining to knowledge of His very Essence!

thou wouldst assuredly attain to it."<sup>319</sup> Herein lies the secret of the saying of the Prophet (may God bless him and peace be upon him!): "None can know God, except God; none can mention God, except God; none can see God, except God." That is, none can know God except solely by His grace, none can mention God except solely through His grace, and none can see Him except solely by His grace.

The belief of all those from amongst the group of the true Wujūdiyyah concerning the meaning of the formula lā ilāha illā'l-Lāh (there is no God but God) is that: lā wujūda shay'an haqiqatan illā'l-Lāhu (nothing exists in reality save God), and that is: mā fi'l wujūdi illā huwa nafiyyu'l-mashriki 'an wujūdihi [19] wa ithbātu waḥdatihi fī wujūdihi bilā ghayrihi (there is nothing in existence except His existence, and this is to negate any partner with respect to His existence, and to affirm His oneness and attribute His unity to Himself without attributing existence to others). The existence of all creation is as if it were a shadow - a metaphorical being - whereas the original and true being is that of God Most Exalted. In metaphorical being there is no reality;

319 Ibnu'l-'Arabī interprets this very saying:

If you regard Him through Him (i.e. if you regard the Essence from the point of view of the Essence), then He regards Himself through Himself, which is the state of unity; but if you regard Him through yourself (i.e. from your point of view as a form) then the unity vanishes.

Cf. 'Affīfī, pp. 10-11.

it is annihilated and is nothingness when set against true being. As Shaykh Junayd (may God sanctify his secret!) says: "That [existence] which is new, when set against eternal existence, is left without a trace" - meaning it is annihilated.

All the [upholders of the true Wujūdiyyah] (muwahhīd) make extinct in their contemplation all the existences of creation when they contemplate the Existence of God which is Real and Absolute, and they say: "Nothing possesses real existence save God." It is evident that that which is other than God is absolute nothingness - at no time possessing real being - since all the learned and the imbued with truth are in agreement in their statements, their analogies, their love and insight; further that which is other than God is adamu'l-mahd min haythu dhātihi wa lā yūṣafu bi wujūdin mā 'ala'l-Lāhi ta'ālā - [20] (absolute nothingness by virtue of His Essence, and it cannot be described as existing together with God). Shaykh ibn 'Aṭā'u'l-Lāh<sup>320</sup> (may God sanctify his secret!) says: "That which is other than God cannot, to the People of Unity and the People of Gnosis, be described as existent and cannot be described as having absolute being, for it can never be that the being of a thing is one with God's Being. Apart from His Essence the Unity of His Being rests upon His Essence. And that which is other than God is not a being that is absolute by virtue of the fact that God does not create a thing except that

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320 Cf. GALS II, pp. 145-146.

which He has caused to be created." As the sublime Words of God Most Exalted convey: 'All things perish except His face.'<sup>321</sup>  
And the Prophet (may God bless him and may peace be upon him!) says:

"Beware! - everything save God is vain  
and every pleasure is transitory.<sup>322</sup>

Shahdān. [21] How entirely real is the difference between [the meaning of] the words of the Ṣūfīs that God and the Universe is one, and the words of the Wujūdiyyah Deviators that God and the Universe is identical. The Ṣūfīs mean, when they say this, that God alone exists, that His existence alone is real and rests upon His Essence. They never mean in the least that God's existence depends upon the Universe as they [*i.e.* the Deviators] who assert that: 'Existence is God.' And as Shaykh Muḥyī'l-Dīn Ibnu'l-'Arabī (may God sanctify his secret!) says in the Fuṣūṣu'l-Hikam:

... And the true Being belongs only to God  
the Real and particular in point of His Essence.  
His Being is His Essence.<sup>323</sup>

He further says:

... And that the World is nothing but His  
manifestation.

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321 Qur'ān 28:88.

322 This is not what the Prophet said. They are Labīd's famous lines for which 'Uthmān himself sat among the people to hear him recite:

Why, surely everything save God is but vanity,  
and every pleasure must inescapably pass away;  
and every man shall one day know what he has earned  
when the account-books are laid open before God.

Cf. Arberry, A.J., The seven odes, London, 1957, p. 126.

323 Cf. Fuṣūṣu'l-Hikam; wa'l-ta'liqāt 'alayhi bi qalām Abū'l-'Alā 'Afīfī, [Qāhīrah] 1365/1946, 2v. in 1, p. 104. Rānīrī does not quote Ibnu'l-'Arabī faithfully.

Further

... That the World is only an imagination [in the mind of God?]. It has no real existence.

All the Sūfīs and the Mutakallimīn are in concerted agreement in asserting that: "The World together with all its parts is nothing but a series of accidents; and that of which they are accidents is God."<sup>324</sup> The meaning of 'accident' in their terminology [22] is: 'an accident [is a thing that] does not endure two instants of time.'<sup>(14)</sup> The meaning of that upon which the accidents depend is God's Being, Eternal, Beginningless. He is the self-subsistent One, and He is the One Who gives subsistence to others. Hence, the World is not fit to be categorized as 'being' - it is called darkness, non-being, imagination and mirage; it is nothing but a shadow.

When that the World is such (i.e. its existence cannot be categorized as being even though it is perceptible) it cannot then be another existent apart from God the Exalted. This is the reason why they say that God and the Universe is one. They do not intend it to mean that the World<sup>(15)</sup> and God are one being and identical.

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(14) The accidents change, come in succession and disappear. Others like them come and replace at each breath and instant.

(15) The reason why this world is called not-being [or no-thing] is because it never becomes a real thing at each breath of its appearance, but it is a thing insofar only as God creates it.

<sup>324</sup> Cf. Lawā'ih, pp. 29-30. Rānīrī's notes (14) and (15) elucidating the meaning of 'accidents' bear an identity with what Jāmī says in Flash 26 (q.v.).

This is why they say that God and the Universe are neither the same nor different, for their identity and non-identity would require two entities existing per se. It [the Universe] belongs to God. Question (should someone ask): "Are the sun in the heavens and the sun that is reflected in the mirror one and the same or two?" Then answer: "The sun in the heavens and the sun reflected in the mirror are one." Question (should someone ask [further]): "Is it not true then that from this saying it is clear that the sun in the heavens and the sun in the mirror are one being?"

Answer: "Indeed [23] the sun in the heavens and the sun in the mirror are not in the least one being. Such an assertion cannot be accepted by the learned who have a sharp mind for the sun in the mirror is not regarded as having existence. That which exists is only the sun in the heavens. If the sun in the heavens also exists in the mirror then assuredly they are in communication and both of them are one being. [But] this is absurd for were even a part of the sun's being or its light immanent in the sun in the mirror then the mirror would become heated and would burn away. Furthermore if the being of the sun in the heavens is immanent in the being of the sun in the mirror, then to the mind it [i.e. the mirror] would be extremely immense; for the sun in heaven is about thirty times bigger than this world - and the mirror is merely a finger's length in size. How then can a mirror of a finger's length

accommodate the sun in heaven whose size is thirty times this earth! It is clear then that the sun that is seen reflected in the mirror is the image, the manifestation, and the reflection of the sun in heaven."

The purpose of the deviating Wujūdiyyah when they say that God is identical with the Universe, is to mean that God and the Universe are one being. God [to them] is the Universe, and the Universe is God - may God preserve us [24] from such beliefs!

Shahdān. Verily the contemplation amongst the learned who are perfect is their knowledge regarding [the relationship between] God and the Universe is as expounded by the author of the Miftāḥu'l-Ghayb<sup>325</sup> (may God sanctify his secret!):

Indeed the perfect and those who have attained maturity [in knowledge] did not deny [the existence of] the World as it was denied by the Subjectivists.(16) They neither affirmed its existence as it was affirmed by the People

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(16) That which resides in it [?]: that is, it gives benefit [?], and shatḥiyyāt which according to the definition of the Ṣūfīs are that which escape from the tongues of some of the People of Allāh when they are in the state of intoxication. Such utterances are not in accordance with religious law and reality. They remain human and the words they utter in their shatḥiyyāt are done involuntarily.

<sup>325</sup> This is the work of the celebrated Ṣadru'l-Dīn al-Qūnawī. Cf. GALS I, pp. 807-808.

of the Veil. But they accepted the existence of both the World and God and they made a distinction between the two.

Tanbīh.<sup>326</sup>

Know, O Seeker!, that ecstatic expressions (shathīyyāt)<sup>(17)</sup> 327 that escape from the tongues of the wise caused by their extreme intoxication such as: "I am God!", and "I am the Truth!" and such like, [would seem to] reveal to us that God, the Creator, and the created are one being. But God forbid that they mean this, for their ecstatic expressions are involuntary. Such expressions occur on their tongues when they are unconscious of themselves and [25] uttered when in the midst of intoxication; like those who talk in their sleep when they dream of something they desire; and like

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(17) The meaning underlying the term shathīyyāt is, from the point of view of language, to 'throw away' as one throws away the useless froth from a boiling pot, leaving only what is useful. In the same manner, the hearts of all the People of God are like the boiling pot, and their shathīyyāt are the froth of their states; they are clear [i.e. audible] but useless.

326 Tanbīh: Mind you!, a warning of what is to be clarified in the following paragraph.

327 Compare with Ḥamzah's definition of this term and his interpretation of it in Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, pp. 158, 203. Also see Ḥamzah's definition and interpretation of fanā': ibid., pp. 202, 163-4, 166-9. Cf. Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj's interpretation in his Kitāb al-Luma' fī'l-Taṣawwuf, edited by R.A. Nicholson, Leiden, 1914, pp. 99ff., and pp. 375ff of the Arabic text. Also al-Ghazzālī's Mishkāṭ al-Anwār, translated by W.H.T. Gairdner, London, 1924, pp. 19-21 of the text. Compare also Ghazzālī's definition of fanā' with Ḥamzah's in Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, p. 164; and in connection with this also p. 202. Compare Ḥamzah's interpretation of tajrīd (denudation) and tafrīd (isolation) with Junayd's (Cf. Zaehner, R.C., Hindu and Muslim mysticism, London, 1960, pp. 10, 124, 152; and Sarrāj op.cit., pp. 241-3 of the text).

those who become habitually hysterical with words<sup>(18)</sup> [latah].<sup>328</sup> These are all involuntary actions. Similarly this is what the People of Allāh experience during their ecstatic utterances; they become extinct in themselves of all that is other than God and they are drowned every instant of the day and night in their contemplation of God. Then it occurred upon their tongues when they were uttering the habitual "He is God!" - "He is God!", or "He is the Truth!" - "He is the Truth!", to transform the 'He' into 'I'. Such an occurrence is caused by God upon their tongues without their endeavour. The Ṣūfīs call those who utter *shaṭḥiyyāt* 'they who are in the state of being overpowered' (maghlūbu'l-ḥāl), and 'they whom God has caused to be exempt from the recordings of the Pen' (marfū'u'l-qalam). It is permitted to them to utter in such a state only such words as 'I am the Truth!' However according to the

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(18) The meaning underlying the term 'intoxication' is, according to the definition of the Ṣūfīs, extinction of the creature to himself, and to what is other than God. This is brought about by virtue of his being overpowered by God's visitation, and His manifestation to him.

328: For latah see Wilkinson, p. 587.

Prescribed Law<sup>(19)</sup> they are to be condemned.<sup>(20)</sup> It is not permitted to them to [slip into] the erroneous beliefs of the Deviators and the Zindīqs,<sup>(21)</sup> or to do deeds God does not favour. Should their [26] self-extinction and their intoxication be complete, they would still not be free from the responsibility of 'Do's' and 'Don't's', for God Most Exalted is ever prevailing upon their intellect in such a manner that He preserves them from committing acts contravening the Prescribed Law. He bestows upon them His grace so that they may perform their obligatory duties even though they may be intoxicated or extinct in the contemplation

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(19) I.e. He shall not be punished by God in the Day of Resurrection, for he utters his ecstatic expressions involuntarily, and also because such utterances escape from his tongue due to the overpowering manifestation of God upon him. As [is the case when] God says - 'Surely I am God!'<sup>329</sup> - from the olive tree on Mount Sinai. The one who utters such ecstatic utterances is a believer (mu'min) to God.

(20) I.e. if they are not [already] condemned to death.

(21) I.e. all beliefs that are contradictory to God's Book, the sayings of the Prophet, and the consensus of all the 'Ulamā'. Or [such beliefs that] make permissible what God has forbidden.

I.e. they [i.e. the believers in falsehood] shall be charged with apostasy and adherence to dualist doctrines (zindīq) and if not they should be condemned to death.

329 Qur'ān 28:30; also 19:52, 20:10-14, 27:7-9, 28:29.

of God. Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Faḍlu'l-Lāh<sup>330</sup> said that this is the case with those who are learned in God as gleaned from their sayings.

O Seeker!, it can never be that God's Being and the being of the creatures are one being, and the being of the creatures never becomes[or is]the Being of God; [and this is so] even if one becomes extinct in the contemplation of God, or survive eternally in God. As Shaykh 'Alī ibn Aḥmad al-Mahā'imī (may God sanctify his secret!) in his book Irā'at al-Daqā'iq sharḥ Mir'at al-Haqā'iq,

says:                   No matter how far he gets, he cannot get  
out of the limits of created beings, and he  
never attains to the divine rank - and even  
though he may become annihilated in God or  
subsisting through Him - contrary to what  
some silly people have believed.

Shahdān! Whosoever [27] utters shaṭhiyyāt and believes in its interpretation as being literal without being truly extinct in his intoxication<sup>(22)</sup> in the manner of the People of Allāh, then he is a Deviator and a Zindīq,<sup>331</sup> furthermore he is a rejector (kāfir) to God and to the Prescribed Law. Such a person is to be condemned to death in this world and eternal Hell-fire in the next.

O our Lord, do not let our hearts stray  
After Thou has shown us the right path,  
And bestow upon us Thine Mercy.

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(22) I.e. voluntarily, conscious of himself.

330 Cf. GALS II, p. 617.

331 Cf. Ḥamzah Fansūrī, pp. 157-158.

Thou art indeed the Bestower.  
And may God bless our Master Muḥammad;  
His House and Companions,  
And may peace be upon them all!

Completed on the Hijrah of the Prophet (may God bless him and may peace be upon him!) One Thousand One Hundred and Eighty-Six<sup>332</sup> years on the Year Waw<sup>333</sup> on the Twelfth Day of Sha'bān, Sunday, after the Mid-day Prayers. My brother, 'Abdu'l 'Azīz is the scribe.

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332 The date given here is of course incorrect. The real date of the completion of this work is unknown. But it is most likely written between 1634 and 1644 just before he returned to Rānir (Cf. Voorhoeve, p. 5).

333 There are eight cycles to the Javanese Year, the seventh being called waw ( ㉑ ). See Pigeaud, Th., Javaans-Nederlands Handwoordenboek, Batavia, 1938, p. ix.

## APPENDIX I

Facsimile of the text  
of the Hujjatu'l-Siddiq li daf'i'l-Zindiq

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مقات فرکتان شطریات اتودا افتاد کنتی فد ظاهر عبادۃ  
 فرکتان ایت دین قیاد کانی غلبه مابقی مسرف حال کل  
 اهل الله ایت کل جلد یلم ای صلح دان نرزد یق لاک کافر فد  
 الله دان فد ظاهر شرح دان حکما کن اکندی دبدام دنیا دین  
 یونه دان دلم اخره سنسایس ککل دلم فارک سلام شام  
 مرینا لا ترغ قلوبنا بعد اذ هدیتنا و هب لنا من لدنک حرمة  
 انک انت الوهاب ارزین بی تمکام جافق کبریا کوفلظکن هات  
 کام محمد بن درفد کله کو تنجوت کنکام جالن بیغ بتل دان  
 انکراه کبریا کنکام درفد حضرتیم مرجحة  
 بهوشن اغلو جوا بیغ امه مقدانکراه و  
 صلی الله علی سیدنا محمد و آله  
 و صحبه وسلم تسلیم اکثر کثیرا  
 برکتک یا ارحم الراحمین

سجده  
 بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم  
 الحمد لله رب العالمین

فد لیهتم النبی صلی الله علیه وسلم ستریب سراسی دولا فین  
 فوله انهم قاهن کفد ناهن و کفد دویلس هاری بولن شعبان  
 کفد هاری احد فد وقت بعد حلاۃ الظهر کاتبه انی محمد العزیز

فناات دان مابقن کالغون تباد کو کمر در فداات تکلیف  
 بایت امر دان نهی کارن ادا اله حق تعالی قائم دغن ممر نتمکن  
 عقلن دان دفلهر کنن کندک در فدا کل فرین اتن یغ و مصیة  
 سرت ر انکراهیت توفیق کندک فدا مفر چکن کل فرض قد  
 عاد غالبه مابقن سرت فنا فی الله کات شیخ محمد بن فضل  
 الله دکنده کتسون در فدا فکرتن کل عارف بالله فی طالب  
 کمال م تباد جاد وجود حق تعالی ایت وجود مخلوق دان  
 وجود مخلوق ایت کمال م تباد جاد وجود حق تعالی جملی  
 فنا فی الله دان بقا بالله کالغون سمرت کات شیخ علی بن احمد  
 المہامی قدس الله سره ددالم کتاب امرأۃ الدقایق شرح  
 مرأۃ الدقایق بانه وان یبلغ ما یبلغ لا یتخرج من حد الحقایق  
 الکونیة ولا یبلغ مرتبة الحیة وان صار فانیا فی الله  
 او بقیا به خلاف ماتو لهم بعض الشفها یعنی بهوش  
 جملو اصل عبد دغن کسد هدا هن واصل کند حق تعالی کالغون  
 مکل کال م تباد ای کلور در فدا حد مخلوق دان تباد جاد دفر وجود  
 ثاکن وجود الله جملو جاد ای فنا فی الله بقا بالله کالغون بر لاهن  
 دغن یغ دا اعتقاد کن متغم جاهل یغ زندیق شهد ان بر غسیاف

تولید لسان یغ لا ویر لسان مایقن دان یغ مفیکو تتکال  
 تیدر دان اومی دغن مسواة فکر جان دان یغ تر حاده اکن  
 مسواة فکر جان سفی او رغبیغ لاته مکل تر لیم لسان دغن  
 تیاد اختیار د مکیلاک حال مکل اهل الله قد شطحات  
 کارن اداله غالب قد فقیهت مریکت قناد رب دان اکن  
 مکل عاسوی الله سرت مقبول دان کارم ای قد تیغ م  
 کتیک قد یغ دان عالم دائم مشاهد مکل حق تعالی لال بولکوله  
 اسل سنان مکل مریکت در قد مکل اسماء الله هکل تر عادتله  
 قد لسان هو الله هو الله الله هو الحق هو الحق مکل  
 تر توکله هو ایت دغن انما مکل یغ مکلین ایت دفر لکوک حق  
 تعالی اسل سنان مریکت دان دغن تیاد اختیار مکل  
 اداله قد اصطلاح اهل الصوفی دنمای اکن یغ مقاد شطحات  
 ایت مقلوب الحال دان مرفوع القلم قد حق تعالی جی  
 دان دبیر کن مریکت اکندی هات قد فکر جان افالحق دان  
 بر غساب کون جوتانی قد ظاهر شرع د حکم کن اکندی دان تیاد  
 دبیر کن مریکت اکندی قد مکل اعتقاد یغ ملحد دان زندق  
 دان مکل فر براتن یغ تیاد د کمرهای حق تعالی جطو قد حال

یعنی کل اعتقاد یغ بر سلاهن دغن کتاب الله دان حدیث مرسل الله دان اجماع کل  
 علما اتو د حلال کتن بر یغ د حرمن الله خاصیه منه یعنی د حکم کن مریکت اکندی  
 دغن موند دان زندق دان جطو تیاد و برونه اکندی خاصیه منه عی الله

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم  
 الحمد لله رب العالمین  
 والصلوة والسلام  
 علی سیدنا محمد  
 وعلی آله الطیبین  
 الطاهرین  
 المعصومین  
 أجمعین  
 بعد از این که از حق تعالی  
 استعانت نمودیم و بفرموده  
 او عمل کردیم این کتاب را  
 در بیان بعضی از معانی  
 و اسرار دینی و اخلاقی  
 و عرفانی که در کتب  
 قدسیه و کتب معتبره  
 مذکور است جمع کردیم  
 و در این کتاب به بیان  
 آن پرداخته ایم و امید  
 است که این کتاب برای  
 قاریان عزیز و محبت  
 خداوندگار و پیروان  
 ائمه اطهار علیهم السلام  
 مفید و نفع آلود باشد  
 و در این کتاب از کتب  
 قدسیه و کتب معتبره  
 استفاده شده است و در  
 این کتاب به بیان  
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 مفید و نفع آلود باشد

درفد براعتقاد بقدر مکیب ایت شهدان ادا له مشاهده شکل  
 عارف یغ کامل مکمل کن حق تعالی دغن عالم ایت سهرت کات  
 صاحب مفتاح القیب قدس الله سره واما لکل و المکنون  
 لا یتقون العالم علی محو ما یتقیه اهل الشهود الحالی و لانه  
 بشبوتنه علی نحو انبات اهل لیباب مع اعترافهم بالحق و  
 العالم و تمیزهم بین الحق و ما سواه یعنی ادا له لکل یغ کامل  
 یغ اهل التمکین نیاد و نفیکن مریکت عالم سفرت یغ و نفیکن اهل  
 الشهود الحالی دان نیاد و انبات کن مریکت کن عالم سفرت یغ  
 و انبات کن اهل لیباب سرت و قبل کن مریکت کن حق تعالی  
 دان عالم دان دبید کن مریکت اننا رجع تعالی دغن عالم  
 تنبیه کتموی الهم هی طالب بهو و فرکتان شطیحات یغ و لنبی  
 لسان ستمه عارف فد حال غلابه مابق سفرت کتات اننا  
 لله دان انا الحق دان باز غساب کین یغ کتمون ورفد فرکتان  
 ایت بهو حق تعالی دغن مخلوق مساواة حقیقه دان سوجه و  
 مکل بقدر مکیب ایت حاش الله کمال م نیاد مقصود دان نیاد  
 و ساج مریکت کن فرکتان سطیحات ایت هات کن بر لکی  
 اتس لسان مریکت دغن نیاد ایت کندرین سریت

۴۴ ایت تفکر و لیباب ایت سهرت  
 دان سطیحات یغ و رفد اصطلاح اصل  
 العو فی ایت یغ و رفد یغ و رفد  
 ورفد لسان ستمه اهل الله ایت  
 تفکار غلبه مابق مریکت مکیب  
 مکیب ایت نیاد و رفد دغن حکم  
 دغن دغن حاش الله سمان م  
 دغن فرکتان بشریه جویاد  
 سطیحات ایت حاش الله غنی الله  
 عنه

۴۵ ایت فزون مواد ورفد سطیحات  
 ایت فد لغز یغ ستمه و رفد فرکتان  
 یغ و رفد کن یغ و رفد فرکتان  
 بر رفد دان تفکار بر رفد یغ  
 ستمه و مکیب لک قله لک اهل الله  
 ایت اقام فریت و رفد دغن اهل الله  
 سطیحات ایت یغ و رفد دغن اهل الله  
 یغ و رفد لک یغ و رفد دغن  
 لک اسرار

مکالم ۲ نیاد سوچود متهمار بقدر لاغت دهن متهمار بقدر دلم  
چرمن مک بیغ دملکین ایت نیاد تربورث قد کلم بد مان بیغ قاجم  
عقلن کارن متهمار بقدر دلم چرمن ایت نیاد کبلان ایت  
دان هاگ بیغ کبلان ایت متهمار بقدر لاغت جو مک بطواد وجود  
متهمار بقدر لاغت ایت قد متهمار بقدر دلم چرمن نیچای بر هو بقله  
دان سوچود له کد وانه مک بقدر ملکین ایت مکالم ۳ نیاد دهن عقل  
دان جطواد اسواة سترک درقل وجود متهمار بقدر لاغت ایت  
ادقد متهمار بیغ کلها تن دلم چرمن نیچای هاغت دان تر تنوله  
چرمن ایت دان لاک فول جطواد وجود متهمار بقدر لاغت ایت  
قد متهمار بیغ کلها تن دلم چرمن ایت بتاف فوس قد عقل کارن  
متهمار بقدر لاغت ایت کیوم ۳ نیکل فوله کین دنیا این بسر متهمار دان چرمن  
ایت قد سر سجاد بیجو بسر مک بتاف داف چرمن بفوس سجاد  
ملولکن متهمار دلاغت بیغ بسر نیکل فوله کین دنیا این مک بتاف وجود  
متهمار بیغ کلها تن دلم چرمن ایت بیغ بیغ دان تمفت کپتان دان  
بکس متهمار بقدر لاغت جو اد فون مقصود وجودیه بیغ عقل  
مفتاکن حق تعالی دهن عالم اسر جو یایت دکند الکی وجود الله  
دان عالم سوچود مک الله ایت عالم دان عالم ایت الله تعالی

المعرفه لا يبيّن زعمائهم في صرخه ايت تباد اي ككل قد دو ماس  
 وبن جرد در وقت معروف ايت بابت وجود الله في انزل لاك ابد ب  
 اياه في ايم شد زين دان اياه في تحقيقا ممكن بكل لا يثبت مكل تباد  
 دغهاي اكن عالم ايت دغن نما وجود هات سن ادا له و دغهاي اكن دك  
 دغن نام ضلالت دان لا شين باطل دان خيالي دان سلفي دان  
 ظلي جو مكل افيل ادا له حال عالم ايت دمكين يعني تباد له كبل  
 دغن دكوانت ايت جطو كلمه اتان قد قطيعت مات كالف فمكل تباد  
 له اي مند واي وجود حق تعالي سب انيله كات مريكت بهو حق  
 تعالي دغن عالم اس بوكن مقصود مريكت بهو عالم دغن حق  
 تعالي سو جود دان بر سواه كارن ايتله كات مريكت بهو حق تعالي  
 دغن عالم بر ليين قون تباد دان برسواتقون تباد كارن بر ليين  
 دان برسوات ايت مقفند اك دو وجود هات سن ادا له اي ملك  
 بكن حق تعالي سؤل جك دتياي سؤرخ بهو متهماري بقدا لاغه  
 دغن متهماري بئع كلمه اتان دوالم چر من ايت اما كه اتو دو جواب بهو  
 متهماري بئع دلاغت دغن متهماري بقدا دلم چر من اس چو سؤال  
 جك دتياي سؤرخ بو كنكه كنهون در قد و كنهان اين بهو متهمار  
 بئع دلاغت دغن متهماري بئع دوالم چر من ايت سؤجود جواب بهو

۳۸ يعني ادا له هر حق ايت  
 براو به ۲ لال بو كنه  
 دان بهلغ مكل دغهاي كنه  
 سب كنه قد يئع كنه  
 دان كنه خاينه منه

۴۰ يعني سب دغهاي اكن عالم  
 ايت لا شين كارن اي تباد له  
 حقيقي قد يئع ۲ نفس الامر  
 درين تاني ادا له يئع قد يئع  
 ديد كن الله اكن دي خاينه منه

امت بین انصار و کتاتان اهل الصوفی بهم حق تعالی در حق عالم  
 ایت اس دان انصار فرکتان وجودیه یعنی ملکی و معنوی است تا حدیث  
 دغنی عالم ایت اس مکل مقصود اهل الصوفی در حق فرکتان ایت  
 یات بهیون حق تعالی جو یعنی موجود لاک ترتنت و بتودت  
 قد ذات جو کال ۲ تیاداد وجودت قد عالم سفرت کات سفرت کات  
 الوجود هو الله یعنی یعنی وجود ایت یات الله دان سفرت کات  
 شیخ محی الدین عزی قدس الله سره دلم کتاب فصوص الحکم  
 والوحی دلتق انما هو الله الحق خاصة من حیث ذاته عینه  
 ذاته یعنی یعنی وجود ایت یات حق تعالی هات من ایاله الله  
 یعنی سبترت لاک ترتنت ای در حق فی حق ذات ایشم وجودت دان  
 لاک قول کتات وان العالم لیس لا تجلیه دان بهیون عالم ایت تیاد  
 اد ای ملین تجلی حق تعالی یعنی مظهرت دان لاک قول کتات  
 فالعالم متوهم ماله وجود حقیقی مکل عالم ایت یات یقند و ممکن جو  
 تیاداد بکیت وجود حقیقی مکل بر حقیقتی ممکنین اهل الصوفی دان ککل  
 متکلمین متکائن العالم بجمع اجزائه اعراض والمعرض هو الله  
 یعنی یعنی یعنی دغنی مکل مکل مکل بکوت بهراف عرض دان معرض  
 ایت یات حق تعالی مکل مراد در حق عرض ایت قد اصطلاح بکیت

یعنی بیهوشی او اله ماسوی الله ایت عدم متضمن در فیه  
 فی حق ذاتی دان نیاد و افت و فریکن کنی عدم شخصی ایت او  
 ای وجودی و سرتی الله کات شیخ ابن عطاء الله قدس سره سما  
 سوی الله تعالی عند اهل التوحید و المشرقة لایین صف بوجود و لا  
 فقل امر لا وجود مع فیه ثبوت احدیت و لا فقد لایین لانه  
 لا یفقد الا ما وجد یعنی ماسوی الله ایت قد اهل التوحید  
 دان اهل المصرفت نیاد و افت و فریکن دغن وجود دان نیاد و افت  
 و فریکن دغن عدم مطلق در کارن سکا م نیاد سواة وجود  
 شئی سرت حق تعالی لایین در قد ذاتی کارن ثابتله کامان وجود  
 الله قد ذاتی جودان نیاد ماسوی الله ایت عدم مطلق در  
 کارن بیهوشی نیاد جود جد یکن حق تعالی کن سواة شئی یکن  
 بر غیغ جد یکن سرفت فرمان الله تعالی یغها تفکی کل شئی ما  
 لك الا وجهه یعنی شئی م شئی ایت بناس یکن ذات الله حق  
 سبد نبی صلی الله علیه و سلم الا کل شئی ما احل الله باطل و کل نعیم  
 لا محالة نراند یعنی نیاد که کو کتوب تیغ م کل سواة بر غیغ  
 لایین در قد الله ایت سیمی جوادان ار نیت نیاد بکین وجود  
 حقیقی دان تیغ م نعمت ایت تدافت نیاد هیلع جود شهادان

واشبات وحدته في وجوده بلا غيره ارتبث تباداد وجوده  
 حقيقة ما ليكن حق تعالى جو عايت منفيكون سكوته در قد وجود الله  
 دان مقابله كن كاسان حق تعالى قد وجودت وجودت تباداد وجود  
 حقيقي بكن لا اينت مكن بهيوسن وجود مكن مخلوق ظل لاك وجود  
 مجازي جودان اصلي لاك حقيقي ايت بايت وجود حق تعالى جود  
 مكالم مصاد وجود حقيقي قد وجودت بغير مجازي صانست اداله اي  
 هافس دان لنيف لاك عدم افيل د بند فكن دغن بغير حقيقي منفرد  
 كات بغير جنيد قدس الله سره المحدث اذا قورن بالقديم لم  
 يبق له اثر يعني وجود بغير محدث ايت افيل د بند فكن  
 دغن وجود بغير قد بيم نسبي اي تباداله تفكك بكن بكن ارتبث صانست  
 دان قتاله اي مكن اداله ككل موجد ايت مقوما فكن دالم ضايله  
 اكن ككل وجود مخلوق قد بند غ مشاهدت اكن وجود الله بغير  
 حقيقي لاك مطلق سرت كات مريكت تباداد موجود بغير حقيقي  
 هان الله مكن پتاله ماسواله ايت عدم المحض كال م تباد  
 برووجود حقيقي كارن اتفاقه ككل فكن ان عارف دان محقق  
 قد اشارة دان عبارة قد ذوق دان وجدان دان ماسواله  
 عدم محض من حيث ذاته ولا يوصف بوجود مع الله تعالى

الكندي يشرح ما كان شرح شبلي قد عني الله به من أن سورته لا  
 لا كندي لم يصرح بوجوب ذلك فقال لا قال لأنك تطلبه  
 بكل فلو طلبته به لوجدته يعني تهوكم افكروا أن افهم  
 توحيدهم على سبيله لا الكلاك ايت تبادع ما هكل كانت شرح شبلي  
 دركارن بگوشت افگو منتنت توحيد ايت دغند يگو يعني دغن داي  
 افيام جو مكل چلو كوتنت كن توحيد ايت دغن انكراه حق تعالي  
 نچاي كوفرو له الكندي انيله ره سي بد نبي صلي الله عليه وسلم  
 لا يعرف الله الا الله لا يذكر الله الا الله لا يري الله الا الله يعني تباد  
 مغل الله ملينكن الله دان تباد مبيت الله ملينكن الله دان تباد ملية  
 الله ملينكن الله يعني تباد دكلل عبد كن حق تعالي ملينكن دغن  
 سمات م انكراهات الكندي دان تباد دافت دسبت عبد كن حق  
 تعالي ملينكن دغن كمات م انكراهات الكندي دان تباد دافت دلجه  
 عبد كن حق تعالي ملينكن دغن كمات م انكراهات الكندي مكل ادا له  
 اعتقاد ككل وجوديه يغ موجد انة فله معني كلمه لا اله الا الله  
 تباد موجودهات الله يعني لا وجود لشيء حقيقة الا اله اذ يث  
 تباد وجود بكل سواة شيء فله حقيقتن ملينكن توتنت بكل  
 حق تعالي يعني ما في الوجود الا هو وفي المشرق عن وجوده

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المطلق یعنی واجب الوجود ایستله و مجرد یعنی مطلق یعنی  
وجود الله ایت برکن وجود یعنی مقید مکن ادا الله وجود الله کنون  
کیفیتش دان کیفتش دان نیاد دافت و بشکن دان و تفاصیل  
در فدا حقیقتش دان کنه ذاتش سفرش فرمان الله تعالی و محله  
کم الله نفسه یعنی در فتکوت الله الکام در فدا کفنی معرفه کام  
کشد کنه ذاتش دان سبد نبی صلی الله علیه و سلم حکم فی ذات  
الله حقی یعنی ادا الله کلین کام فدا معرفت ذات الله احق دان  
کات نبی الله داود علیه السلام سبحان من جعل اعتراف العبد  
بالجز عن شکره شکر انما جعل اعترافه بالجز عن معرفته معرفه  
یعنی معاسوج توهن یعنی مجذوب میکن اقرار عبادی دغن مله کنه درین  
در فدا عباد و شکر الندی دغن کمفرن شکر کفرش و جد میکن اقرار عبادی  
دغن مله کنه درین در فدا کفنی معرفت فدا کنه ذات الله دغن کمفرن  
معرفت کات ابوبکر الصدیق رضی الله عنه سبحان من لم یجعل خلقه  
سبیل الی معرفه الا بالجز عن معرفته یعنی معاسوج توهن یعنی  
نیاد مجذوب میکن بکل مخلوق جان کغد معرفه ذاتش ملینکن در فدا  
مله کنه درین در فدا معرفت الندی مکن پتاله نیاد حاصل معرفت  
عبد دان توحیدش کن حق تعالی ملینکن دغن سکرمه انکراه توهن

الندی

مشکل بود که بر هر چه بر تنش کمال فقر کلمات برود و دان نصاری  
 ادبکی تو هنر بیخ برنامه مرتضی ایت انق اقبیل که کینه و کینه  
 دان اعتقاد وجودیه بیخ ملحد مکس مکارغ کبیا فکن قول کینه  
 دان اعتقاد وجودیه بیخ موحده لاک اهل الصوفی وجد یکن حق  
 تعالی کبریا نکت در فعل قوم مرکب کات و جودیه بیخ موحده  
 بهر چه وجود الهی ایت اس جودیه بیخ موحده بیخ موحده  
 دان تقسم بیاد بر مفعول دان بوسوک م بیاد خاص دان عام بیاد  
 جوهر دان جسم مرت و مکن اد وجد یکن مکمل فکر یقین است  
 ایت شهد از بهر وجود الهی ایت مکال م بیاد برو به دان بیاد  
 جام مکمل فکر ایت کارن ای الا کما کان یعنی ادا اله ای کارغ  
 معرفت اداث دهر جودیه بیخ مکال بیخ لاک وجد یکن حق تعالی  
 مکمل فکر بیاد ای جاد مکمل فکر ایت یعنی مکمل لاک مکال  
 مسئله وجد یکن مکمل فکر ایت فون بیاد جاد ای سر و دان سر و  
 دهن مکمل فکر ایت یعنی بهر وجود الهی ایت ترست و خود ذات  
 الهی جود مکال م بیاد جاد ای وجود مخلوق دان وجود مخلوق ایت  
 مکال م بیاد جاد ای وجود الهی معرفت کات شیخ محمد الدین عزیزی  
 قدس الله سره قد کتقم تصنیف واجب الوجود هو الوجود



من احاد الاشياء، يكما له دان ج لوكام كانت بفتح ظاهر فد عالم  
 ايت وجود حق تعالي اتوا اسماء سكالقون مكل سكال م تباد  
 اد وجود الله در فد فيه حق ظاهر ايت اد وجود ب موجود فد  
 تيقم مخلوق وللقول بوحدة الوجود في الكل لا يجوز  
 القول بالهيئة كل واحد من الاشياء ادقون مراد در فد  
 كانت اهل الصوفي واحدة الوجود في الكل يعني كاسان  
 وجود الله دغن عالم ايت بوكن مقصود مركبت كن تيف  
 مكل فركار يفتربت ايت حق تعالي اذ الكلام اي كلام من  
 قال بوحدة وجود الكل اتمها هو في ان المجموع اي مجموع وجودا  
 ت الاشياء امر واحد وهو ظهور الحق في الكل لا ان كل واحد  
 من الموجودات هو المجموع الذي ظهر فيه الحق بعلية كارت  
 مقصود اهل الصوفي دغن كتابات وحدة وجود الكل يعني كاسان  
 وجود عالم دغن سكلو سكلو ايت مقصود مركبت هان سكلو اداله  
 مجموع وجود كل اشياء ايت سواة فكله جان جويا يتوله ظهور حق  
 تعالي فد عالم بوكن مقصود مركبت بهو سكلو تيقم در فد مكل  
 موجودات يا يتوله مجموع عالم بفتح ظاهر دلمن حق تعالي فن ذات  
 دان حفات دان اسماء دان لاک فوک کتابت دالم کتاب محاض

آیت الله دغن وکشان نصاری کثات نبی الله عیسی ایستله الله  
 مکل یقده مکلین آیت نیاد الله تربوت فذلک کل بدمان بقبر ایمان  
 کات شیخ علی ابن احمد المهایمی قدس الله سره دالم کتاب  
 مرآة الدقائق شرح مرآة الحقایق دغن قال العقل او  
 النفس والطبیعة کلیات او مواد ونها من الکواب والنس  
 هیر والمولید الله باعتبار مظهریتیه حاله فقد اخطأ  
 کما خطه من قال لید نرید انه نرید وان کانت یدیه من جملة  
 مظاهره فان کانت مخطئا فی اطلاق الاله علی مالس بالیه  
 فقد کفر وتزندق یعنی بر غسیاف مفاعتقاد کن عقل اتو  
 نفس اتو مکل طبیعة اتو بر شبا کین در فذلک کل بنتغ دان مکل  
 عناصر دان حیوانات دان نباتات دان جمادات آیت حق تعالی  
 دغن اعتبار مظهرت مکل کث سلله ای سفرت یغ مغات کن  
 تا هن سزید ایتوله سزید دان جکل اد قاعنث آیت در فذلک  
 جملة مکل مظهرت کالفون افیسر اد الله ساله اعتقادت قد  
 مغات کن یغ لاین در فذلک حق تعالی ایستله حق تعالی مکل کث جدیدله  
 ای کافر دان زندق وان قلنا الظاهر فی کل العالم وجود  
 الحق واسمایه فلیس وجوده من حیث هو ظاهر فی کل واحد

مسنقه در قد مریکیت بهو الله ایت منکای قیلک مسنقه  
 فرمان الله تعالی لقد کفر الذین قالوا ان الله ثالث ثلاثة  
 یعنی مسنقه کافره مریکیت مفات ادا الله ایت منکای  
 تیلک افکات مسنقه در قد مریکیت بهو نبی الله عیسی ایتله  
 الله دان لاک قول کات قوم نصاری بهو الله تعالی تورن  
 در قد لاهوت کفد عالم ناسوت یایت لمباکی بغای جادی  
 در قد عالم اجسام مک کبال قول ای کفد لاهوت مک ادا  
 مسکنین فرکتان دان اعتقاد مریکیت کفر مسنقه فرمان الله تعالی  
 لقد کفر الذین قالوا ان الله هو المسيح بن مریم اریث بهو  
 مسنقه کافره مریکیت بغ مفات بهو سن الله ایتله عیسی بن  
 مریم دغر الهم هی بد مان فرمان تولهن یقدا لم قران مسکن  
 فری کج دین انسان دو قوله دو لافن تمفتن بیان مسنقه کات  
 صاحب الزبد قدس الله سره وقد ذکر الله الانسان فی ثمانية  
 وعشرين موضعا وقال انه غلوک یعنی سن دبستکن الله تعالی  
 اکن انسان ایت فد دو قوله دو لافن تمفت مک فرمانن بهو سن  
 انسان ایت مخلوق مک انیله بین انتا فرکتان وجود الله ایت  
 وجود مخلوق دان وجود مخلوق ایت وجود الله دان انسان

مریکیت الندی نیجایه قیاد د کات مریکیت سفرت یغده مکین مک  
 ادا له مریکیت معالرا کن مریکیت اصل الاسلام دان قاکه د سا لیکن  
 کبیکن مذهب دان آم چک د کات مریکیت دغن پناث مکینه الله دان  
 الله ایت کام نید الله د قبول کن اوله کلین مریکیت کن فرکتان مک  
 دلند عکن اوله دریغ د باکل دغدغ یغ بر قوم سفای جاغذ کلینان  
 فرکتان یغ جاغت م دان اعتقاد یغ ضلالت مک د سا مریکیت دغن  
 کثاث بهوش الله تعالی ایت دیوی کام دان وجود کام دان  
 کام د بریت دان وجود ایت جو مک یغده مکین ایت تباد ترلند  
 فد کل بد ماف یغ بچقتان دان تباد تربوت قد کل عارف یغ کامل  
 شهد ان ادا له فرکتان دان اعتقاد مریکیت سفرت فرکتان دان اعتقاد  
 قوم علی الهیه دان اسما علیه درقد قوم رافضی کثاث بهوش  
 حق تعالی ایت تشو لال جاد علی بن ابی طالب کرم الله وجهه  
 دان کفق فرکتان اعتقاد قوم یهودی کثاث بهوشی الله عزیر  
 ایت انق الله سفرت فرمان الله تعالی قالت اليهود عزیر ابن  
 الله یعنی کات یهودی عزیر ایت انق الله دان کفرت فرکتان  
 دان اعتقاد قوم نصاری بهوشی الله عیسی ایت انواله  
 سفرت فرمان الله تعالی وقالت النصاری المسیح ابن الله

ایست دالم وجود کل مخلوقات سرت کثات نیاد موجود هات الله  
 دان لاک داعقاد کنش قد معنی کلیمه لا اله الا الله نیاد وجود کل  
 هات وجود الله مکل دکهند اکث معنات نیاد وجود مکلین و  
 جود الله وجود کل این دان لاک فول کثات کام دغن الله بنفس دان  
 سوجود دان لاک فول کثات بهو الله تعالی کهون ذاتی دان بات  
 کیفیت دان کثات در قد فی هو اداي موجود قد خارج قد میان دان  
 مکان انیل کثات دان اعتقاد کافر یغ بات سمرت کثات شیخ محی  
 الدین ابن عربی قدس الله سره دلم کتاب فتوحات مکیه قد میاکن  
 اعتقاد کل اهل النواص دقول مکلین دان د بطل کثات کن مذهب  
 وجودیه ایت کثات من هنا ایضا نزلت اقام طائفة عن مجرب  
 التحقیق فقالوا ما نتم الا ما نری فجعلت العالم هو الله والله نفس  
 العالم ولبس هذا بمشهد لکونه ما یستحقون به تحقیق اهله فلو تحقیقوا  
 به ما قالوا ذلك یعنی در قد کثات انیل ترکلتیچر اعتقاد سوا قوم  
 در قد جالن یغ سبوت در کارن کثات مرکبت نیاد موجود مکلین  
 بارغیغ کام لیهت مکل جد یکنسپا له عالم ایت الله دان الدایت دیری عالم  
 سکالام اعتقاد این نیاد بتر کارن وجود الله ایت بارغیغ جاد مرکبت  
 دقد ری یعنی وجود الله ایتله یغ منجد یکن مرکبت مکل چطور بتر معرفت

یعنی مراد در قد کثات ایت باب  
 یسیر ان یجیل قد قد دان لاک  
 دلم دان بعث دان بارغ  
 کثات غاشبه قد  
 غفیر الله قد

یعنی مراد کثات ایت باب  
 در قد دان سر دان باو دان هات  
 دان کثات یسیر دان کثات  
 سبکات در قد حقه جسم غاشبه  
 قد غفیر الله قد

مک ادا له وجودیه ایت دو قوم سواة وجودیه یغ موجد  
 کد و وجودیه یغ ملحد سفرت مرجیه ایت دو قوم جو سوات  
 مرجیه مرحوم کد و مرجیه ملعونه مک مرجیه مرحوم ایت  
 بایست مک صحابه رسول الله صلی الله علیه وسلم دان مرجیه  
 ملعونه ایت بایست سواة قوم یغ در فد قوم ترجه قوله دو یغ  
 ضلالت لاک ایس نازک دملک لاک وجودیه یغ موجد ایت  
 بایست مک اهل الصوفی دجد یکن حق تعالی کبریا کیت در فد  
 قوم مریکت دان وجودیه یغ ملحد ایت بایست مک زندیق نفوذ  
 ماله منها ادفون سب و نمای وجودیه ایت وجودیه کارن  
 ادا له نکث دان فرکتان دان اعتقاد مریکت فله وجود الله مک  
 مکارغ کیت کن اعتقاد دان مذہب وجودیه یغ ملحد دان وجودیه  
 یغ موجد سفای کوبد کن انسا را اعتقاد کد واث کات وجودیه یغ  
 ملحد بهو وجود ایت اس بایستوله وجود الله مک وجود الله یغ اس  
 ایت بیاد اای موجود مستقل ندر یغ دافت دبد کن ملیکن  
 دلم کند و غن کلین مخلوقات جو مک ادا له مخلوقات ایت وجود  
 الله دان وجود الله ایت وجود مخلوقات مک عالم ایت الله دان  
 الله ایت عالم بهو ادا له مریکت مایتن وجود الله یغ اس

بایست مک صحابه رسول الله صلی الله علیه وسلم دان مرجیه  
 ملعونه ایت بایست سواة قوم یغ در فد قوم ترجه قوله دو یغ  
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 الله ایت عالم بهو ادا له مریکت مایتن وجود الله یغ اس

این یعنی کلور عالم در قد ذات  
و حق کو اسد دیرین نیاد و حق  
و عبد این حق تعالی  
آنکه بی غایب

ای تربت در قد وجود اله دغن تا اثرت تیا ددغن اختیاس  
حق تعالی سمرت کلور قانس متهاری در قد ذات متهاری مکتیادا  
له کو اس متهاری منهانی قانس سلام اد متهاری اد اله قانس  
دعکین لاک سلام اد ذات اله اد اله عالم تیا د بر چری دان قیاد  
تفکل در قد ذات اله در قد انرب دانغ کفد ابد بر هو بیغ دان  
بر تمو سلام لمات دان لاک قول کثات بهو اله تعالی تیا د کو اس  
اتس کل مسواة دان تیا د کو اس ای منجد یکن مسواة بیغ لاین در قد  
سده کلور در قد اث دان تیا د ای کو اس فد مشو بهکن عالم بیغ سده  
اد این دان لاک قول کثات بهو توجه قال لافه دان توجه قال  
بوم تیا د وجد یکن اله تعالی کن کد واث در قد تیا د کفد اد لاک  
بغا ابدی دان لاک قول کثات بهو منت تولغ کفد اله ای مکتای  
نسان جو کاردن عبد ایستسایس دلم لغه تولغ جو اد فون قایتله  
بر بوعه عبادة ایت منجد یکن دیری سروق دغن اله سیرم کو اس  
جودان لاک قول کثات بهو اله تعالی جو بیغ عاشق دان معشوق  
کن دیرین مکر اد اله کل فرکتان دان اعتقاد مریکت ضلالت لاک  
کفر نعوذ بالله منها افسیل کو کتهویه اعتقاد دان مذهب طائفه  
فلا سفه مکتکت کن قول اعتقاد دان مذهب طائفه وجودیه

اس جو قد معنائ يايتوله ذات حق تعالي مكل مراد در قد حقيقة  
 قد اصطلاح اهل الصوفي ايت يايت الحقيقة ما به الشيء فهو هو  
 ارفايت بغير حقيقة ايت سوات شيء يقد غندي شيء ايت اي اي  
 يعني يارغ سوات شيء بغير جاد اي در قد سواة شيء مكل  
 مسواة شيء ايتوله حقيقة الفات حقيقة فريف ايت كساون  
 دان حقيقة فراه ايت تو كغ دان مراد در قد حقيقة قد اصطلاح  
 منطقين ايت يايت الحقيقة ما يكون الشيء به كالحجوان  
 الناطق بالنسبة الى الانسان ارفايت بغير حقيقة ايت بارغ سواة  
 شيء يقد غندي اي سفرت حيوان ه فاطف دغن نسبة كغ  
 انسان يعني حقيقة انسان ايت هيد في يقبركات مكل يتالم قد  
 اصطلاح منطقين حقيقة مسواة شيء ايت ديكر سواة شيء مكل  
 اختلاف اختيار متكلمين دان اهل الصوفي قد ميا بكن وجود الله  
 دغن عالم ايت اختلاف لفظي جو بكن معنوي سفرت كات او مرغ ليم  
 بلس دغن تغم دو قوله مكل قد معنوي سام جو دان قد لفظي بولان  
 ليين اقبيل كو كتهويله اعتقاد دان مذهب متكلمين دان اهل  
 الصوفي مكل سكارغ كيت كن قول اعتقاد دان مذهب حكما فلاسفه  
 كات حايغه فلاسفه بهو وجود الله دان عالم كدوان قد مكل كن

لین کد واث سفای جاغن فد سکه عوام بهو وجود الله دغن  
وجود عالم ایت سوچو دسقرت اعتقاد قوم ملحد دان نزد یق  
ادفون فداقت اهل الصوفی ایتفون دغن دلیل عقلی دان نقل چی  
لاک دتمبه فول کشف دان نزوق مکرتیکل صریکت دغن مات  
هتین دان دزسات دغن فرسانن بهو وجود ایت اسچو یایستوله  
وجود الله یقتیا کلها تن دغن مات کفال دلم د امرالدنیا این  
دان یغ کلها تن دغن مات کفال ایت یایت عالم یفتیاد ابروچو  
سقرت وجود الله مکرت وجود الله ایت وجود حقیقی لاک مطلق دان  
وجود عالم ایت وجود مجازی لاک مفید ظل دان مکل باکی وجود  
الله مکل ان ظل ایت تیاد دافت دکات الندی وجود دان تیاد دافه  
دکات الندی عدم مطلق درکارن چک دکات الندی وجود  
نسبایی سکتوله ای دغن وجود الله دان چک دکات الندی عدم  
مطلق مکل عدم ایت تیاد ادرسواة شیء جوافون دان عالم ایت  
ادای کلها تن مکل پتال عالم ایت مظهر وجود حق تعالی مکل  
نسبة انما وجود الله دان عالم ایت برسواة فون تیاد دان  
برلیپن فون تیاد کارن عالم ایت مظهر دان مکل مکل حق تعالی  
مکل پتال فدا اصطلاح اهل الصوفی بهو وجود دان حقیقة ایت

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اورغ مراج دغن بالانتراث ايه اس هو جطواد وجود بال تترات  
 بايق كالغون تباد كبلان هان يغ كبلان ايت وجود مراج جودان  
 لاک نول تمثیل بیضا يغ دغن يغ امفوت بیضا يغ قد قتل ص دو وجود  
 تناف تباد دكات الكندي دو وجود کارن بیضا يغ ايت تباد كبلان وجود  
 ث سوال جک تباي اورغ بهو بیضا يغ دغن يغ امفوت بیضا يغ ايه  
 مؤثر فک اتود و جواب بهو بیضا يغ دغن يغ امفوت بیضا يغ ايت  
 مؤثر جود کارن بیضا يغ ايت تباد كبلان وجود ث هان من اداله  
 بیضا يغ ايت مظهر يغ امفوت بیضا يغ جومک سب ایتله دكات اورغ  
 بهو امفوت بیضا يغ دغن بیضا يغ ایت اس تباد دود این تباد  
 لاین مک اداله مقصود دكات متکلمین دان اهل الصوفي ايت سواکا  
 جوتباد برلیسین انشارد و طایفه ايت شمل ان بهو قد اف  
 متکلمین ايت دغن دلیل عقل دان نقل جود تیلکن کفد عالم مک دلیمین  
 ادای موجود يغ محدث لاک براویه م دان دتیلکن دغن مان صرین  
 کفد وجود حق تعالی فون اد موجود يغ قدیم مک دتیلکن دو وجود  
 سوات جایز الوجود کد و واجب الوجود مک جایز الوجود ايت یات  
 مخلوق دان واجب الوجود ايت یات خالق مک اداله نسبة انشار کدوا  
 ايت نسبة خالق دان مخلوق جومک سب ایتله دكات مرکبت برلین

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
 الحمد لله رب العالمين  
 والصلاة والسلام على  
 سيدنا محمد واله الطيبين  
 الطاهرين

عالم ایت اس مکل جدیدله ای کافر کارن کتبی در قد فر کتانی  
 یغذ مکلین اینه بهو وجود الدن دان عالم جاد سواة حقیقه دان  
 سوجود کات اهل الصوفی بهو کام فون قبول له کن اعتقادان  
 وکلتان متکلمین ایت اد فون فد اصطلاح کام بهو وجود ایت اس  
 جویا یتوله ذات الدن تعالی دان عالم ایت نیاد برو وجود دان  
 نیاد لایق و تمای اکنند <sup>دغن نام</sup> وجود کارن ای عدم المحض مکل اقبیل  
 اداله عالم ایت عدم المحض دان وجود حق تعالی ایت وجود المحض  
 مکل مناته جاد سوجود عدم المحض <sup>دغن</sup> وجود المحض حان سن اداله  
 عالم ایت مظهر دان ظل ملک بکل حق تعالی یعنی تحفت پات حق  
 تعالی دان بیغیاع سفته اقام روفی یغ کلیماتن دلم چرمین بدل تمشیل  
 حق تعالی ایت اقام یغ منیلک چرمین دان عالم ایت اقام روفی یغ  
 کلیماتن دلمت مکل وجود حق تعالی <sup>دغن</sup> عالم برلاین فون نیاد دان  
 برسواة فون نیاد کارن برلینستین دان برسواة ایت مفرند اک دو وجود  
 مستقل مندرین مکل اقبیل اداله وجود الدن جو یغ اس دان عالم ایت  
 نیاد برو وجود مکل نیاد الدن جاد برلاین لیکن در قد کارن ایتو لم کام کات  
 وجود الدن <sup>دغن</sup> عالم اس جطواد عالم ایت موجود کلیماتن کال فون تناو  
 نیاد کبلا <sup>دغن</sup> وجودت در کارن ای نیاد برو وجود حقیقی سفته کات

یعنی کلمات برو وجود حقیقی عالم ایت  
 هو اقام یغ منیلک چرمین دان عالم ایت

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محل هارف قد مولفکن اعتقاد کل زندیق می گیتکن دلم رساله  
این اعتقاد دان ملاهی اهفت طایفه یاب متکلمین دانی اصل الصوف  
دان حکما فلاسفه دان وجودیه پنج ملحد قد صابتن وجوه الله و غن  
عالم ایزد برلیننکه اتو بر سواة سمرت یغلاک کن ترست کیت انی محل  
سکارغ کلاهی قد چن کن معنی وجو دایت یایت ذات یعنی کادان  
مسواة شیئی محل ذات ایت ادکلات کلیماتن دغن مات کلمات سمرت  
عالم دان ادکلات تیا دکلیماتن دغن مات کفال متاف صابتن کنده  
عقل دان شرع اتو کشف دان ذوق یایته مرله وجود الله مات متکلمین  
بهو وجود ایت دوفر کار فرام وجود الله کدو وجود عالم محل وجود  
الله ایت واجب الوجود لاک قایم نند مرین دان وجود عالم ایت ممکن  
الوجود یعنی دجد یکن حق تعالی در قد عدم کند وجود خارجی لاک ای  
قایم دغن حق تعالی محل جد یله حقیقه کدوات برلین لیب ننگا دان  
کدوات برلین لیب ننگا کن حق تعالی ایت قدیم لاک مجید یکن دان  
عالم ایت محدث لاک دجد یکن محل پتاله قد اصطلاح مریمکت  
بهو وجود ایت دوفر کار سواة وجو حقیقی کدو وجود مجازی محل  
وجو مجازی ایت ملک بکل وجو حقیقی فک جطو تیا دبرلینن کدوات  
نسبای جد یله بر سواة محل بر فسیاف متاع اعتقاد کن بهو حق تعالی دغن

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عالمی



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ حمدُ الإلهِ هو بُسْمُ  
 حقیق فی بحر نواله کانت الدارات غریق کل فوج فبین بکل الله  
 ایاله یغ مستحق دغن کفین اذ الله کل اروح بر اوله لمعه دارقد ان افکره ان  
 وانعم علیها بجوده التوفیق اولئک من النبیین والصدیقین دان  
 دامکراهین کن مریکت دغن افکره توفیق مریکل ایتوله درقد کل  
 نبی دان عارف باله فحقق محققهم حق التوفیق ومیزنوا الحق  
 من الباطل بالتصديق مک تحقیقکن مریکل ایتوله کن توفیق  
 دغن بیزن تحقیق سرت دیکل کن جان یغ بنزد رقد جان یغ باطل  
 دغن تصدیق وحققوا حقایقهم بالتدقیق فخر روافد علمهم  
 ویتنوا الطريق دان تحقیقکن مریکستوله کل علم حقایق دغن  
 دقیق مک تصنعکن مریکت کل علموت دان پتا کن جان انم فغن  
 حصل له لتوفیق الرقیق تبعهم ولا لصار الملحد والزنادیق  
 مک بر غیاف سفاس بر اوله توفیق نسجای دایکتا له جان کل  
 نبی دان صدیق دان جکیا دایکتا کن اعتقاد مریکت نسجای  
 جدیده ای درقد قوم ملحدان رندیق والصلاة والسلام علی النبی  
 الشفیق وعلی اله وصحبه من اهل الوثیق دان حرمة الله دان سلامت  
 اسن نبی محمد یغ امة فیایغ کن امتن دان اسن کل کلو رکات دان

حجة المصطفى الشيخ الرافعي

كراش

الشيخ نور الدين الرافعي

(نسخة مقسولة ٩٢)

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## APPENDIX II

The significance of the term zindiq

In Islām in medieval times the significance of what is termed by Western scholars and students of Islām as 'heresy' was not only religious, but - depending upon the situation in which it arose - was invariably social and political as well. There is no doubt that the dissensions between political factions had in most cases a religious basis (as in Islām it is difficult to draw a distinction between the political and the religious). Beginning perhaps with examples in the notorious teachings of Ibn Saba' and Ibn Maymūn (q.v. EI) 'heresy' has since been regarded as a threat to undermine Islām and the structure of the Muslim community from within.

It all started when, between the death of the Prophet and the fall of the Umawī Khilāfat, two main groups arose to challenge what may be regarded then as the consensus of opinion of the Community. On the one hand we have the Shī'at 'Alī, which was later to develop during the course of the period into two main trends, one of which was the Mawlā group led by al-Mukhtār, and the other the Shī'ah proper, or that which developed into the Ithnā 'Ashariyyah. From the Mawlā group was to spring the Ismā'ilīs and the Qarmatīs followed later by the Assassins. The Shī'at 'Alī as such was a kind of political party - a healthy opposition party - without religious overtones; fighting for the settlement of the question of succession to the Khilāfat. On the other hand we have the Khawārij, a group which soon developed extremist views and fostered anarchistic tendencies.

The 'Abbāsīs have, so to speak, hitch-hiked to power on the vanguard of the Shī'ah revolution which finally overthrew the Umawīs. They have used the Shī'ah group as a 'cat's paw' to achieve their own ambition - the mastery of the Khilāfat. No sooner had they achieved this than they discarded the Shī'ah group which had then become useless to them and which became instead a danger to their cause for which they were branded as a kind of outlaw. Thus, then, the Shī'ah revolution did not cease; on the contrary, it now grew with greater vehemence, this time to overthrow the 'Abbāsīs who had continued to create revolutionary situations.

The growth of a kind of feudal and military rule in the eleventh century helped greatly to create situations which became ideal breeding grounds for the Ismā'īlīs and the Assassins, whose seductive teachings appealed to the masses to whom they were largely directed. To counteract this state of affairs, the Sunnī state built madrasahs all over the Empire to disseminate the views of the Ahlū'l-Sunnah wa'l-Jamā'ah.<sup>334</sup> This was a time when Ṣūfī brotherhoods arose and al-Ghazzālī wrote his great works.

By the time of the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century the Shī'ah of the Ismā'īlī trend and the Assassins had ceased to become a threat. But the experiences which the Sunnī State and the 'Ulamā' had in past history taught them much about indoctrination

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334 See Taftāzānī's brief account about the People of the Approved Way and the Community, Taftāzānī, pp. 5-10. Also, EI article Sunna and related references therein.

of teachings alien and dangerous to Islām and to the Muslim Community. All such teachings considered as seditious and dangerous have not been labelled as 'heretical' in the true sense of the word, for throughout the entire course of Islamic religious history not one of the words used to denote seditious and dangerous teachings contrary to the spirit of Islām conveyed an identical meaning with the word 'heresy' as it does in Christian religious history. It is a significant fact that, as Lewis has pointed out,<sup>335</sup> the word hartaga or hartūqī or hartīqī as used in modern Arabic literature is a loan-word of European Christian origin.

The first of these words to appear in the course of Islamic religious history denoting a kind of rebel to Islām, is the word bid'ah (q.v. EI), which means 'innovation.' Innovation was then looked upon with suspicion - and rightly so, for by innovation was implied that of the undesirable sort. But as the vicissitudes of time impressed upon the Community the need for adaptation to alien environment and social changes, innovation became gradually distinguished by the Community between the bad, or the undesirable, and the good, or the desirable. From the religious point of view, however, there can be no division of good and bad bid'ah. An innovation is always an innovation - and it is always undesirable in whatever historical period. But from the historical and sociological point of view the meaning underlying the term bid'ah

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<sup>335</sup> Lewis, B., Some observations on the significance of heresy in the history of Islam. *Studia Islamica*, vol. 1, pp. 43-63.

has come to evolve so that distinctions between the good and the bad bid'ah are established. Thus, then, in non-religious matters, it was made possible by the ijmā' (q.v. EI) that what was considered bad innovation at a period of time in the past or present may be considered as good innovation at a period of time in the future - depending of course upon the circumstances and the applicability of that innovation insofar as it would promote the welfare of the Ummah. It should be pointed out that when Lewis said that opposition to a good bid'ah is also a bid'ah<sup>336</sup> the word bid'ah here has a different meaning than it had originally, for there is nothing added to what already forms the consensus of opinion prior to the addition of a good bid'ah. It simply becomes opposition, which means that an addition to what already forms a body of opinion of the Ummah is opposed. There is no new addition. But since what is opposed is good, such opposition is undesirable, and bid'ah here therefore means opposition to what is good and desirable. A Muslim who is guilty of a bad bid'ah is not expelled from membership in the Community and declared outside the pale of Islām. Only when his bid'ah is persistent, excessive, and aggressive is he regarded as such.

Next in chronological order to appear in Islamic religious history is the word ghuluww (q.v. EI), which means 'excessiveness' or tendency to 'exaggerate' - to go beyond the limit, as Ibn Saba's

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336 Op. cit., p. 53.

attitude towards 'Alī illustrates. Such people are referred to as the ghulāt and are regarded as outside the pale of Islām.

The term zindīq comes next. This term is generally translated by Western orientalist as 'heresy'. It would seem that the term, which is of Persian origin, was first applied to the Manichaeans in the Sassānid times. It was applied to the ascetic and unorthodox forms of the Iranian religion by those who upheld orthodoxy. In Islamic times zindīq was also applied to the Manichaeans, but more specifically to those who while outwardly professing Islām were inwardly professing dualist doctrines. A classic example was the case of al-Ḥallāj. Gradually it came to be applied to the unorthodox in general. Unlike bid'ah or ghuluww the charge of zindīq was not just simply a theoretical one as in the case of the former two when all that the 'Ulamā' could do was to condemn the guilty to damnation in the next world. The charge of zindīq brought about practical consequences and one so charged was tried in court by the 'Ulamā' and if found guilty was sentenced to death in a peculiar manner. It has been known that such a dangerous charge had often been levelled against one not really guilty of it, but one whom the accusers wished to liquidate for political or personal reasons. At the same time when zindīq came to denote a Manichaean or a dualist, it also denoted suspicious Ṣūfī doctrines and beliefs, and atheism as well.

Properly speaking, however, the charge against atheists or those who do not believe in any religion at all is denoted by the term mulhid, which appeared in the historical context after zindīq. This means 'deviator' (from the right path). But again, it later came to be almost identified with zindīq and was used against one guilty of propagating and holding subversive doctrines.

From the point of view of Islamic religious history, the terms kāfir and kufr are perhaps nearest the equivalent of the term 'heresy' in Christian religious history. The term kāfir is the active participle of the verb kafara, which conveys the meaning 'to reject as false what is true'. Kāfir denotes the unbeliever and kufr is unbelief. A person guilty of bid'ah, ghuluww, and other forms of sectarian tendencies may still be considered a believer - that is, a Muslim. But a Muslim who ceases to believe in what he is required to believe is a kāfir and is placed outside the pale of Islām. The kāfir is not a member of the Community and he is also considered as a person who does not possess faith (īmān), that is, he is not a Mu'min. However, we find in the writings of the various 'Ulamā' that the term kāfir is loosely hurled about at each other. As such it has no practical effect. But such a past-time, which is known as takfir, became less frequent when Islamic law was systematized and codified, and the 'Ulamā' gradually became unwilling to denounce other Muslims as kāfir. In point of fact there is a ḥadīth prohibiting such behaviour.

As used by Rānīrī in the context in which he vehemently denounces Ḥamzah Faṣṣūrī it seems quite clear that he employs the term zindīq as a convenient portmanteau term of abuse for the suspected 'heresies' of the latter. Ḥamzah is definitely the more learned of the two - at least from his writings - in the understanding and exposition of the Ṣūfī doctrines in question. Furthermore Ḥamzah does not indulge in takfīr as Rānīrī does, and as far as I am aware, Ḥamzah uses the term zindīq perhaps not more than twice in his writings, and even so this he does when referring to the Rawāfiḍ and the Mu'tazilah.

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